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FOREWORD
During the last decade, there has been a shift in the governance of fisheries and coastal resources to
a broader approach that recognizes fisher’s participation, local stewardship, and shared decision-making
in the management of fisheries. Through this process, fishers and resource users are empowered to
become active members of the resource management team, balancing rights and responsibilities, and
working in partnership with government, rather than antagonistically. This approach is called co-
management.
It is becoming increasingly clear that governments, with their finite resources, cannot solve all fishery
and coastal resource problems. Local communities will need to take more responsibility for solving
local problems. In order to do this, however, communities must be empowered and provided with the
resources to make decisions locally, and to take actions that meet local opportunities and problems.
The assistance and support of government will still be needed to achieve these results, although the
role and responsibilities of the government will also need to change. The concept of co-management
has gained acceptance among governments, development agencies and development practitioners as
an alternative fisheries management strategy to the top-down, centralized government management
approach.
The Fisheries Co-management Research Project was the first global study of this management strategy.
It was a unique partnership between the WorldFish Center, the Institute of Fisheries Management, and
national partners in Asia and Africa. The results produced from the project were innovative and wide
ranging. Overall, the project has been instrumental in raising the awareness of co-management strategies
and arrangements among governments, fishers, non-governmental organizations, academic and research
institutions, fisher organizations and other resource stakeholders. A number of development practitioners
have replaced community-based coastal resource management strategies with the broader strategy of
community-based co-management, in part as a result of interactions with the project. The project,
through its publications, training activities and networking, has been instrumental in reshaping
government policies to support co-management.
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Abstract
This report presents the results of a ten-year Fisheries Co-management Research Project in Asia. The
project was a collaboration of the WorldFish Center, the Institute for Fisheries Management (Denmark),
and national research partners in Bangladesh, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, and
Vietnam. Phase 1 ran for five years from 1994 to 1998 and Phase 2 ran for another five years from 1999
to 2003. The project was based on a mutual interest to gain practical experience in research on fisheries
co-management; to evaluate its applicability as a sustainable, equitable and efficient management
strategy; and to develop models for use and adoption by governments, fisheries communities, NGOs
and others. The project has identified the principles and conditions for implementation of fisheries
co-management as a sustainable, equitable and efficient management strategy. The prospects for
successful implementation were also assessed.
Summary
The Fisheries Co-management Research Project had the overall purpose of evaluating the prospects
for the successful implementation of fisheries co-management strategies. The project systematically
and comparatively documented and assessed strategies and processes of fisheries co-management
implementation in Asia, particularly at the national and community levels. This was accomplished largely
through comparative case studies, country research and networking.
The research has shown that co-management provides a strong institutional structure to address
fisheries and coastal resource management. However, the implementation of co-management is costly,
complex and long. An enabling legal, policy and administrative structure from the government is
required to support co-management. There needs to be a true partnership between the resource
users/stakeholders and the government. This project has identified several key factors which communities
with successful community-based co-management possess.
The case studies illustrate that community-based co-management can indeed promote a well managed
fishery that maintains or improves both the quality and quantity of fish stocks and coastal ecosystems.
Living standards of fishers and their families can be improved, and fishers can manage their fishery
with no or limited outside (government) assistance. Fishers can also be empowered to take control
of management and development of the fishery and community. However, there are no guarantees
of success. Co-management will not necessarily work in every community. The chances for success
and sustainability of co-management increase when people are informed, empowered, and are willing
to participate.FISHERIES AND COASTAL RESOURCES CO-MANAGEMENT IN ASIA: SELECTED RESULTS FROM A REGIONAL RESEARCH PROJECT 4
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CHAPTER ONE
Introduction
In 1994, the WorldFish Center*, located in Penang, Malaysia, and the Institute for Fisheries Management
and Coastal Community Development (IFM) at the North Sea Centre in Hirtshals, Denmark, in
collaboration with national research partners (NARS) in several countries in Asian (Philippines, Vietnam,
Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, Bangladesh) and Africa (Malawi, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, South
Africa, Benin, Cote d’Ivoire, Senegal), initiated the ten-year Fisheries Co-management Research Project.
The project was implemented in two phases. Phase 1 ran for five years from 1994 to 1998 and Phase
2 ran for another five years from 1999 to 2003.
The collaboration between the WorldFish Center, IFM, and NARS was based on a mutual interest to
gain practical experience in research on fisheries co-management to evaluate its applicability as a
sustainable, equitable and efficient management strategy; and to develop models for use and adoption
by governments, fisheries communities, NGOs and others. The project was funded by the Danish
International Development Agency (Danida). Additional funding was obtained for project activities
from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the International Development
Research Centre of Canada (IDRC), the Netherlands Development Cooperation, and the Swedish
International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA).
The purpose of this publication is to present a synthesis of the findings from the various research
activities of the project in Asia and the outputs of NARS partners in particular. More specifically, as
stated in the project proposal, “the final product of the research will be the determination of prospects
for and identification of principles and conditions of successful implementation of fisheries co-
management as a sustainable, equitable and efficient management strategy.” This research report
presents the results of the project research activities in Asia over its ten-year life span.
1.1 Project overview
The purpose of this section is to allow the reader to gain an overall understanding of the project in
order to be able to put the various research activities undertaken by the project into perspective, and
to better evaluate its accomplishments, outputs and research results. The two phases will be discussed
separately.
1.1.1 Project objectives and expected benefits
Phase 1 of the project had both a development and an immediate objective (ICLARM 1993). The global
development objective to which the Fisheries Co-management Research Project is to contribute is:
sustainable and equitable management of fisheries in developing countries to meet the nutritive and
economic needs of poor people. The immediate objective of the project is: to have a set of regionally
or nationally applicable fisheries co-management models developed and applied to selected aquatic
resource systems in several countries and pilot sites in Asia and Africa.
* The WorldFish Center (formerly known as the International Center for Living Aquatic Resources Management (ICLARM)) was
headquartered in Manila, Philippines prior to February 2000.FISHERIES AND COASTAL RESOURCES CO-MANAGEMENT IN ASIA: SELECTED RESULTS FROM A REGIONAL RESEARCH PROJECT 8
During Phase 1, the project tested the applicability of the fisheries co-management model as an
alternative fisheries management strategy under varying conditions (political, social, cultural, economic,
biophysical, and technological) worldwide. General principles and propositions that facilitate successful
fisheries co-management were identified and documented at both the national government and
community/fisher organization levels.
The research project established in what situations co-management can be a sustainable, equitable and
efficient management strategy and recommended how it can be successfully implemented. Specific
methodologies and guidelines for implementing fisheries co-management at the national government
and community/fisher organization levels are now available for use by the target beneficiaries. Several
of the partner countries have taken action at both the national government and community/fisher
organization levels to implement fisheries co-management strategies.
The second phase of the project was based on the need to continue with the research activities started
in Phase 1 and to develop new research directions in order to generate more specific information for
policy development and practical applications (ICLARM 1998). The main objective of Phase 2 was to
discern the benefits and weaknesses of the co-management approach in terms of three outcome criteria
– sustainability, efficiency and equity; and to discover under what conditions these benefits and
weaknesses are manifest (IFM/ICLARM-World Fish Center 2001).
1.1.2 Project Strategy
The project strategy for both phases of the project was to conduct research on a variety of aquatic
resource systems and countries around the world (ICLARM 1993, 1998). The selection of various aquatic
resource systems (coastal, coral reef, lake, river/floodplain) and certain countries in which to implement
the project was to test under what conditions fisheries co-management can be an alternative fisheries
management strategy. Asia and Africa were selected as the two regions of focus for both phases of the
project based on priority regions for fisheries research identified by the WorldFish Center’s strategic
plan (ICLARM 1992). The partner countries selected to conduct the project were given priority based
on a number of criteria. These criteria included:
1. number of beneficiaries to be affected by the research results,
2. magnitude of impact on beneficiaries,
3. extent of potential use by NARS and host government,
4. extent to which results would strengthen national programs,
5. interest of NARS and host government in the project,
6. contribution of project results to sustainable, equitable and efficient fisheries resource
management in the country,
7. probability of achieving research objectives, and
8. potential for methodological and paradigm transfer to other countries, NARS and resource
user groups.
Partner countries in Asia during Phase 1 were the Philippines, Vietnam, Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia
and Bangladesh. During Phase 2, Cambodia was also included in the project. Partner countries in Africa
included South Africa, Malawi, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Zambia, Senegal and Benin.CHAPTER ONE • INTRODUCTION 9
The research activities of Phase 1 of the project were conducted through three components (ICLARM
1993):
1. comparative case studies of fisheries co-management;
2. country research; and
3. information exchange.
The first component, comparative case studies, made use of secondary data sources, such as project
reports, research reports, NGO reports, scientific journal articles and other published materials, to gain
insights into approaches, processes, performance, results and impacts of co-management at both the
national government and community levels. This research component has resulted in a publication
by Sen and Raakjaer-Nielsen (1996). The second component, country research, was a comparative
assessment to evaluate and document the approaches and processes of fisheries co-management
implementation at the community/fisher organization level and the performance results, and to examine
the legal, policy and administrative conditions for fisheries co-management at the national government
level. The purpose of the country research was to gain detailed and practical understanding and
experience into the approaches, institutional arrangements, performance, and legal and policy factors
affecting the implementation of fisheries co-management. The country research made use of a variety
of activities including historical reviews of co-management experiences; case study analysis; impact
evaluations of co-management arrangements; hypothesis testing of advantages or benefits of co-
management; government, legal, institutional and policy analysis; pilot sites; and workshops. The
country research was conducted at both the national government and community/ fisher organization
levels, and was done in collaboration with NARS partners. The third component, information exchange,
was a networking and training activity among and between the research partners.
The research activities under Phase 2 had a multi-site, multi-method research design in which comparisons
were made among various co-management programs (IFM/ICLARM-World Fish Center 2001). Three
research strategies were employed with different emphases given the needs of respective partners:
1. case studies used to test hypotheses by making comparisons both between the same case
at different times and between cases;
2. identifying best practices; and
3. special studies that examine methodological or background issues.
A number of hypotheses concerning the advantages of co-management were tested under Phase 2.
These include:
• legitimacy: increased authority of the organization, regulations, management system;
• transaction costs: overall reduction;
• incentives: behavior modification;
• enforcement and compliance: improvement;
• institutional resiliency: flexibility and adaptation of institutional and organizational arrangements;
and
• conflict management: improvement.
A number of cross-cutting issues were tested in Phase 2 including:
• gender: roles in management;• organizational form: most appropriate and effective;
• scale: institutional and organizational arrangements, ecosystem, users
• process: institutional and organizational arrangements, evolution of time (dynamics);
• structure and content of agreements; and
• impact: measurement of short and long term impacts of co-management.
1.1.3 Project research framework
Both phases of the research project made use of a comparative analytical approach, relying on a
common research strategy and framework for use in each partner-country and resource system, in
order to integrate and improve the understanding and implementation of co-management strategies
(ICLARM 1993, 1998).
In Phase 1, an institutional analysis research framework was developed that provided for a structured
approach to examine and document the origin, current status, operation and performance of fisheries
co-management systems. Institutional analysis, which examines how institutional arrangements and
the set of rights and rules by which a community organizes activities affect user behavior and incentives,
provided the basic research framework for studying fisheries co-management institutions. The research
framework was designed to be specific enough to provide guidance in case study settings, yet general
enough for use in a range of situations, and useful in both documentation and implementation of
fisheries co-management systems. This framework was used in all the three research components of
Phase 1. The use of a common framework allowed data to be collected and analyzed in a standardized
format, the results to be compared, and generalizations to be made about fisheries co-management
systems for use within the country and shared with others worldwide.
In Phase 2, however, emphasis was put on relationships between the institutional analysis research
framework, and specifically on the context variables (demographic and political economy; biological,
physical and technical attributes; market attributes; external institutional and organizational arrangements),
the attributes of the co-management process (size, structure, history, embeddedness, representation,
enforcement) and conflict, and certain dependent variables (transactions costs, equity, resilience)
(IFM/ICLARM-World Fish Center 2001). Three hypotheses were developed as areas of investigation
that could add new knowledge to the overall understanding of co-management.
More information on the research framework used in both phases of the project is presented in Chapter
3.
1.2 Data sources
The focus of this publication is the research undertaken by the NARS partners, in some cases working
with WorldFish Center staff, in the Philippines, Vietnam, Thailand, Cambodia, Malaysia, Indonesia, and
Bangladesh over the last ten years. Selected outputs of NARS partners are highlighted. Over fifty
researchers worked with the project and over sixty individual research projects and activities were
undertaken during the life of the project (see Appendix 1 for a list of project publications). The NARS
partners and WorldFish Center staff prepared annual research work plans in order to sequence and
coordinate research activities in each country and the region.
FISHERIES AND COASTAL RESOURCES CO-MANAGEMENT IN ASIA: SELECTED RESULTS FROM A REGIONAL RESEARCH PROJECT 10CHAPTER ONE • INTRODUCTION 11
The research projects and activities include the following:
a) Reviews of community-based coastal resources management and co-management
experiences
Vietnam (Thong et al. 1996; Ministry of Fisheries/VCOCCP/ICLARM 1995; Thong and Thieu
1998)
Philippines (Carlos and Pomeroy 1996)
Indonesia (Nikijuluw 1996a+b)
Thailand (Tokrisna et al. 1998)
Asia (Pomeroy 1995)
b) Case study analysis
Bangladesh (Khan and Apu 1998; Thompson et al. 1998)
Thailand (Masae et al. 1998; Pimoljinda and Boonraksa 2000)
Indonesia (Nikijuluw 1996; Novaczek and Harkes 1998; Novaczek et al. 2001; Susilowati 2000)
Vietnam (Pham and Phung 1999)
Philippines (Pomeroy and Pido 1995; Villavicencio and Baling 1995; Agbayani and Babol 1997;
Katon et al. 1997; Baticados and Agbayani 1998; Katon et al. 1998; van Mulekom and Tria 1999;
Garces and Done 1998).
c) Methodology development (Pido et al. 1996a+b; Agbayani and Babol 1998; Pomeroy et al. 1996;
and Harkes 2001).
d) Hypothesis testing of advantages or benefits of co-management (Kuperan et al. 1996;
Kuperan et al. 1997; Kuperan et al. 1998; Murshed-e-Jahan et al. 1999; Susilowati 1998; Baylon 2002;
Siar et al. 2004; Susilowati 2002; Masae et al. 2002; Siason 2002; Harkes 2001; Fernandez and Carnaje
2002; Nao Thuok et al. 2003; Thompson et al. 2000)
e) Government legal, institutional and policy analysis (University of the Philippines 1996;
Susilowati 1996; Fellizar et al. 1997; Pomeroy and Berkes 1997; Torell 1998; Purwaka and Sunoto
1999; Ehsanul 1999; La Vina 1999)
f) Meeting and workshops (Pomeroy 1994; Foltz et al. 1996; Institute of Fisheries Management
1995; ICLARM 1996; Pido 1996a; Middendorp et al. 1999; Viswanathan et al. 2000; Viswanathan et
al. 2004).
g) Pilot site (ICLARM/SEARCA/SEAFDEC-AQD/Tambuyog 1997).
h) Other publications (Pomeroy and Williams 1994; Sen and Nielsen 1996; Pomeroy 1998; Brown
and Pomeroy 1999; Pomeroy et al. 2000; Pomeroy et al. 2001; Viswanathan et al. 2003; Wilson,
Nielsen and Degnbol 2003; Nielsen et al. 2004; Pomeroy and Rivera-Guieb 2005)
It is important to note that many research outputs from the project, primarily from WorldFish and IFM
staff, have appeared elsewhere in scientific journal articles, books, conference proceedings and other
publications over the last decade. It was felt that it was not necessary to duplicate these outputs in this
publication. It was more important to highlight the outputs of the NARS partners, most of which have
only appeared as project reports and have not been widely circulated.FISHERIES AND COASTAL RESOURCES CO-MANAGEMENT IN ASIA: SELECTED RESULTS FROM A REGIONAL RESEARCH PROJECT 12
1.3 Publication outline
This research report has seven chapters. The first three chapters serve as background information
about the project and about co-management. Starting with chapter four, new information and results
generated from this research project are presented. Following the introductory Chapter 1, Chapter 2
discusses the definition of co-management, the theoretical concepts behind co-management, and its
advantages and disadvantages, as well as the institutional analysis research framework used. Chapter
3 describes the research framework used in the two phases of the project. In implementing the fisheries
co-management project, it became necessary to develop new research methods and to further refine
existing methods. In Chapter 4, four methods for research on co-management - rapid appraisal, process
documentation, impact and performance evaluation, and measuring success are elaborated. In conducting
the research on fisheries co-management, a number of hypotheses concerning the purported advantages
of co-management versus centralized management systems were identified. Five of these hypotheses
– lower transaction costs, improved enforcement and compliance, scaling up, participation, and
institutional resilience – were tested during the research project. The results of the research are
presented in Chapter 5. A summary of a number of co-management case studies from around Asia, all
conducted using the institutional analysis research framework, are presented in Chapter 6. The final
chapter, Chapter 7, is a discussion of lessons learned from the project and the future prospects for
fisheries co-management in Asia.CHAPTER TWO • FISHERIES AND COASTAL RESOURCES CO-MANAGEMENT 13
CHAPTER TWO
Fisheries and Coastal Resources Co-management
This chapter discusses concepts and definitions concerning fisheries and coastal resources co-
management.
2.1 Co-management defined
Cooperative management or co-management can be defined as a partnership arrangement in which
the community of local resource users (fishers), government, other stakeholders (boat owners, fish
traders, boat builders, business people, etc.) and external agents (non-governmental organizations,
academic and research institutions) share the responsibility and authority for the management of the
fishery (Figure 1). Through consultations and negotiations, the partners develop a formal agreement
on their respective roles, responsibilities and rights in management; referred to as “negotiated power”.
Co-management is also called participatory, joint, stakeholder, multi-party, or collaborative management.
Figure 1. Fisheries Co-management is a partnership
Fisheries Co-management is a partnership
Co-management covers various partnership arrangements and degrees of power-sharing and integration
of local (informal, traditional, customary) and centralized government management systems (Figure
2). Fisheries co-management can be classified into five broad types according to the role government
and fishers play (Sen and Nielsen 1996):
Instructive: There is only minimal exchange of information between government and fishers. This type
of co-management regime is only different from centralized management in the sense that the
mechanisms exist for dialogue with users, but the process itself tends to be the government informing
fishers on decisions they plan to make.















































Cooperative: This type of co-management is where the government and fishers cooperate together
as equal partners in decision-making.
Advisory: Fishers advise the government on decisions to be taken and the government endorses these
decisions.
Informative: The government has delegated the decision-making authority to fisher groups who are
responsible for informing government of the decisions made.
It is generally acknowledged that not all responsibility and authority should be vested at the community
level (Box 2.1). The amount and types of responsibility and/or authority that the state level and the
various community levels have will differ, and depend upon country and site-specific conditions. The
substance of this sharing of responsibility and authority will be negotiated between community members
and the government within the boundaries of government policy. Determining what kind of and how
much responsibility and/or authority to allocate to the community level is ultimately a political decision
in which the government will always play a more decisive role. However, the key to co-management
is the negotiation and agreement between the state and non-state actors concerning an important
factor in defining a common and acceptable balance in sharing power and allocating responsibilities.
Figure 2. Co-management integrates local and centralized government management systems
BOX 2.1: Community
The term “community” can have several meanings. Community can be defined geographically by political
or resource boundaries, or socially as a community of individuals with common interests. For example, the
geographical community is usually a village political unit (the lowest governmental administrative unit); a
social community may be a group of fishers using the same fishing gear or a fisher organization. A community
is not necessarily a village, and a village is not necessarily a community. Care should also be taken not to
assume that a community is a homogeneous unit, as there will often be different interests in a community,
based on gender, class, ethnic, and economic variations. Recently, the term “virtual community” or “community
of interest” has been applied to non-geographically based communities of fishers. Similar to the “social
community”, this is a group of fishers who, while they do not live in a single geographical community, use
similar gear or target the same fish species or have a common interest in a particular fishery.CHAPTER TWO • FISHERIES AND COASTAL RESOURCES CO-MANAGEMENT 15
2.2 Co-management as a process
There is no blueprint or model for co-management but rather a variety of arrangements from which
to choose to suit a specific context. Co-management should be viewed not as a single strategy to solve
all problems of fisheries management, but rather as a process of resource management, maturing,
adjusting and adapting to changing conditions over time. A healthy co-management process will change
steadily in response to changes in the level of trust, credibility, legitimacy, and success of the partners
and the whole co-management arrangement. Co-management involves aspects of democratization,
social empowerment, power sharing, and decentralization. Co-management attempts to overcome the
distrust, corruption, fragmentation and inefficiency of existing fisheries management arrangements
though collaboration. Co-management is adaptive; that is, through a learning process, information is
shared among partners, leading to continuous modifications and improvements in management.
Through co-management, the partners actively contribute and work together on fisheries management.
They share the costs and benefits and the successes and failures.
Although regulations are used, co-management is not a regulatory technique. It is a participatory
management strategy that provides and maintains a forum or structure for action on empowerment,
rule making, conflict management, power sharing, social learning, dialogue and communication, and
development among the partners. Co-management is a consensus-driven process of recognizing
different values, needs, concerns and interests involved in managing the resource. Partnerships, roles
and responsibilities are pursued, strengthened and redefined at different times in the co-management
process, depending on the needs and opportunities, the legal environment, the political support,
capacities of partners, and trust between partners. The co-management process may include formal
and/or informal organizations of fishers and other stakeholders.
The establishment and operation of co-management can be complex, costly, time-consuming, and
sometimes confusing. Research has shown that it may take three to five years to organize and initiate
activities and interventions at the community level. It will also take this time for the partners to address
concerns about legitimacy, trust, accountability and transparency.
Co-management can be considered as a middle course between the government’s concern about social
efficiency and equity and local concerns for active participation and self-regulation. Co-management
involves a formal or informal agreement among partners to share power and to share the right to
manage. Co-management can serve as a mechanism not only for fisheries management but also for
community, economic and social development as it promotes fisher and community participation in
solving problems and addressing needs. In some cases, co-management may be simply a formal
recognition of a fisheries management system that already exists; some informal and customary
community-based management strategies are already in place, operating side-by-side with formal state-
level management strategies.
2.3 Stakeholder involvement
Other than fishers, stakeholders (individuals, groups or organizations who are in one way or another
interested, involved or affected (positively or negatively) by a particular action) that derive economic
benefit from the resource (for example, boat owners, fish traders, business suppliers, police, politicians,
consumers) should also be considered in co-management (see Section 4). These stakeholders often
hold considerable political and/or economic influence in the community and over resource use andmanagement. A proper balance of representation among stakeholders will prove crucial to the success
of co-management (Box 2.2). A central question, however, is which stakeholders should be represented
and involved and how those representatives should be chosen. While it is useful to have representation
of all stakeholders, a line must be drawn or else the process will break down from the representation
of too many interests. As will be discussed in Section 5, stakeholder analysis can help to identify those
stakeholders who should be included in co-management. This question can be partially answered by
determining the spatial scale at which co-management should operate. The best opportunity for co-
management seems to occur at the local or “community” scale (although national level fisheries advisory
bodies to government can also be effective).
Box 2.2: Community and stakeholders
The term “community” tends to abstract the diversity of interests among different groups of people.
For example, some “community consultations” are mainly attended by men but the results are
considered as the output of the “community.” The invisibility of women, especially in fisheries, is
disregarded because fisheries is often viewed in a limited sense, i.e. mainly from the capture of marine
or aquatic produce. While women rarely fish, they play important roles in pre- and post-production
activities in fisheries.
The term “stakeholders” could aggregate people too, with disregard for differential needs and
interests. Stakeholders that only include the direct users of the coastal resources is a limiting
conception. The non-recognition of women as direct users because they are not fishers (in the
traditional sense) has resulted in their limited access, participation and benefits to coastal resource
management projects and similar intervention focused on fisheries. The 1998 Philippine Fisheries
Code has an initial recognition of women’s interests in fisheries development even though it is limited
in providing a single-seat for a women’s organization in the fisheries council and still lacks an
appreciation of women-specific issues in the agenda of the council. More work is definitely needed
to better understand the contributions of women to fisheries.
Source: Tanyang, Gaynor. 2001. Women in Fisheries: A Review of Limited Literature. A paper commissioned by the NGOs for Fisheries
Reform for the Workshop on Fisheries and Gender held on 25-26 September 2001.
2.4 Equity and social justice
Through co-management, equity and social justice in fisheries management are sought. Equity and the
equitable sharing of power among and between government, fishers and other stakeholders in a
community are often thorny issues in co-management. These issues are usually visible along social and
economic divides in a given community, such as gender roles. Those fishers who will receive the costs
(and benefits) of management and regulation need to have a voice in decision-making about fisheries
management. Equity and social justice is brought about through empowerment and active participation
in the planning and implementation of fisheries co-management. Responsibility means fishers have a
share in the decision-making process and bear the costs and benefits of those decisions. The theme
of co-management is that self-involvement in the management of the resource will lead to a stronger
commitment to comply with the management strategy and regulations. The mutuality of interests and
the sharing of responsibility among and between partners will help to narrow the distance between
resource managers and fishers, bringing about closer compatibility of the objectives of management.
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Co-management is based on the common property theory (Box 2.3). Co-management provides for the
collective governance of common property resources. Common property regimes are forms of
management based on a set of individually accepted rights and rules for the sustainable and interdependent
use of collective goods. A collective good is defined as a resource that is managed and controlled by
a group of users. A common property regime is composed of a recognized group of users, a well-
defined resource that the group uses and manages, and a set of institutional arrangements for use of
the resource. In some situations, the group may formalize the institutional arrangements with an
organizational structure for management. Common property represents private property for the group
of co-owners (Gibbs and Bromley 1989).
BOX 2.3: Property rights regimes
The literature on property rights identifies four ideal analytical types of property rights regimes:
• State property: with sole government jurisdiction and centralized regulatory controls;
• Private property: with privatization of rights through the establishment of individual or
company-held ownership;
• Communal property: in which the resource is controlled by an identifiable community of
users or collectively, and regulations are made and enforced locally; and
• Open access: absence of property rights.
In reality, many marine and coastal resources are held under regimes that combine the characteristics
of two or more of these types. The four property rights regimes are ideal and analytical types; they
do not exist in the real world. Rather, resources tend to be held in overlapping combinations of these
four regimes. Strictly speaking, pure communal property systems are always embedded in state
property systems and state law, deriving their strength from them. Resource managers cannot function
effectively unless they know the property rights regime they are dealing with.
Source: Bromley 1991
Common property resources share two key characteristics (Ostrom 1991). First, they are resources for
which exclusion (or control of access) of potential users is problematic. Second, the supply is limited,
that is, consumption by one user reduces its availability to others. It is also important to make a
distinction between a resource unit and a resource system. A resource unit (what individuals take from
the resource system such as fish) is not jointly used while the resource system itself, the fishery, is
subject to joint use.
Co-management is a governance arrangement located between pure state property and pure communal
property regimes. It should be noted that while state law can enforce or strengthen communal property,
it might not always do so. The level of help from the state will depend on its willingness to support
communal property systems.
2.6 Institutional arrangements and collective action
Common property regimes as collective resource management systems have been shown to develop
when a group of individuals are highly dependent on a resource and when the availability of the
resource is uncertain or limited (Runge 1992). If the resource problem is repeatedly experienced, such
as low or no catch, and if it exists within a single community of users, the fishers are likely to develop
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a collective institutional arrangement to deal with the problem. Institutional arrangements are sets of
rights the fishers possess in relation to the resource and the rules that define what actions they can
take in utilizing the resource. In the face of uncertainty in resource availability, fishers are more willing
to group together to trade-off some benefit from individual use of the resource for the collective
assurance that the resource will be used in a more equitable and sustainable manner (Gibbs and
Bromley 1989). Institutions, through rights and rules, provide incentives for the group members to
take certain actions to achieve a desired outcome. Institutional arrangements require an investment
of time on the members’ part to build. Coordination and information activities are initial aspects of
building institutions. The transaction process of developing institutions will have costs. These transaction
costs can be defined as the costs of: (1) obtaining information about the resource and what users are
doing with it; (2) reaching agreements with others in the group with respect to its use; and (3) enforcing
agreements that have been reached. For common property regimes, these costs are part of the collective
decision-making process.
An individual member of the group relies on reciprocal behavior from other members of the group
regarding their adherence to the agreed upon rules for management. An individual’s choice of behavior
in a collective action (action taken by a group - either directly or on its behalf through an organization
- in pursuit of members perceived shared interests) will depend upon how he or she weighs the benefits
and costs of various alternatives and their likely outcomes. An individual’s choices are often affected
by limited information that leads to uncertainty and by the level of opportunistic behavior (taking
advantage of a situation in your own self-interest so as to get the benefit while bearing less of the cost)
that individual resource users can expect from other resource users. Individuals also have differing
discount rates (the value people put on the future benefits from the resource versus today); many
poor fishers, for example, attributing less value to benefits that they expect to receive in the future,
and more value to those expected in the present (Ostrom 1991).
In some situations, individuals may have incentives to adopt opportunistic strategies to circumvent the
rules and to obtain disproportionate benefits at the cost of others. Three types of opportunistic behavior
may occur: (1) free riding, (2) corruption, and (3) rent seeking. Free riders (holding back on one’s
contribution so as to get the benefit while bearing less of the cost) respond to incentives to engage
in other activities while other members of the group work. Corruption can occur when incentives exist
for rules to be changed for an individual through, for example, the provision of illegal payments. Rent
seeking (the gaining of excess profits from the resource) can occur when an individual’s assets, such
as property rights, increase in value through special advantages (Ostrom 1992; Tang 1992). The
imperative of the common property regime is to establish institutional arrangements that reduce or
minimize transaction costs and counteract opportunistic behavior.
The principal problem faced by group members of a common property regime is how to organize
themselves. That is, how to change from a situation of independent action to one of collective action
and coordinated strategies to obtain greater joint benefits and reduce joint harm. A sense of “commonality”,
commitment and compliance must be established for the collective good. The collective group must
overcome two broad classes of problems. The first, call appropriation problems, is concerned with
how to allocate the resource units (i.e. fish) in an economically efficient and equitable manner among
the resource users. The second, called provision problems, is focused on behavioral incentives to
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Collective action does not occur where there is no organization that has authority to make decisions
and to establish rules over the use of the resource. Note that institutions are not organizations.
Organizations put into effect institutional arrangements (Bromley 1991). There can be a variety of
organizational forms for governing the resource that may range from a government agency or enterprise
to the fishers themselves. The common property regime will need to establish an agenda and goals
to be achieved. This may include an identification of the problem or issue to be addressed, management
and adjudication. The authority system to ensure that fishers’expectations are met is normally inherent
in the organization.
However, membership within common property regimes is not always equal. Some members may have
fewer or lesser rights than others. Access to the resources, for example, may change or rotate for
members through the year. Corresponding duties may or may not vary accordingly. The rights and
duties of members of the group must be clearly specified.
Collective action entails problems of coordination that do not exist in other resource regimes, such
as private property. In order to organize the harvesting, for example, fishers must develop rules to
establish how rights are to be exercised. Rules give substance to rights, structure a situation, define
the behavior of the group’s members, and reduce conflicts. Rules may create different incentive
structures that affect cooperation or conflict among fishers (Tang 1992). The type of rules that are
devised will depend upon the severity of the problem the fishers face, the level of information they
possess, socio-cultural traditions, the extent of the bundle of rights they hold, the level of opportunistic
behavior, and the ease with which actions can be monitored and enforced. Rules require, permit or
forbid some actions or outcomes. Rules provide stability of expectations, and efforts to change rules
can rapidly reduce their stability (Ostrom 1991).
The institutions and rules the fishers use may not always be the same as formal laws. The fishers may
develop institutions and rules to meet their needs that are not legitimized by government.
For institutional arrangements to be maintained over time, it is important to develop workable procedures
for monitoring the behavior of fishers, enforcing against non-conforming behavior with sanctions, and
settling conflicts. The ease and costliness of monitoring rules devised to organize the fishing activity
depend upon the physical nature of the resource, the rules-in-use, and the level of compliance with
the rules (Ostrom 1990). The number of times that non-compliance must be measured affects the cost
of monitoring. The ease and cost of monitoring will depend upon whether the fishers can monitor
compliance themselves while fishing or through self-monitoring incentives, or if they must establish
more elaborate arrangements or engage external authorities.
Fishers who violate the rules need to have sanctions imposed upon them. What constitutes an effective
sanction will vary depending upon the nature of the group of fishers. In most cases, sanctions are likely
to increase with the severity of the offense (Ostrom 1992).
Conflicts may arise within the common property regime and between users. The intensity and frequency
of conflicts are likely to be closely related to the perceived relative scarcity of the resource. Conflict
can arise due to several factors including: (1) absence of recognized rules, (2) divergence in the
interpretation of the rule, and (3) outright trespass of a rule. Part of the institutional process must
include a mechanism for discussing and resolving what is and is not a rule violation and how to settle
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effective, the fisher must have a stake in the institutional processes and be involved in monitoring and
enforcement (Townsend and Wilson 1987).
Common property regimes and their associated institutional arrangements need to be dynamic in
order to adjust to new opportunities, internal growth, externalities, and institutional dissonance (Ostrom
1992). Institution building is a long-term process and often is based on trial and error. Allocation rules,
for example, may need to change as a result of poor compliance. The structuring of institutions must
be an ongoing process to meet the changing conditions.
Whether or not local, self-governing institutions can be developed is often dependent upon governmental
policies. In countries that do not recognize the rights of local community organizations or do not create
opportunities for communities to organize themselves in a de facto manner, it is more difficult for
fishers to successfully find solutions to collective action problems. Many governments are not willing
to give up management authority over resources or do not believe that self-governing organizations
can be successful. There is no one single answer for how to resolve these differences.
2.7 Community-based management
Community-based management (CBM) is a central element of co-management. There is some debate
over the similarities and differences between co-management and CBM. Community-based resource
management, as explained by Korten (1987), includes several elements: a group of people with common
interests, mechanisms for effective and equitable management of conflict, community control
andmanagement of productive resources, local systems or mechanisms for capture and use of available
resources, broadly distributed participation in control of resources within the community, and local
accountability in management. Sajise (1995) has defined community-based resource management
(CBRM) as “a process by which the people themselves are given the opportunity and/or responsibility
to manage their own resources; define their needs, goals, and aspirations; and to make decisions
affecting their well-being.” Sajise further states that “CBRM as an approach emphasizes a community’s
capability, responsibility and accountability with regard to managing resources. It is inherently evolutionary,
participatory and locale-specific and considers the technical, sociocultural, economic, political and
environmental factors impinging upon the community. CBRM is basically seen as community
empowerment for resource productivity, sustainability and equity.”
According to Ferrer and Nozawa (1997), “community-based coastal resource management (CBCRM)
is people-centered, community-oriented and resource-based. It starts from the basic premise that
people have the innate capacity to understand and act on their own problems. It begins where the
people are, i.e., what the people already know, and builds on this knowledge to develop further their
knowledge and create a consciousness.”
They further state that “… it strives for more active people’s participation in the planning, implementation
and evaluation of coastal resources management programs. CBCRM allows each community to develop
a management strategy that meets its own particular needs and conditions, thus enabling a greater
degree of flexibility and modification. A central theme of CBCRM is empowerment, specifically the
control over and ability to manage productive resources in the interest of one’s own family and
community. It invokes a basic principle of control and accountability which maintains that control over
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Fellizar (1994) writes, “CBRM can be looked at in various ways. It can be a process, a strategy, an
approach, a goal or a tool. It is a process through which the people themselves are given the opportunity
and/or responsibility to manage their own resources; define their needs, goals and aspirations; and
make decisions affecting their well-being. A strategy for achieving a people-centered development,
CBRM has a decision-making focus in which the sustainable use of natural resources in a given area
lies with the people in the local communities. CBRM is an approach through which communities are
given the opportunity and responsibility to manage in a sustained way the community resources, define
or identify the amount of resources and future needs, and their goals and aspirations, and make
decisions affecting their common well-being as determined by technical, sociocultural, economic,
political and environmental factors. It is a tool that facilitates the development of multilevel resource
management skills vital to the realization of potentials of the community. Also, CBRM stands for people
empowerment and achieving equity and sustainability in natural resource management. The key
concepts are community, resources, management, access and control over resources, viable organizations
and availability of suitable technology for resource management and utilization.”
Rivera (1997) states that the CBCRM approach has several characteristics. It is consensus-driven and
geared toward achieving a balance of interests. The emphasis is on communities and at its core is the
community organization. It is a process of governance and political decision-making and it is geared
toward the formation of partnerships and power sharing. Rivera writes, “It can be argued that CBCRM
is a politically negotiated process of making decisions on the ownership, control and overall policy
directions of coastal resources. Questions of resource allocation, distribution of resource benefits and
management arrangements among stakeholders will always have to be included. Moreover, CBCRMs
central concern is the empowerment of groups and social actors and a sense of self-reliance at the
micro-level that stimulates a more synergistic and dynamic linkage to the meso- and macro-levels.
Further, it can be argued that CBCRM is the route to co-management. It is maintained that power issues
are central to the formation of co-management schemes. Hence, partnerships between government
and communities should take careful consideration of the capacities of communities in making and
sustaining these partnerships.” Rivera states that in the Philippines, much of the work of non-governmental
organizations (NGO) on CBCRM can really be considered as co-management. Co-management is
referred to by the NGOs as tripartite formation between the government, the community and the NGO.
NGOs also refer to co-management as “scaling-up”, i.e. the recognition that the state cannot be ignored
in sustaining local actions. The scaling-up efforts of NGOs include project replication, expansion of the
geographic scale of management efforts (i.e. single community to multi-jurisdictional), building grassroots
movements, and influencing policy reform.
2.8 Community-based management (CBM) and co-management
The above definitions of community-based resource management show that while there are many
similarities between co-management and CBM, there are differences in the focus of each strategy. These
differences center on the level and timing of government participation in the process. CBM is people-
centered and community-focused, while co-management focuses on these issues plus on a partnership
arrangement between the government and the local community of resource users. The process of
resource management is organized differently too. Co-management has a broader scope and scale than
CBM with a focus both inside and outside the community. The government may play a minor role in
CBM; co-management, on the other hand, by definition includes a major and active government role.22
Co-management often addresses issues beyond the community level, at regional and national levels,
and of multiple stakeholders, and allows these issues, as they affect the community, to be brought
more effectively into the domain of the community. CBM practitioners sometimes view the government
as an external player and adversary, to be brought into the process only at a late stage, if at all. This
can lead to misunderstandings and lack of full support from the government. Co-management strategies,
on the other hand, involve government agencies, resource managers and elected officials early and
equally, along with the community and stakeholders, developing trust among the participants.
When CBM is considered an integral part of co-management, it can be called community-based co-
management. Community-based co-management includes the characteristics of both CBM and co-
management; that is, it is people-centered, community-oriented, resource-based, and partnership-
based. Thus, community-based co-management has the community as its focus, yet recognizes that
to sustain such action both a horizontal link (across the community) and a vertical one (with external
agents outside the community organizations and institutions, such as the government) are necessary.
Community-based co-management is most often found in developing countries because of their
community’s need for overall economic development and social empowerment, in addition to resource
management.
One variation of community-based co-management is traditional or customary co-management. Such
systems are or were used to manage coastal fisheries in various countries around the world. Existing
examples in Asia and the Pacific have been documented over a wide discontinuous geographical range
(Ruddle 1994). Many of these systems play a valuable role in fisheries management and will be useful
into the future, locally and nationally. Traditional or customary co-management is a formal recognition
of the informal systems as done, for example, in Vanuatu and Fiji. Co-management can serve as a
mechanism to legally recognize and protect these traditional and customary systems and to specify
authority and responsibility between the community and the government. It also involves a definition
of shared powers and authority.
Stakeholder-centered co-management seems to be more common in developed countries, where the
emphasis is to get the users participating in the resource management process. It can best be characterized
as government-industry partnership that involves user groups in the making of resource management
decisions. This category of co-management focuses on having fishers and other stakeholders represented
through various organizational arrangements in management. Unlike community-based co-management,
little or no attention is given to community development and social empowerment of fishers. Examples
of stakeholder-centered co-management can be seen in several countries in Northern Europe and
North America (Nielsen and Vedsmand 1995; McCay and Jentoft 1996).
It should be noted that co-management and integrated coastal management (ICM) share many similarities
such as the coordination of various stakeholders at different levels and an active role of the government
(Christie and White 1997).
2.9 Advantages and disadvantages
The potential advantages of co-management include:
1. A more transparent, accountable and autonomous management system.
2. A more democratic and participatory system.
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3. More economical than centralized management systems, requiring less to be spent on
management administration and enforcement, in the long run.
4. Through involvement in management, fishers take responsibility for a number of managerial
functions.
5. Makes maximum use of indigenous knowledge and expertise to provide information on
the resource base and to complement scientific information for management.
6. Improved stewardship of aquatic and coastal resources and management.
7. Management is accountable to local areas. Fishing communities are able to devise and
administer management plans and regulatory measures that are more appropriate to local
conditions. (Localized solutions to local problems).
8. By giving the fishers a sense of ownership over the resource, co-management provides a
powerful incentive for them to view the resource as a long-term asset rather than to discount
its future returns.
9. Various interests and stakeholders are brought together to provide a more comprehensive
understanding of the resources.
10. Since the community is involved in the formulation and implementation of co-management
measures, a higher degree of acceptability, legitimacy and compliance to plans and regulations
can be expected.
11. Community members can enforce standards of behavior more effectively than bureaucracies
can.
12. Increased communication and understanding among all concerned can minimize social
conflict and maintain or improve social cohesion in the community.
Despite all these advantages, co-management has several disadvantages and problems, including:
1. It may not be suitable for every fishing community. Many communities may not be willing
or able to take on the responsibility of co-management.
2. Leadership and appropriate local institutions, such as fisher organizations, may not exist
within the community to initiate or sustain co-management efforts.
3. In the short-run, there are high initial investments in time, financial resources and human
resources to establish co-management.
4. For many individuals and communities, the incentive(s) – economic, social, and/or political
– to engage in co-management may not be present.
5. The risks involved in changing fisheries management strategies may be too high for some
communities and fishers.
6. The costs for individuals to participate in co-management strategies (time, money) may
outweigh the expected benefits.
7. Sufficient political will may not exist to support co-management.
8. Unease of political leaders and government officials to share power.
9. The community may not have the capacity to be an effective and equitable governing
institution.
10. Actions by user groups outside the immediate community may undermine or destroy the
management activities undertaken by the community.
11. Particular local resource characteristics, such as fish migratory patterns, may make it difficult
or impossible for the community to manage the resource.
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12. The need to develop a consensus from a wide range of interests may lengthen the decision-
making process and result in weaker, compromised measures.
13. There may be shifts in “power bases” (political, economic, social) that are not in the best
interests of all partners.
14. There are those who feel that co-management is too costly and time-consuming and that
other alternatives, with stricter regulations, may be better.
15. There is always a possibility of unbalanced and inequitable sharing of power between the
government and communities and the use of co-management by some political leaders
solely for their own purposes.
FISHERIES AND COASTAL RESOURCES CO-MANAGEMENT IN ASIA: SELECTED RESULTS FROM A REGIONAL RESEARCH PROJECT25
CHAPTER THREE
Analysis of Co-management Arrangements in Fisheries and Coastal Resources:
A Research Framework
Introduction
The research in both Phase 1 and 2 of the project was guided by the institutional analysis research
framework that was developed by staff from ICLARM and IFM (ICLARM/IFM 1996). The purpose for
having a common analytical framework was to enable comparison between the different research
activities of the project and the activities in each country. This allowed data to be analyzed in a systematic
way and permitted generalizations to be made about conditions that facilitate successful co-management.
The original research framework was developed under Phase 1 and modified for use in Phase 2. This
chapter presents a discussion on the research framework as used in both phases of the project.
3.1 Institutional analysis
In conducting research on coastal resources co-management, the interest is in understanding how
rules affect the behavior of the resource users and other stakeholders, as well as the outcomes achieved.
Institutional analysis provides the framework for the research. It focuses on the institutional arrangements,
the set of rights and rules by which a group of resource users and the government organize resource
governance, management and use in collective action situations. The purpose of institutional analysis
is to separate the underlying rules (institutions) from the strategy of the players (individuals and
organizations). The analysis examines how institutional arrangements affect user behavior and incentives
to coordinate, cooperate and contribute in the formulation, implementation and enforcement of
management regimes 1. When carrying out institutional analysis, it is also important to examine some
aspects of organizations because their strategies can influence, or lead to change, in institutions.
3.1.1 Institutions
Institutions constitute the central element in co-management analysis. There are different definitions
of institutions, depending on the discipline of social science. Political scientists, influenced by rational
choice and game theory traditions, view institutions as “frameworks of rules, procedures and
arrangements”, or “prescriptions about which actions are required, prohibited, or permitted” (Powell
and DiMaggio 1991). The new institutional economists, particularly economic historians, contend that
“institutions are regularities in respective interactions, customs and rules that provide a set of
incentives and disincentives for individuals”. The organizational economists conceive institutions
as “governance structures, social arrangements geared to minimize transaction costs” (ibid. p 8).
From a sociological perspective, institutions are: “a system of norms that regulate the relations of
individuals to each other, and define what the relations of individuals ought to be” (Scott 1995).
In this research framework, institutions are: “the rules of the game in a society; the humanly devised
constraints that shape human interactions, and are affected by social, cultural, economic and
political factors”. By adding “cultural factors” among the list of factors that affect the institutions, this
definition is a slightly modified version of North’s (1990).
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1 It should be noted that not every detail of institutional analysis is discussed in this paper. The reader is encouraged to make use of
the publications in the reference list for more specific discussions of several aspects of institutional analysis.26
Berger and Berger (1972) have identified five basic characteristics of an institution: (i) Externality: an
institutions is experienced as having external reality, that is, an institution is something outside the
individual, something real in a way different from the reality of the individual’s thoughts, feelings or
fantasies; (ii) Objectivity: an institution is perceived as possessing objectivity; (iii) Coerciveness: an
institution has coercive power - the fundamental power of an institution over the individual is precisely
that it is objectively there and that it can not be wished away; (iv) Moral authority: an institution does
not simply maintain itself by coercive power; it claims the right to legitimacy; and (v) Historicity: an
institution has a history.
Institutions can either be formal or informal and may be created or evolve over time. Depending on
the situation, the formal rules may be in written form and the informal ones may not. The nature of
rules can further be explained by the use of an iceberg analogy. The top, visible part of the iceberg can
be taken as the formal and written regulations, whereas, the lower part of the iceberg, which is not
visible but exists, constitutes the informal and unwritten rules. Both formal and informal codes may
be violated and therefore, punishments are enacted. Whether they can be enforced, the cost of
enforcement, and the severity of the punishment then determine the essential part of the functioning
of institutions.
3.1.2 Organizations
Organizations are groups of individuals bound by some common factors to achieve particular objectives.
The origin of organizations and how they evolve is influenced by the institutional framework and, in
turn, organizations influence how the institutional framework evolves. Organizations are created for
specific objectives and, in the course of attempting to accomplish their objectives, they initiate the
process of institutional changes. Organizations can be political such as a local council, economic such
as a cooperative, social such as a church, or educational such as a school.
North (1990) used the analogy of a football game to describe institutions and organizations. The rules
of the game are institutions, some of which are formal and written, while others are in a form of
unwritten codes of conduct, which underlie and supplement the formal rules. In this analogy, the
football team is the organization. The main point to note here is that, in an organization, there exist
both formal and informal institutions.
Culture constitutes the structural environment and makes organizations possible and meaningful. In
organizational theory, culture has for a long time been treated as an independent variable. Max Weber
was one of the first to examine the emergence of rational legal rules, which he considered essential
to support the development of organizations (Scott 1995). Thus, organization is a cultural phenomenon
that varies according to a society’s path or stage of development. Based on this, it might be an ethno-
centric ideological stand on the part of the industrialized Western world to regard organizations at the
local level (village level), as implied in the co-management model, as a universal panacea for improved
fisheries management. Modernization, development and formal organization are products of a specific
Western epistemological and institutional tradition.
3.1.3 Rights and rules
The terms "rights" and "rules" are often used interchangeably in referring to the uses of natural
resources. "Rights" refer to particular actions that are authorized (Ostrom 1990, Bromley 1991). A right
is a claim to a benefit stream that is consciously protected, in most cases by the state. Rights define
the uses that are legitimately viewed as exclusive and there are penalties for violating those rights. The
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specification of a right does not define how the right is to be exercised. How rights are exercised is
defined by “rules”. Rules define specifically what acts are required, permitted, and forbidden in exercising
the authority provided by the right. For every “right” that an individual holds, rules exist that authorize
particular actions in exercising the right. For example, a right provides the authority for a fisher to
operate on a specific fishing ground. How the fisher exercises that right through the fishing activity is
specified by rules that may dictate the type of fishing gear used or the time of year when the gear can
be used. Thus, rules specify both rights and duties. The important aspect of rules in terms of institutional
analysis is that they may create different incentives that affect cooperation among users. The more
complete the set of rights, the less exposed the resource users are to the actions of others, and the
less risk the users face in organizing themselves into groups (Ostrom 1990).
Schlager and Ostrom (1993) distinguish between different types of rights:
a) Access right: the right to enter a defined physical property, e.g. participate in the fishery.
b) Withdrawal right: the right to obtain the "products" of a resource, e.g. catch a certain amount of
fish.
c) Management right: the right to devise operational-level rules of withdrawal.
d) Exclusion right: the right to devise operational-level rights of access.
e) Transfer right: the right to sell or lease all or part of the above.
The sources of the rights of access, withdrawal, management, exclusion and transfer are varied. These
rights may originate through a government that explicitly grants rights to resource users. These de jure
rights are given formal and legal recognition. Rights may also originate through resource users. The
government does not usually recognize such indigenous or de facto rights, devised and enforced by
the users. These two types of property rights may overlap, complement or conflict with each other.
While de facto rights may eventually be given recognition by the government, until they are formally
legitimized, they are less secure than de jure rights (Schlager and Ostrom 1993). While most authorities
tend to ignore de facto rights, many have proven to be efficient and equitable.
Rules are defined by authority relationships that specify who decides what in relation to whom. Ostrom
(1992) identifies three levels of rules that are all closely linked:
1. Operational rules govern and regulate resource use (e.g. fishing regulations). Operational rules
directly affect the day-to-day decisions made by the users (e.g. fishers) concerning when, where
and how to harvest (fish); who should monitor the actions of others and how; what information
must be exchanged or withheld, and what rewards or sanctions will be assigned to different
combinations of actions and outcomes. Operational rules can be formal (written, legitimized) or
informal (unwritten customary/traditional). In both circumstances, those to whom they apply
understand them.
2. Collective choice rules are rules about how the resources and their exploitation should be managed,
e.g. in a co-management institutional set-up. Such institutional arrangements are needed to adjudicate
conflicts, enforce decisions, formulate and change operational rules, detect and sanction against
rule violation, and hold officials accountable. In a broad sense, collective-choice rules include
qualifications for participation in the management organization and whether membership is
compulsory. They may state what proportion of the group of resource users must agree before a
rule may be adopted. Of critical importance are the arrangements for monitoring and enforcing
compliance with the operational rules and for settling disputes.
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There may be multiple levels of collective-choice entities depending on the situation. In some
situations, only one entity, e.g. a national fishers' association may be constituted to adopt and
enforce its own collective-choice and operational rules. In other circumstances, multiple collective-
choice entities at the national, regional and/or local levels, may subject resource users to multiple
sets of operational rules. For example, national-level regulations may overlap with local-level
regulations that may also overlap with customary or traditional practices. As a consequence, issues
of coordination and control must be addressed when multiple levels of collective-choice entities
are in place (Tang 1992).
3. Constitutional-choice rules determine who is eligible to participate in the system and establish the
process by which collective-choice rules are created, enforced and modified. Constitutional-choice
rules include, for example, the national legislation that establishes the national administrative and
management structure, which legitimizes co-management arrangements.
Operational or working rules are nested within collective choice rules that are in turn embedded
within the constitutional rules. In other words, the rules affecting operational choice are made
within a set of constitutional choice rules.
3.2 Research framework: Phase 1
Based on the theoretical concepts described in Section 2, an analytical framework has been developed
for use by project researchers on fisheries co-management. This analytical framework can be used
to make generalizations about the type of co-management arrangements appropriate for different
situations. In particular, the analysis will enable:
1. The identification of the existing property rights system in order to determine who has
access to the resource, who defines rights to exploit the resource, and whether any of these
rights are transferable.
2. The identification of scale and level of user group involvement in order to determine the
ways in which user groups do or can participate in co-management. Scale refers to the
geographic size of the area affected by co-management and also the numerical size of the
groups involved. Level refers to the level of governance such as local, regional or national
at which user groups are involved. Scale is related to level in the sense that different tasks
can be carried out at different levels.
3. The identification of the nature of the representation of user groups in the decision-making
process in order to determine the participants in the co-management arrangement, which
user groups are legitimate participants in the decision-making process and who can claim
rights to participate.
4. The identification of the type of management organization (existing or possible) in order
to determine the type of co-management arrangement most appropriate for a particular
resource or resource system.
The research framework allows for the essential elements of the action situation to be identified and
examined. The framework is used to collect and organize information on key contextual variables that
characterize collective action situations at multiple levels. Although the same sets of contextual variables
are used to describe and analyze all situations, these contextual variables will take on different values
in different situations. By utilizing the same set of contextual variables, it is possible to conduct a
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systematic and comparative analysis of diverse situations and identify relationships among variables
for evaluative, diagnostic and design purposes. The research framework is adapted from theoretical
and empirical work on the Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework developed by
researchers at the Workshop on Political Theory and Policy Analysis at Indiana University, USA. The
research framework was discussed with NARS partners at a number of workshops resulting in refinements
and application of the framework.
The framework, whose graphical representation is given in Figure 1, enables the following analyses:
1. Institutional arrangements analysis: This component links contextual variables characterizing key
attributes of the resource (biological, physical), the resource users (social, cultural, economic,
political), and features of the resource harvesting and distribution system (technology and markets)
with the institutional management arrangements (rights and rules). The contextual variables are
each composed of a number of attributes. A cause and effect relationship exists among and between
the contextual variables, the institutional arrangements (the focus of the analysis) and the resulting
transactional (action) situations. The institutional arrangements and the contextual variables affect
the actions of the resource users and authorities responsible for fisheries management by shaping
the incentives and disincentives they have to coordinate and cooperate in resource governance,
management and use. The incentives, in turn, shape the patterns of interaction and behavior
between the co-management partners, i.e. the types of co-management arrangements established
and the way they function.
2. Co-management performance analysis: The co-management arrangement results in outcomes.
These outcomes will, in turn, affect contextual variables as well as the behavior of resource users,
other stakeholders and public authorities (indicated by dotted line in Figure 2). Time is a critical
element. All the contextual variables can change through time and this may cause change in
institutional arrangements that affects incentives, patterns of interaction and outcomes. The
outcomes of co-management institutional arrangements can be evaluated in terms of management
efficiency, equity, and sustainability of resource utilization.
3. Characteristics of successful co-management institutional arrangements: The most important
aspect of this analysis is the specification of what conditions and processes bring about successful,
long-enduring fisheries co-management arrangements. A successful fisheries co-management
arrangement can be characterized, at a minimum, as being economically efficient (the benefits of
operating and maintaining the co-management arrangements exceed the full set of direct and
indirect costs); equitable (participation of and fair treatment for the people involved in managing,
governing and using the resource), institutionally sustainable (resilient and enduring co-management
arrangement) and ensuring ecosystem sustainability (being ecologically healthy). From the above
analysis, a list of principles and propositions about conditions and processes can be identified.
The institutional analysis focuses on how rules combine with various contextual variables to structure
the action situation and to generate particular types of outcomes. The analysis begins with an identification
of variables affecting the action situation: the institutional, biophysical, technological, market, socio-
cultural, economic, and political attributes and conditions of the resource users and the resource.
These variables form the context within which resource users, other stakeholders, and authorities
coordinate and cooperate to establish institutions and organizations to govern, manage and use the
resources; from which emerge some patterns of interaction. Patterns of interaction result directly from
the mutual choice of strategies by members of the group. These patterns of interaction result in
outcomes.
CHAPTER THREE • ANALYSIS OF CO-MANAGEMENT ARRANGEMENTS IN FISHERIES AND COASTAL RESOURCES: A RESEARCH FRAMEWORK30 FISHERIES AND COASTAL RESOURCES CO-MANAGEMENT IN ASIA: SELECTED RESULTS FROM A REGIONAL RESEARCH PROJECT
In analyzing institutional arrangements, the basic strategy is to separate and dissect the structural
components of the action situation - contextual variables, incentives, patterns of interactions and
outcomes (Figure 1). The purpose of this is to examine relationships between and among the parts.
Each part of the framework has a causal relationship with other parts, some stronger and others weaker
depending on the choice in the relationship. Biophysical and technological attributes can have a direct
affect on outcomes. For example, high levels of fishing effort can lead to overexploitation of resources,
regardless of whether or not institutional arrangements are in place. Institutional arrangements, on
the other hand, have an indirect effect on outcomes as they lead to changes in human behavior and
choicethat affect interactions and sustainable outcomes (Oakerson 1992). Different combinations of
these parts can be examined depending on the situation. These relationships can be analyzed forward
or backward depending on whether one is using the framework as an evaluative, diagnostic or design
tool. Explicit and implicit assumptions about the relationships help structure and guide the analysis.
In a short-run analysis of an action situation, the contextual variables are assumed to be unchanging.
Over a longer period, however, change will occur in them. Yields may increase, gear type may change
or the day-to-day rules may be restructured. A dynamic element can be introduced into the framework.
One approach treats institutional changes as exogenous; the aim is simply to understand how a series
of changes in resource attributes or institutional arrangements affects patterns of interaction and
outcomes. Another approach examines long-term relationships between attributes and institutional
arrangements in an iterative and causal fashion. For example, outcomes can affect patterns of interactions
resulting in a process of learning by the resource users; causing, in turn, individuals to modify their
strategies. These relationships can be traced through the framework to identify factors that cause the
strategies to change (Oakerson 1992). In this research project, the focus is on the second approach.
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3.3 Institutional arrangements analysis (applied to fisheries co-management)
3.3.1 Contextual variables
(a)Biological, physical and technological attributes
Problems and constraints over resource use often originate in the biological and physical attributes
of the resource, for example, resource scarcity, and in the harvesting technology used. The biophysical
and technological environment of the fishery commonly structures the nature of interactions among
fishers. The vulnerability of fishers to scarcity and uncertainty in supply and its effects impact upon
their incentives to engage in collective action. Collective action situations have been shown to
develop when a group of individuals are highly dependent on a resource and when its availability
is uncertain or limited. If the resource availability problem is repeatedly experienced, and if it exists
within a single community of users, the users are likely to develop institutional arrangements to
deal with the problem. To understand the actions fishers have taken and the institutions that they
have developed requires an understanding of the fishing grounds, fish stocks, fishing activities,
boundary conditions and fishing technology. Key questions to be considered are shown in Table 1.
Table 1. Biological, physical and technical attributes
1. Type of ecosystem (marine coast, coral reef, estuary, lake, river, floodplain, etc.).
2. Boundaries (physical, administrative, restrictions on access to fish resources).
3. Health status of fish habitats (spawning areas, nursery areas, fishing grounds).
4. Characteristics of target fish species and stocks (migratory or sedentary; status of stocks).
5. Characteristics of fisheries (industrial, artisanal, fishing technologies used, physical range of fishing
operations, seasonal variations in fishing activities, etc.).
 6. Final product forms of catch (fresh, salted, dried, smoked, fermented, frozen, canned, etc.).
1 - 6  MUST INCLUDE MAJOR CHANGES IN RECENT YEARS.
Oakerson (1992) has identified three considerations for analyzing these attributes:
1. Subtractability: The relative capacity of the fishery to support many fishers simultaneously without
mutual interference and/or without diminishing the aggregate yield of the fishery for the group.
The harvesting activity of an individual fisher subtracts from the amount of fish available for other
fishers to withdraw. The catch of one fisher affects the amount of fish that can be harvested by
other fishers utilizing the same fishing ground. Oakerson (1992) states, "The analysis should specify
as precisely as possible the 'limiting conditions' that pertain to natural replenishment or maintenance
of the resource. Physical limits established by nature or technology provide critical information for
devising rules to maintain jointly beneficial use."
2. Exclusion: The degree or relative ease with which access to the fishery is limited. The physical
nature of fishing grounds means that exclusion (or limiting access) of fishers is both difficult and
costly. A single fisher would find it difficult to exclude other fishers; therefore, fishing grounds are
subject to joint use. Oakerson (1992) states, "Two types of exclusion can be distinguished: (1) access
may be fully regulated on an individual basis, or (2) it may be partially regulated and applied only
to those outside the immediate community. This distinction is related to the potential exposure
to increases in demand. Within a definite community of users, increases in aggregate demand derive
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users can also contribute to an increase in total demand on the resource." Thus, a fishery is
characterized by high levels of inter-dependence among fishers. The action of one fisher affects the
actions and outcomes of other fishers. These interactions can lead to conflicts among fishers over
fishing grounds and the amount of fish (Schlager 1990).
3. Indivisibility: The spatial boundaries of the fishery, which determine the minimal scale on which
effective coordinated resource management can occur. Physical boundaries having to do with
divisibility of the fisheries derive from nature, human design and technology. Fishing gear type and
terrestrial and oceanographic features often dictate the division or partitioning of the fishery into
smaller units for management purposes (Oakerson 1992).
The basic institutional forms for fisheries management are fundamentally shaped by these three
characteristics of the resource. In addition to the above, two other concerns are important.
Technological problems occur when fishers physically interfere with one another in the fishing
activities. Gear conflicts may occur or the placement of gear may interfere with the flow of fish,
often referred to as crowding.
(b)Market (supply and demand) attributes
Resource problems are often market-based. Market attributes (price, structure, stability) can affect
the incentives for resource use activities, effort levels and compliance with rules. Market attributes
include those related to the operation and function of the market and those related to fishers’ and
fish traders’ relationships. The first of these comprises market availability and orientation (local,
regional, national, international), stability and transparency of supply and demand over time and
competitive situation. The second includes such attitudes as credit linkages between fishers and
fish traders, and rules on market behavior.
Key questions to be considered are shown in Table 2.
Table 2. Market attributes (including major changes in recent years)
1. Types of fisheries  (commercial, recreational, subsistence).
2. Market orientation of the fisheries (local, regional, national, international markets).
3. Value of fish products (high or low value market).
4. Market structure (many or few suppliers/buyers, market dominance, power relations between
suppliers and buyers, interdependencies).
1 - 4  MUST INCLUDE MAJOR CHANGES IN RECENT YEARS.
(c)Socio-economic and socio-cultural attributes of fishers and fishing communities
Fisher and community attributes include religious beliefs and practices, traditions and customs,
sources of livelihood, the degree of social, cultural, economic and locational heterogeneity or
homogeneity, asset ownership, level of community integration into the economy and polity, and
others. Whether individually or in combination with others, each of these attributes potentially
encourage or disencourage cooperation. General assumptions about fishers and stakeholders are
related to how they behave both individually and in groups. Stakeholders, indirectly dependent
upon the fishery for their livelihood such as fish traders, processors and transporters, are also
included since their relationship with fishers can provide incentives or disincentives for the fishers
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Table 3. Socio-economic and socio-cultural attributes
1. Homogeneity/heterogeneity of fishers, fish traders, fish processors and other stakeholders
(ethnicity, religion, fishing gear use, gender, ownership of boats and fishing gear).
2. Dependency on fisheries/fish trade/fish processing for livelihood; other sources of income/
subsistence.
3. Indigenous knowledge relevant to fisheries management (ecological and biological knowledge
of resources and habitats, knowledge of catch and fishing technologies).
4. Cultural factors affecting community or group attitude to fisheries/fish trade/fish processing and
determining behavior of individuals/groups.
Some literature suggests two key attributes that encourage cooperation (Ostrom 1990, 1992, Runge
1992): (1) if a community of fishers exhibits a high degree of social, cultural and economic homogeneity
in terms of kinship, ethnicity, religion, interests, beliefs, customs, livelihood strategies, etc.; and (2) if
there is a high dependence or reliance of fishers on the fishery for their livelihood and the number
of alternative livelihoods available in the community is low. If the fishers are highly dependent upon
the fishery and if the availability of the resource is uncertain or limited, fishers are more likely to facilitate
collective action to deal with the problem.
(d)Institutional and organizational arrangements at the community level
Institutional arrangements concern the rights and rules that apply to and regulate the fisheries in
which community members take part. The research focus is on power structures at the local level,
decision-making arrangements, participation of fishers and stakeholders, legitimacy, and mechanisms
for enforcement and compliance with rules.
Organizational arrangements concern the characteristics of the fora in which decisions are made
and collective action taken at the local level. Important issues are representation, decision-making
procedures, implementation of decisions in the field, and interface with other related fora (dealing
with resources other than fish, e.g. tourism). The questions that are considered critical are given
in Table 4.
Table 4. Institutional and organizational arrangements at the community level
1. Community power structures and leadership (role, functioning and importance of traditional
leadership structures in decision-making inside/outside the fisheries sector).
2. Organizations established/appointed to serve as co-management partners (legal basis, mandate,
representation, decision-making system/procedures, mechanisms for implementation of
management decisions/enforcement).
3. Local regulation of access to fish resources (principles for allocation of fishing rights or for
exclusion of groups or individuals).
4. Operational rules in place concerning fish catch, fish trade and fish processing, including origin
of rule.
5. Legitimacy of institutional arrangements, and organizational set-up involving fishers and other
stakeholders’ attitudes towards co-management.
6. Mechanisms for conflict resolution among resource users.
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Fisheries co-management arrangements often identify the community level as the most important level
for partnership and sharing of management responsibility. Therefore, institutional analysis at this level
is of crucial importance to the understanding of co-management arrangements.
(e)External institutional and organizational arrangements
Institutional and organizational arrangements at higher levels than a community usually affect the
institutional and organizational arrangements at the community level. The relations can vary widely.
Some community-level institutional arrangements (e.g. the establishment of operational rules for
fishing in waters adjacent to the local community) may have been subject to constitutional approval
and may be supported by both enabling legislation and government enforcement. Other institutional
arrangements at the community level may not have that legitimacy vis-a-vis fisheries and other
authorities at the municipal, district, regional or higher levels.
Organizational arrangements at the community level may have been developed and designed at a
higher level to meet higher level needs and fit into a multiple layer, nested structure. They may,
for this reason, have to follow rules and procedures that are more or less compatible with the local
conditions. Institutional and organizational arrangements outside the fisheries sector may impact
on community institutional and organizational arrangements. Key questions are given in Table 5.
Table 5. External institutional and organizational arrangements
1. Overall structure of national, political and administrative system (relation between legislative and
administrative systems; centralization/decentralization).
2. Department of Fisheries and other relevant organizational structures involved with fisheries
management (mandate and legal basis, structural organization, management function and tasks
at national, provincial, district levels).
3. Legal basis for co-management arrangements (enabling legislation, administrative decree, and
others).
4. Government agencies outside the fisheries sector whose mandate and activities interfere with
or impact on the fisheries.
5. Power structures outside the fishing communities that have impact on local power structures
and leadership (e.g. influences of political leaders, and high ranking military or police chiefs).
6. Role of donor organizations in promoting/enabling co-management arrangements.
7. Impact of power structures or powerful actors on the fisheries management agency.
1 - 7 MUST INCLUDE MAJOR CHANGES/NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN RECENT YEARS.
(f)Exogenous (macroeconomic, social, political, natural) attributes
A variety of factors exogenous to the fishery resource, fishers and fishing community have an impact
on fishers or community institutional arrangements. These are factors that are beyond the control
of the fishers and community, and at times also beyond higher-level entities. These are surprises
or shocks to the community or management system, brought about by macroeconomic, social,
political or natural occurrences, or interventions that affect the survival of the institutional
arrangements. They include typhoons, war, civil unrest, change of political system, economic crisis,
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These factors can provide an indication of how well the institutional arrangements are functioning
and surviving through their capacity or resiliency to accommodate sudden change. Critical issues
are listed in Table 6.
Table 6. Exogenous (macroeconomic, social, political, natural) attributes
1. Political and economic context of co-management arrangement (change in political system and
overall economic development since colonial times; major events that have an impact on the
survival of institutions such as market liberalization).
2. Disasters caused by war/civil unrest, typhoons, earthquake, flooding, etc. that have an impact on
the survival of institutions.
3.3.2 Incentives to cooperate and coordinate
The contextual variables and the institutional and organizational arrangements for decision-making
and implementation of decisions made give incentives and disincentives for individuals and groups to
cooperate, engage in collective actions and coordinate activities to achieve desired outcomes. The
focus of the research is on the relative importance of the various variables and arrangements in creating
incentives for fishers and stakeholders to coordinate, cooperate and contribute as individuals and as
a group. The contextual situation and the institutional arrangements in place also make government
authorities responsible for fisheries management incentives and disincentives to coordinate and
cooperate with fishers and other stakeholder groups at various administrative levels. The dominant
incentives for government agencies may to a large degree relate to the exogenous economic and
political attributes and to institutional and organizational arrangements external to the local community.
Table 7 lists these questions.
Table 7. Patterns of interaction among co-management partners
1. Major incentives for groups of fishers and other stakeholders to engage in fisheries co-management.
2. Major incentives for a government agency to engage in co-management.
3. Origin and development of co-management initiatives; driving forces in the process.
4. Characteristics of a co-management arrangement in place (type of arrangement).
5. Ways and means of communication among the co-management partners.
6. Mechanisms in place for conflict resolution among the co-management partners.
3.3.3 Patterns of interactions between co-management partners
The incentives for groups of fishers and stakeholders, and government agencies responsible for fisheries
management to coordinate and cooperate are reflected in the pattern of interaction between the
parties. For research on co-management arrangements, the analytical focus is on the institutional and
organizational arrangements established for the co-management partnership to materialize as well as
the evolution process of the partnership. The analysis allows for a typology of the co-management
arrangement in question, but should also provide detailed information on how the practical aspects
of fisheries co-management are dealt with in the action situation at various administrative levels. This
includes, for example, the monitoring of fish stocks and fishing effort, the enforcement of fishing
regulations, regulatory interference with fish markets, structural adjustments, etc. (Table 7).
It is the pattern of interaction among the co-management partners in action that determines the
dynamics of the co-management (evolution) process and ultimately the outcome of co-management.
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3.3.4 Outcomes
The co-management outcomes are produced as a result of the patterns of interaction among the co-
management parties. The consequences affect both those involved directly in the action and those
indirectly involved.
The outcomes of co-management institutional arrangements can be evaluated in terms of performance,
that is, the achievement of management objectives and the impact on the resource and its users. It is
expected that in certain situations co-management institutional arrangements will perform better than
other types of fisheries management measures, such as centralized management or self-management.
The performance of co-management institutional arrangements can be evaluated at two levels. The
first level of evaluation relates to overall institutional performance of co-management versus other
types of management arrangements. These advantages include equity, being more efficient in terms
of administration and enforcement, increased sense of ownership of the resource by users, higher
degree of acceptability and rule compliance, improved information about the resource, greater social
cohesion in the community, and more participation (Pomeroy and Williams 1994). A comparative
assessment of the performance of different co-management institutional arrangements can be conducted
at this level of evaluation.
The second level of evaluation relates to performance in meeting specific management objectives and
impacts at the operational level. Each individual co-management case has objectives established by the
participants, both resource users and the government. Performance evaluation is conducted to determine
how well the objectives are met and what the impacts of the management activity are on both the
human and biophysical environment.
The most common evaluative criteria are efficiency, equity and sustainability. The measurements of
these criteria are further explained in Chapters 5 and 8.
Efficiency
There are various measures of efficiency. The first aspect of efficiency is whether fishers have achieved
an optimal rate of use of the fishery (Oakerson 1992). A less rigorous criterion is that fishers are not
exceeding the sustainable economic yield of the fishery. A second measure of efficiency has to do with
the flow of benefits resulting from the co-management institutional arrangements and the costs (such
as transaction costs) of establishing and maintaining such arrangements. A minimal efficiency criterion
is that the benefits of operating and maintaining co-management arrangements exceed the full set of
direct and indirect costs. A comparative efficiency criterion is that the difference between the benefits
and the costs of co-management institutional arrangements in one setting is the same as or greater
than those of a more centralized arrangement elsewhere (Ostrom 1992) (Table 8).
Table 8. Efficiency of co-management arrangements
1. Stakeholders' assessment of the return for the time and effort invested by them in the co-management
arrangement (in terms of appropriateness of rules and regulations, enforcement of decisions made).
2. Government authorities’ assessment of the cost-effectiveness of co-management in comparison
with previous management arrangements (government expenses for establishing and operating
co-management arrangement assessed in relation to the compliance with rules and the need for
monitoring and control.As management processes are established to achieve particular objectives, the cost-effectiveness
of the process compared to others has to be evaluated. One of the purported advantages of co-
management compared to centralized management is that it will reduce transaction costs - the
costs of information gathering and processing, coordination of decision-maker/user groups and
regulation enforcement. Some of these costs remain fixed regardless of the management regime,
such as information that is required by law. Other transaction costs vary with the quality of data
and the process used to make decisions. Hanna (1994) points out that a centralized approach is
often associated with low program design costs but high implementation, monitoring and enforcement
costs as the management regime may have little legitimacy with user groups. A co-management
approach, on the other hand, is associated with high program design costs, as effective participation
is time-consuming and therefore costly and the benefits may not become apparent for some years.
However, co-management is likely to lead to lower implementation, monitoring and enforcement
costs, as legitimacy of the regime is greater (Hanna 1996).
Equity
Equity (fair treatment for all people involved in managing, governing and using the resource) has four
main components (Hanna 1996):
(a) Representation: an equitable management regime should represent the range of interests in the
fishery and accommodate the full diversity of those interests.
(b) Process clarity: the management process should have a clear purpose and a transparent operation.
(c) Homogenous expectations: the extent to which participants have similar expectations concerning
the management process and its objectives.
(d)Distributive effects: the management process should address the distributional changes embedded
in the options under consideration.
Equity can be measured in several ways. First, is the distribution of an individual's return on contributions
to the management and governance effort roughly similar to the benefits they receive? Oakerson (1992)
states, "The presence of inequities may lead to the collapse of reciprocity, resulting in less efficient use.
Equity problems are apt to be aggravated by asymmetries (unequal proportions) among users, which
create opportunities for some to benefit at others' expense. This, in turn, can lead to costly conflict
where all parties lose."Corruption and abuse of authority may contribute to inequities. A second
measure is to determine if there are patterns of redistribution that fishers wish to achieve at this level
of institutional arrangements (Table 9).
Table 9. Equity effects of co-management arrangements
1. Changes in the representation of the various stakeholders' interests in the decision-making
process.
2. Changes in the transparency and clarity of the decision-making process vis-a-vis the stakeholder
groups (information systems and procedures established).
3. Convergence of expectations of stakeholders as regards the objectives of fisheries management
and the management process.
4. Changes in the distribution of (access to) the benefits from the fisheries among stakeholder
groups and individuals.
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Sustainability can be divided into stewardship, resilience and governance. Stewardship, the tendency
for resource users to maintain productivity and ecological characteristics of the resource, is divided
into three components: time horizons, monitoring and enforcement. To promote resources stewardship,
the management process should expand time horizons beyond the short term. A sense of stewardship
is more likely if the effects of the management regime can be monitored and, where necessary,
enforcement measures taken (Table 10).
Table 10. Sustainability effects of co-management arrangements
1. Changes in attitudes of fishers/stakeholders towards maintaining productivity of fish resources
and integrity of ecosystem (changes in time horizons, interest shown in monitoring of stocks and
habitats, compliance with rules and regulations, and participation in enforcement at the individual
level).
2. Changes in governance (compliance at group/community level, changes in conflict resolution,
and existence of effective measures/procedures for rule enforcement).
3. Ability of co-management arrangement to handle major changes in contextual attributes (e.g.
fluctuations in resource base, changes in market structures, new entrants in social system, etc.).
Resilience is the ability of the management system to absorb and deal with changes and shocks. The
three components of resilience are rule flexibility, structural adaptation and market adaptation. Rules
should be flexible enough to respond quickly to changing conditions. The management regime should
be able to adapt to changes in both the structure of the industry and the market (Hanna 1996).
Governance includes the level of rule compliance as a major aspect. The willingness of fishers to
regularly follow operational-level rules reflects the viability of the rules as coordinating devices. Other
measures of governance may include overall reduction in conflict, existence of an effective conflict
resolution mechanism, and existence of practical and implementable enforcement procedures.
3.3.5 Characteristics of successful co-management institutional arrangements
The most important research task for an institutional analysis of fisheries co-management is to specify
conditions and propositions for successful development of co-management institutions, and identify
the most favorable arrangements for maintaining it. A number of questions need to be answered: Why
are some co-management arrangements successful, while others fail? Why do some co-management
arrangements endure for long periods of time? How can we improve the success rate for implementation
of co-management arrangements?
The success of co-management institutional arrangements may be related to specific contextual variables
or attributes, and these may affect the development and maintenance of the arrangements. The research
framework provides a means to distinguish attributes that lead to successful co-management from
those that lead to failure. For example, specific biophysical or fisher attributes, such as boundary
definitions or fish stock characteristics or social homogeneity of the community, may be critical factors
for the success of co-management. They may be even more critical than the institutional arrangements
themselves. By identifying these attributes and then examining their relationship with patterns of
interaction and outcomes, it is possible to specify conditions and propositions that can lead to successful
development and maintenance of fisheries co-management institutional arrangements.
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Over the last decade, research done at different locations around the world has documented many
cases of co-management in fisheries and other natural resource systems. From the results, certain
conditions are emerging that appear to be central to the chances of developing and sustaining successful
co-management institutional arrangements. Ostrom (1990, 1992) and Pinkerton (1989, 1991, 1992,
1993, 1998) have made useful contributions to our existing knowledge about key conditions for
successful fisheries co-management. These key conditions are discussed in Pomeroy and Williams
(1994). However, these conditions should not be considered as complete as continued research is
needed to reveal more about co-management arrangements and the factors leading to successful
performance.
3.4 Research framework: Phase 2
Phase 2 built on Phase 1, through the addition of more hypothesis testing (IFM/ICLARM-World Fish
Center 2001). The Phase 2 framework retained the contextual factors from the Phase 1 framework, but
placed group processes and conflicts in the central role. The emphasis in Phase 2 was the evaluation
of fisheries co-management in terms of its contribution to the sustainability of both the fisheries
resources and fishing communities, the efficiency of resource management, and the equity of management
outcomes. The main objective of Phase 2, as discussed above, was to discern the benefits and weaknesses
of the co-management approach in terms of sustainability, efficiency and equity, and to discover under
what conditions these benefits and weaknesses are manifest.
In Phase 2, the original institutional analysis research framework was modified in order to focus on the
three outcome criteria of sustainability, efficiency and equity (Figure 4).
Figure 4. Relationship between the institutional analysis research framework and the dependent variables
The variables on the right side of Figure 4, namely demographic and political economy; biological,
physical and technical attributes; market attributes; and external institutional and organizational
arrangements, come from the original institutional analysis research framework. They set the context
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These variables are the dependent variables that describe the outcomes of the co-management program
in terms of the three criteria of sustainability, efficiency and equity. Transaction costs measure the
efficiency of the co-management program. Equity is the degree to which the outcomes of the co-
management program are fairly distributed among the different groups with interest in the fishery.
Institutional strength measures sustainability. It has four dimensions:
1. Legitimacy is the degree of social and cultural acceptance of the system of rules and understanding
that regulate or purport to regulate the fishers’ behaviors toward the resource.
2. Attitude towards measures or outcome legitimacy is the degree to which local people support
particular management measures.
3. Compliance is the degree to which people engage in behaviors prescribed by or avoid behaviors
proscribed by management institutions.
4. Robustness is the ability of an institution to provide stability and meaning to human behavior across
a wide variety of situations.
Two variables occupy the key position between the contextual variables and this complex of dependent,
outcome variables:
1. The attributes of the local CMP processes include a number of things identified as important
both in Phase 1 and the general literature:
a) The size of the process points simply to the number of people involved.
b) The structure of the process is the way that decision-making processes exist in time and space,
i.e. who meets and makes decisions and where and when they meet.
c) The history of the process is the story of how they developed to the present day, including
how they began and by whom they were initiated.
d) The embeddedness of the CMP process is the degree to which they draw upon shared cultural
meanings. The CMP process can make use of shared cultural resources through such actions
as using traditional authority systems, having open dialogues, or making use of traditional
ecological knowledge. One particularly important aspect of embeddedness is representation.
This is the way in which the voices of the various groups that are concerned with the fishery
are heard in the CMP decision-making process.
e) Another key attribute of the process is the mechanisms provided for enforcement. These have
at least two dimensions: surveillance and sanctions. Surveillance of fishing behavior is necessary
for enforcement. Just as important, people need to know about the behavior of other people
in order to decide on their own behavior (Ostrom 1990). People cooperate more when they
see others cooperating (Sell and Wilson 1991). Seeing others, and being seen by them, lead to
conforming to an institution; this is an independent and essential part of maintaining that
institution. Sanctions can be defined as both the probability and severity of punishment for
violations of the management institutions once they have been observed. Subjective reports of
both of these things have been used successfully (Kuperan and Sutinen 1998).
2. Conflict is the other variable in this key central position between the contextual and outcome
variables. A critical part of understanding co-management is producing descriptions of local conflicts
and how they relate to the co-management project. We can identify several dimensions of conflicts41
related to the co-management projects, such as the frequency , the intensity, the persistence of
conflicts, and the degree to which conflicts spread. Co-management programs can be both a product
of conflicts and a mechanism for their resolution.
3.4.1 General hypotheses for Phase 2
Several hypotheses that were felt to add new knowledge to the overall understanding of fisheries co-
management were developed as areas of investigation for Phase 2. Their development was based on
the general literature and results of Phase 1. These hypotheses, closely related to one another, are:
Hypothesis 1 : The relationship between the four institutional strength variables, i.e. legitimacy,
attitudes towards management measures, robustness and compliance are all positive
and that they are in turn dependent upon a management system charactierized by
trust, authentic collaboration, and transparency.
Hypothesis 1A : The institutional strength of management is positively related to resource sustainability.
Hypothesis 1B : The institutional strength of management has a negative effect (i.e. lowers) on
transaction costs while the co-management program itself has an independent positive
effect.
Hypothesis 2 : More embedded co-management processes increase the strength of fisheries
management institutions where scale of both resources and markets are low and the
variability of the markets and resources are high.
Hypothesis 3 : Institutional strength is a result of the interactions between government policies,
demographics, political and economic factors, and conflicts between stakeholders.
Institutional strength is increased to the degree that the design of the co-management
program is able to channel and resolve these conflicts.
Hypothesis 3A : Stronger co-management institutions will emerge in areas of demographic flux where
local communities are seeking to use cooperation with the government as a way to
exclude outsiders that they see as threatening to their access to the resource. The
success of a co-management program in such an area will rest on its ability to channel
these conflicts and/or contribute to their resolution. Alternatively, stronger institutions
will emerge in homogeneous areas with a long tradition of cultural solidarity.
Hypothesis 3B : Co-management programs that are initially of the instructive and consultative types
become cooperative only where the government: a) concretely demonstrates a
willingness to respond positively to local policy desires, and b) provides support for
building local organizational and knowledge capacity.
Hypothesis 3C : The institutional strength of co-management efforts is a function of the relationship
between traditional and formal authorities reflected in the design of the program.
This relationship, in turn, interacts with political and demographic factors in specific
ways.
Three levels of comparison are used for testing each hypothesis. These are: a) resource/program as
the basic unit of analysis of the co-management program; b) village as the smallest local unit for general
administration or the smallest local unit for the co-management program; and c) comparison between
individuals. The comparisons can be made across time in the same place or between different places.
CHAPTER THREE • ANALYSIS OF CO-MANAGEMENT ARRANGEMENTS IN FISHERIES AND COASTAL RESOURCES: A RESEARCH FRAMEWORK42
A number of variables are suggested for measurement of each hypothesis. These include:
• Demographics.
• Scale of markets and resource.
• Variability of markets and resource.
• Motivations of fisheries agency.
• Processes involving age of program, relations with traditional authorities, representation,
NGO participation, relations with other community/government groups, structure,
enforcement, types of measure used, responsiveness to participation, transparency of co-
management, trust of co-management, support for local co-management efforts, and ladder
of co-management.
• Conflicts relating to ethnicity/race, class, gender, gear/species, theft, markets, multiple users,
locals versus outsiders, etc.
• Resilience including legitimacy, attitudes towards management measures, robustness,
compliance.
• Other outcome variables including equity, resource sustainability, transaction costs.
Where comparisons can only be made at the highest level, i.e. resource/program, in order to measure
and compare variables and test the hypotheses, only two variables, the scale and variability of markets
and resources, absolutely require comparisons for the hypotheses they test at the highest level. This
is because it is very unlikely that variance can be observed within a particular program dealing with a
particular resource. While it should be possible to find variance in market attributes, it is not possible,
by definition, to find variance in resource attributes that attach to the program area as a whole. This
does not mean, however, that variance for other variables of interest at the village and individual levels
will always be found. It only means that it is possible to find such variance.
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CHAPTER FOUR
Methods for Implementing and Assessing Fisheries Co-management
In implementing the fisheries co-management project, it became necessary to develop new research
methods or to further refine existing methods. This chapter provides a summary and examples of
methodologies developed by partners and project staff to assess, evaluate and implement co-management.
The methodologies highlighted in this chapter are: (a) Rapid Appraisal Approach to Evaluation of
Community-level Fisheries Management Systems (RAFMS), (b) Process Documentation Research, (c)
Impact Evaluation of Community-based Resource Management Projects, and (d) Measuring Success
of Co-management Projects.
4.1. Rapid Appraisal Approach to Evaluation of Community-level Fisheries Management
Systems (RAFMS) 5
What is RAFMS?
Information on local community-based marine resource management systems exists in many countries.
This information, however, is often anecdotal or written in a narrative format. As such, it lacks the
specifics necessary for the system’s institutional and organizational characteristics to provide a useful
basis from which to analyze its operations. If effective fisheries management efforts are to succeed, it
is essential that resource managers and policy-makers have up-to-date information about these
community-based management systems and their socioeconomic, political, and ecological contexts.
Studies need to be current, detailed, and location-specific to provide a comprehensive knowledge base
on the range of types, functions, and status of fisheries management systems in the country. There are
compelling arguments to strengthen local management and responsibility, because few governments
are able to manage their fishery resources effectively without the cooperation of the fishing community.
With limited funds, time and research personnel, it is not always possible to conduct a detailed, in-
depth study of community-based fisheries resource management systems at a specific site. A rapid
appraisal methodology can be useful as a critical first step in documenting the existence of community
management systems and in providing general information on their operation and impacts. The rapid
appraisal method is no substitute for more detailed studies, but it can provide cost-effective information
and a direction for further action. Hence, the RAFMS (see Pido et al. 1996b) was developed for this
purpose.
The RAFMS is primarily a topical Rapid Rural Appraisal (RRA), which is aimed at documenting and
evaluating the existing informal and traditional fisheries management system(s) in a coastal community
and its relationship with the more formal fisheries management system administered by the government.
As such, the RAFMS has been designed to identify the existence of informal fisheries management
systems or to document conditions that may afford the opportunity for their creation. The RAFMS is
partly a participatory tool, because the involvement of local researchers and members of the fishing
community is imperative. The mode of participation in RAFMS is consultative, where the fishers interact
5 Methodology and conceptual framework condensed from an ICLARM publication written by Michael D. Pido, Robert S.
Pomeroy, Len R. Garces and Melvin B. Carlos entitled “ A Rapid Appraisal Approach to Evaluation of Community-Level Fisheries
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in a two-way communication process during the research. It is also a research tool designed to extract
pertinent information from fishers and other coastal stakeholders in a consultative mode in a relatively
short period of time. The RAFMS, however, is not a tool to be used to empower the community. The
RAFMS’ intended audience are fisheries managers and development workerswho need to gain an
understanding of the fisheries management system at the community level, both informally and formally,
in order to strengthen, legitimize, revise and, if needed, transfer the system.
The RAFMS is collectively undertaken by three groups of stakeholders: (1) RAFMS practitioners, (2)
local researchers, and (3) the fishing community, as illustrated by Figure 5. The RAFMS practitioners
who head the exercise are experts on RRA and Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA) methods. RAFMS
specialists are usually local or outside scientists, academicians or development specialists. Local
researchers, on the other hand, are technicians or specialists, based in or near the study area. The
fishing community includes fishers or coastal stakeholders engaged in various fishing activities. Hence,
the result of the RAFMS exercise is a synthesis or convergence of three viewpoints. It must be noted,
however, that the conduct of the RAFMS does not rely solely on the existence of external experts, since
the long-term goal of the RAFMS is to increase the technical capability of local researchers in order for
them to continue the activity on their own.
Figure 5. Relationships among the RAFMS pratitioners, local researchers and the fishing communities
Although the RAFMS may be used to evaluate any fisheries-based settings, it has several limitations.
First, the variables or factors to be examined are concentrated on fisheries. Although the evaluation
is nested within broader coastal resource management, the analysis deals only on a limited basis with
the other dominant sectors of the coastal zone, such as industry, tourism, and agriculture. Second, it
is suitable for application at the village or community level, rather than a larger geographic or political
area. Lastly, the success of the RAFMS depends on the experience and knowledge of the researchers
undertaking it, and active participation of the fishing community.
 The RAFMS framework
According to Pido et al. (1997), the RAFMS framework is subdivided into four components: (1) the
conceptual base, (2) the contextual variables and their attributes, (3) the research or survey steps, and
(4) the expected output.
RAFMS practitioners
Fishing communities Local researchers45
The RAFMS uses a method known as Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) as its conceptual
base. The institutional analysis research framework provides a structured approach to document and
evaluate the origin, current status, operation, impact and performance of fisheries management
institutions. Oakerson (1992) stated that such a “framework must be specific enough to offer guidance
in the field, yet general enough to permit application to a widely variable situation”. The research
framework links contextual variables characterizing key attributes of the resource and resource user
with the local fisheries management institutional arrangements (rights and rules) (For more information
see ICLARM/IFM 1996).
The contextual variable component makes up the second component of the RAFMS framework. Six
sets of contextual variables and 33 attributes or factors are relevant for the RAFMS framework (Table
11). These variables and their attributes form the context within which fishers and other resource
stakeholders coordinate, cooperate, and contribute to establish organizations and institutions to manage
the fishery resources. Fisher/community institutional and organizational arrangements (Group IV) are
the focus of the RAFMS.
The third component of the framework relates to the research and survey steps that should be taken.
This four-step process, called “quadriangulation”, includes: (1) secondary data analysis, (2) reconnaissance
survey, (3) field data gathering, and (4) community validation. Figure 6 shows the data acquisition and
verification scheme for the RAFMS.
The fourth component refers to outputs generated at the end of the exercise. Such outputs will be the
integration of the results generated from the secondary data (step 1) through community validation
(step 4) to produce a technical report. The document should be able to describe the informal and
formal management systems that govern utilization of fisheries resources at the local level, and how
such a system relates to the broader social, cultural, technical, economic, biophysical and institutional
environment. The report should have three substantive sections that include: (1) the basic profiles of
fisheries/coastal environmental setting; (2) the institutional analysis of the fisheries management
systems; and (3) the recommendations related to planning and policy-making, research and development.
The essence of the RAFMS is the planning and policy-making agenda, which will provide the direction
toward improved institutional and organizational arrangements. It includes the clarification of legal
rights and responsibilities, particularly the traditional and informal use rights, as well as the clarification
of organizational jurisdiction and responsibilities.
Benefit of using the RAFMS
The RAFMS is an interactive process of generating, analyzing, and validating attributes relevant to the
study of the existing community level-fisheries management system. It is one of the pioneering attempts
to develop a rapid appraisal guide for coastal marine environments, and specifically, for understanding
the system of fisheries management at the community level. Among its unique features is the adoption
of institutional analysis as its main framework in combination with agro-ecosystem analysis (AEA) and
other RRA techniques. The other innovations of the RAFMS are: (1) the active roles of local researchers
and members of the fishing community, (2) the ability to generate some quantitative (interval or ratio
scales) data, and (3) the use of quick biological assessment techniques.
Furthermore, the process of conducting the RAFMS has revealed two useful procedural insights. First,
the local or indigenous ecological knowledge, which is a rich source of information, can be quickly
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generated and analyzed using a variety of RRA techniques. Second, the RAFMS can be used as a linking
tool between the researchers (both internal and external) and the local community.
Table 11. Long list of attributes (variables) of the RAFMS framework
Group I. Biological, physical and technical attributes (13)





• General water quality




IC. Technical attributes (5)
• Gear/fishing technology
• Species harvested
• Level of exploitation
• Resource use/harvesting conflict
• Conservation awareness
Group II. Market (supply-demand) attributes) (6)




• Stability of demand
• Market structure





• Livelihood (Occupational structure)
• Attitudes and outlook of fishers
Group IV. Fisher or community institutional and rganizational arrangements (2)
• Individual organizations
• Institutional arrangements
Group V. External institutional and organizational arrangements (2)
• Individual organizations
• Institutional arrangements
Group VI. Exogenous factors (2)
• Natural calamities
• Macroeconomic/political/socio-cultural47 CHAPTER FOUR • METHODS FOR IMPLEMENTING AND ASSESSING FISHERIES CO-MANAGEMENT
Figure 6. Data acquisition/verification scheme for the rapid appraisal of fisheries management system
RAFMS field application: Ulugan and Binunsalian Bays, Palawan, Philippines 6
The field application and testing of the RAFMS was undertaken at two coastal fishing villages in Palawan,
Philippines. Researchers from ICLARM took the lead as the RAFMS practitioners. In drafting the RAFMS
handbook, informal agreements were made with research collaborators. Upon arrival at the site, a joint
workshop between RAFMS practitioners and local researchers involving a discussion of elements of
the RAFMS handbook was made. It was followed by the allocation of members into three technical
groups, namely (1) institutional, (2) socio-economic, and (3) biophysical. The institutional group
handled the contextual variables related to characteristics of fisher/community stakeholders and the
institutional and organizational arrangements. The socio-economic group evaluated the information
on market and supply attributes, while the biophysical group investigated attributes relating to marine
habitats, species harvested, and fishing technology
Field activities
Field activities at Ulugan and Binunsalian bays followed similar routines. Between two and four days
were spent at each village. There was a courtesy call to the village headman and other officers from
6 Condensed from an article by Michael D. Pido, Robert S. Pomeroy, Len R. Garces and Melvin B. Carlos entitled “ A Rapid
Appraisal Approach to Evaluation of Community-Level Fisheries Management Systems: Framework and Field Application
at Selected Coastal Fishing Villages in the Philippines and Indonesia” Coastal Management. 25:183-204.
I - Biological, physical technical
II - Market (supply and demand)
III- Fisher, stakeholder and community
IV- Fisher/community instituitional arrangements
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the village council. This was followed by the reconnaissance survey, which allowed the team to familiarize
themselves with important features in the field such as resource characteristics, make annotation
between reported and real conditions, and settle administrative arrangements. Key informants (e.g.
fishers, fishers’ spouses, moneylenders, fish traders, government officials) were identified or chosen
during this activity. The next step was field data collection, which was the actual generation of primary
data based on the methodologies provided. Semi-structured interview (SSI) was the main tool used
in interviewing the key informants to obtain institutional, socio-economic, and biophysical data. The
SSI was administered either individually or in small groups. Other field data collection techniques
included actual diving at the coral sites, resource mapping, and market visits. Then, each evening  there
was a brainstorming session on the day’s work. The results of interviews and personal observations
were reported and deliberated. These results were then synthesized into key tables, figures, and
diagrams. The last step of the process was community validation.
Results and outputs
Ulugan Bay is located on the mid-western coast of Palawan some 47 km from the capital city of Puerto
Princesa. It is a traditional fishing ground with mangroves, coral reefs, sea grass beds, and small islands.
 Surrounding the bay are five villages (barangays), with a population of about 5000 people in 1991. The
majority of the workforce is engaged in fishing and farming. Binunsalian Bay is located some 20 km
south-east of Puerto Princesa. The coastal stretch, with extensive coral reefs and mangroves, is bounded
by two villages with a population of 1550 individuals in 335 households. Since 1986, fishers have
harvested fish, shellfish, and mangroves year-round in the area.
Through the RAFMS, it was shown that there is a nested organizational/institutional arrangement
structure that operates with regard to marine fisheries. Table 12 shows that in the small village of
Binunsalian, there is a whole array of organizations from the national government agencies, local
government units, non-governmental organizations, and people’s organization that undertake activities
that have a bearing on fisheries management.
The result of the RAFMS exercise also highlights the duality of fisheries management that exists in both
villages. Binusalian and Ulugan Bays, as municipal fisheries, are legally under a state property regime.
As such, the rights and rules systems with regard to the use or management of the fishery resources
emanate from the national government and the municipal (city) government of Puerto Princesa. There
is, however, an informal fisheries management system that exists, although it is not legally sanctioned
by the city government. For example, conflict resolution in Ulugan Bay is solved either by informal or
formal channels. When there is conflict between two fishers, the formal process is to settle the conflict
at the level of the sub-village head. There is an informal way, however, of settling the conflict through
mediation of a respected community elder or senior fisher who is not a member of the village council.
If the conflict is not settled at the sub-village level, it may be formally resolved through the village chief
or informally resolved through other respected members of the community.
The RAFMS also identified unwritten rights and rules that govern the use of certain gear within Manabore
village at Ulugan Bay. A gill-netter may set his net only 10 m or more away from the entrance of a fish
corral. In the case of gill nets crossing, the first one to remove the net is the topmost, and others must
work down to the bottom of the nets. Hook-and-line fishers can fish near fish aggregating devices only
if verbal concurrence is given by the owner. Again, the enforcement of the above rules is largely informal.49 CHAPTER FOUR • METHODS FOR IMPLEMENTING AND ASSESSING FISHERIES CO-MANAGEMENT
There are also informal codes of conduct that exist among certain fishers’ groups in Binunsalian Bay.
A verbal agreement exists among the 13 religious ministers in the area to continuously remind their
congregation (fisher folks) against engaging in destructive fishing practices. Although there is a national
law (Fisheries Code) and existing city ordinances that legally prohibit destructive fishing practices, their
implementation is facilitated by informal sanctions at the community level. Many features of the informal
fisheries management system identified by the RAFMS are not readily observable by government
fisheries managers; some became apparent only during the community validation (Step 4) of the RAFMS
process. Thus, the RAFMS exercise was able to inform fisheries managers of the importance of the
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4.2. Process Documentation Research methodology (PDR) 7, 8
What is process documentation research?
Work on the formulation of process-oriented research methodologies has made important contributions
to the development of more relevant and constructive social science. These methods are helpful in
re-constructing inaccurate organizational myths, by-passing the information filters of bureaucracy, and
providing insights into the intricacies of development program performance, all essential to corrective
change. Involving primarily disciplined observation, accurate recording, and common sense analysis,
these seemingly simple methodologies are in fact important tools used for social science. Process
documentation represents an important contribution of social scientists to develop a social science
relevant to social reality, and therefore to be more effective in contributing to the improvement of
human society.
Process documentation research is a tool to help development organizations guide the process of
implementing new intervention strategies and to learn from their own experience. The information
generated by process documentation research is useful for determining the implementation methods
as well as changes in the implementing agency’s policies and strategies. It was originally developed by
the Institute of Philippine Culture (IPC) to support a program of learning process intervention in the
Philippine National Irrigation Authority, and has since come to be recognized as a basic tool of the
learning process approach. The IPC of the Ateneo de Manila University has been at the forefront of
the effort to develop the concepts and methods of the learning process approach and apply them
within a variety of development agencies (Korten et al. 1989).
Process documentation research is one of the methodologies social scientists have developed to provide
processes and contextual data required for agency capability building toward effective program
implementation. The PDR has since become an important tool for social learning as it highlights the
dynamics and levels of agency and community decision-making. The PDR development was part of
social science’s response to the need for  field research data relevant to decision-making within a
learning process approach.
Process documentation research framework
The learning process approach is usually applied in the development of capabilities to manage a
particular development program. Application of some variation of the learning process approach seems
to be almost essential if the program plan is to enable communities to be more involved in effectively
managing their own resources.
Mobilization of community resources for project development presents a clear instance of a complex
situation. The task calls for a continuous understanding of social relations, power structures, and
conflicting interests in order to provide pertinent decision options regarding policies, procedures, and
7 Condensed from a SEAFDEC/AQD project report written by Renaro F. Agbayani and Alessandro S. Babol entitled “Institutional
Arrangements in the Fisheries Co-Management on Malalison Island, Culasi, Antique: A Process Documentation Research
Methodology”.
8 Summarized from a book edited by Cynthia C. Veneracion entitled “A Decade of Process Documentation Research: Reflections
and Synthesis” based on the Proceedings of a Seminar-Workshop on Process Documentation Research held on 21-24 January
1988 in Tagaytay City, Philippines.52 FISHERIES AND COASTAL RESOURCES CO-MANAGEMENT IN ASIA: SELECTED RESULTS FROM A REGIONAL RESEARCH PROJECT
organizational support response. The PDR captures the unfolding of field processes and events and
knowledge on the dynamics of the relationships among participants. The intensive and continuous
presence of the PDR also allows for the collection of data on the often protracted and unforeseen
nature of the participants’ interactions and activities involved in a community-based participatory
program. At the same time, immediate utilization of the PDR, in addition to other field data, enhances
the understanding of the development of mechanisms and structures for dealing effectively with varying
field conditions surrounding mobilization.
According to Korten et al. (1989), there are several institutional learning functions that the PDR has
proven particularly useful in serving; these are:
1. Reconstructing the organizational mythology. Existing organizational and social practice
is commonly grounded in myths regarding the real nature of the organization, its role, and
its performance.
2. Bypassing information filters. Conventional bureaucratic organizations have built-in
mechanisms that systematically inhibit reality testing. Properly used, the PDR helps bypass
any filtering process that may prevent, corrupt, withhold, and change information as it goes
through the normal channels, giving people at all levels a clear window into the rich detail
of uncensored field experience.
3. Answering the WHY questions. Conventional summative evaluation practice involving
the use of before and after measurement results provides information on the outcomes of
intervention. From a positivist perspective, such measurement is necessary, although it tells
us nothing about the process that connects the outputs to the inputs and, therefore, provides
no insights into why a particular outcome is achieved.
4. Limiting retrospective reconstruction. Simple retrospective analysis by project participants
is seldom an adequate substitute for immediate on-site observation and documentation.
5. Highlighting the process documenter as a key informant. The key informant is an important,
though often overlooked, contributor of process documentation research, as is the development
of the process documenter as a resource to the group responsible for managing the learning
process. In many instance, it is not the process documentation report itself that becomes
the basis of action, but rather the discussions in which the process documenter or supervisor
participates as a key informant.
The PDR seeks detailed, systematic, and timely data on the manner in which field level project
implementation activities are undertaken. Another important PDR concern is data on the dynamics of
group and individual interactions among participants, and the emergent issues and problems important
to the program development and improvement. Data collection, therefore, takes a two-pronged focus.
One is the process of field level implementation such as the participant’s activities, interactions,
discussions, and negotiations; the other is the context of these processes. Thus, PDR data pertain to
both technical and non-technical (institutional, organizational, or extensional) aspects of project
implementation, particularly the processes and context of decision-making at the field level. It is,
however, not a tool for any agency’s site-specific problem-solving task, or a monitoring device that
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Process-oriented research methodologies constitute the social scientist’s response to the need for a
link between development agencies and local communities. The social scientist conducting the research
enhances the communication and interactions among the groups by discussing concerns and issues
raised by the communities. Social scientists at the same time assist the agency in understanding the
research results and their implications for the agency’s work, bringing into the learning process not
only the social science perspectives but also an advocacy role that favors local communities and groups.
Process documentation in program development
There are two approaches to program development, the “blueprint” approach and the “learning process”
approach. Each takes a different view of program development. The blueprint approach observes the
following procedures. Planning of a project to implement a new intervention strategy focuses on the
preparation of a planning document that specifies the goals, objectives, activities, timetable, and the
expected outcomes of the project. Once this plan is prepared and approved, the project is deemed
ready for implementation. Personnel responsible for implementation focus on complying with the plan
because the evaluation of the project centers on the extent to which the implementation has followed
or diverged from the plan. Thus, the blueprint approach assumes that the action agency knows how
to implement the new intervention strategy because this is spelled out in the planning document.
In contrast, the learning process approach, of which process documentation is a component, focuses
more on the outcomes of the project. With this approach, the implementing agency is unsure of the
implementing strategies and, therefore, requires an appropriate methodology of gathering important
information about project implementation. The learning process approach would be appropriate for
pilot projects where sites are considered as “laboratories” prior to implementation of bigger projects
covering larger geographical areas. The learning process approach documents the interactions of
project beneficiaries, the community organizer, and the staff of the implementing agency. It should
reflect a factual recording of important events and activities in the community. As a learning process,
the PDR is unstructured, experiential and inductive (Amonia et al. 1997). PDR provides updated
information for use in the decision-making process by project beneficiaries and implementers. There
is a need to know the specific decisions and actions, and to encourage the participation of the
beneficiaries in the decision-making process and specific activities. The timely information that the
PDR provides contributes to better implementation of project activities and prevents or minimizes
conflicts among beneficiaries, or between the implementers and the beneficiaries.
In actual practice, the PDR embodies both a learning process approach and a blueprint approach. The
overall goals and objectives of a project, such as one for community-based coastal resource management,
provide the “blueprint” part of the project. The way to do it is the “learning process” component of
the project. In a community-based resource management project, the PDR records the development
process focusing on the participatory model of the resource management strategy. The participatory
model includes: (1) mass involvement in the decision-making process through different consultation
activities; (2) mass contribution in the actual implementation of project activities; and (3) mass sharing
of benefits from the project.
The PDR team is composed mostly of a field worker or the process documenter (PD) and the researcher.
It is recommended that a full-time PD be detailed to the project site for effective documentation of
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discussions and should avoid interpreting the field data. Data interpretation and analysis is the
responsibility of the senior researcher assigned to the project. The primary duty of the PD is to record
and document and not to interpret and analyze the data gathered from the field. It is therefore important
that the PD have an open mind, free of biases and prejudices. The PD should also be likable and
trustworthy, so that project beneficiaries will feel comfortable in providing critical information on the
project activities.
The PD should always have a field notebook to record his/her observations. A tape recorder could be
very useful especially in recording meetings and consultations. This would enable the PD to record
the discussions verbatim. If the PD is acceptable in the community, the people will not mind having a
tape recorder present to document the discussions, whether formal or informal.
Writing or inputting should be done at the end of each day, but not later than the end of the week.
This will update the PD, researchers, and project leaders on the status of the project and in the case
of problems arising; it will give project implementers time to act promptly.
In asking questions, the six “Ws” (who, what, when, where, why, and how) are always useful. It is
suggested that a PD should have sufficient field experience and good public relations. Data gathered
must also be confirmed from other respondents without them knowing that the information is being
verified from another source.
Process documentation research output
Like any other research undertaking, the PDR includes the preparation of a final report. Such a report
provides summaries of the documented project activities and events, and a summary of the lessons
learned from the project experience. It may also contain discussion on field level implementation
strategies and mechanisms already incorporated into the program. Because of its narrative nature, a
PDR report tends to be lengthy, but it serves as a repository of field experience. While the report may
not be read in its entirety every month, its presence is very important when issues develop.
The PDR final report represents a more formal record of a particular phase of a program development.
The report is not primarily written to address the agency’s program development needs, which are
the main concern of the monthly reports. Its intended readers are social scientists, planners and
implementers of other development programs, making the final report a contribution that can be
added to the literature on development and program implementation. All in all, the PDR helps bring
the social science perspective to bear upon the assessment of field-level program implementation and
the identification of the lessons learned from it for future improvement, application and expansion.
A PDR case study: Institutional arrangements in the fisheries co-management on Malalison
Island, Philippines 9
In order to help fishers rise above poverty, and to regenerate and manage the marine and coastal
resources, the Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Center Aquaculture Department (SEAFDEC/AQD)
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off western Panay, Philippines. The research project is development-oriented and integrates the various
disciplines of biology, economics, sociology, public administration and engineering in its study of fishing
communities and resources, and in evolving interventions and strategies (Agbayani 1998).
The overall objective of the project is to learn from the collaboration of community organizers, biologists,
and social scientists in adapting recently developed aquaculture and fishery resource management
techniques and to assess the potential replicability of the experience to other fishing communities.
The framework of the project integrates the analysis of the socio-economic conditions of the fisher
population with the condition of the coastal resources, the types of fishing and aquaculture technologies,
and the role of the institutions in setting up rules and rights in the use and management of coastal
resources.
Process documentation research was undertaken to test the usefulness of this methodology in
documenting institutional arrangements of the fisheries co-management on Malalison Island. The
specific objectives of the study were: 1) to document the institutional arrangements in the co-
management of fishery resources on Malalison Island; and 2) to evaluate and analyze the institutional
and management performance of community-based co-management practices.
The use of PDR methodology in this study adopted both the “blueprint” and the “learning process”
approaches. A full-time, site-based PD undertook the process documentation from January 1995 to
November 1996. He was also the technical assistant of the CFRM project at the site from 1991. His
familiarity with the place and people was both an advantage and a disadvantage. It was an advantage
because the PD knew the idiosyncrasies of most people, especially the key people such as the officials
of the barangay, the local fisher organization (FAMI), and the municipal officials. It was a disadvantage
at the same time because he was married to a local girl who was associated with one of the more
influential families; this made him a “suspect” because a number of people perceived him to be biased
in documenting events related to the institutional arrangements. Aside from this small problem, he
was generally accepted and well regarded in the community.
Most, if not all, activities, meetings, and consultations were tape-recorded. Informal talks or “encounters”
with the village people were likewise recorded to supplement information from the meetings and
consultations. It was noted that group discussions before and after meetings are more relevant than
what actually transpires in the formal meetings. Moreover, some fishers were found to be too shy or
were not used to articulating their opinions in formal meetings. Informally, however, they can express
their honest opinions and perceptions concerning the project.
A “blueprint” of the plans and activities (research and development interventions) was already in place
in 1993 during Stage 2 of the CFRM project. The PDR study was implemented during Stage 3 of the
project when fishery resource plans and strategies such as territorial use rights (TURFs) and artificial
reef (AR) deployment were the main issues. The CFRM project implemented several interventions
starting in 1991 to the present. Development interventions focused on people empowerment through
community organizing and capability building, implementation of livelihood activities, declaration of
a fish sanctuary, and the deployment of artificial reefs. By 1997, preliminary studies on sea ranching
of suitable species in the surrounding waters of Malalison Island had been started. Research activities
were multidisciplinary, including resource and ecological assessment (REA), acceptability of territorial
use rights (TURFs), economic utilization of resources, and technological and economic analysis of
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Using a historical background review and the PDR methodology, researchers from SEAFDEC/AQD were
able to chronologically document milestone events that happened from 1990 to 1996. Milestone events
occurring prior to the PDR activities were also included in the report to “pave the way” for the subsequent
events covered by the PDR that led to the formulation of institutional arrangements in the fisheries
co-management project on Malalison Island.
Milestone events occurring prior to the PDR activities in 1995
Prior to the deployment of a full-time PD on Malalison Island, historical records showed several important
events contributing to the success of the CRM project on Malalison.
(1) Passage of Culasi Municipal Ordinance 5-90 and 2-91 by the Sangguniang Bayan. MO 5-
90 designates the one square kilometer between Malalison and the mainland as a TURF protected
area exclusively for the use of the fishers’ association (FAMI) in implementing sea-farming activities.
MO 2-91 prohibits incursions of illegal transient fishers and entry of commercial fishers to the TURF
area.
(2) Investigation on the Traditional Marine Boundaries and TURFs (1991-92). This was carried
out to: 1) verify the existence of traditional marine boundaries; 2) document existing sea tenure
practices and territorial use rights in fisheries; and 3) make recommendations for granting of TURFs
on Malalison Island.
(3) Cross-visits to CVRP in Bohol by FAMI and Barangay Officials (1993). In early 1993, as part
of the capability building activities, FAMI and barangay officials visited the Central Visayas Regional
Project (CVRP) project in Bohol to familiarize them with coastal resource management practices
in other parts of the Visayas. The idea of creating a fish sanctuary was presented to the group during
the trip since this is one of the strategies being implemented by the CVRP in their project site.
(4) First Malalison Forum (mid-1993) and Second Malalison Forum (1994). The first and
second Malaison Forums, initiated by the SEAFDEC CFRM team members with participation of
officers and members of FAMI and residents of Malalison, assessed the status of the project and
prepared annual plans for 1993-94. At these forums, the concept of possibly adopting a fish sanctuary
for Malalison was discussed by all the parties involved.
(5) Creation of Barangay Coastal Resource Management Council. As an offshoot of the consultation
processes, meetings and forums regarding plans on institutionalizing the coastal resource management
plans and policies of barangay Malalison, FAMI members and the Malalison barangay council
decided to create another council that would initiate, coordinate and oversee the consultation
process, formulation, legitimization, and eventual implementation of rules and rights in the co-
management of fishery resources.
Highlights of the PDR institutional arrangements activities (1995-96)
The presence of a full-time process documenter in Malalison from January 1995 to November 1996 saw
the documenting and recording of Stage 3 of the CFRM project. The following are the highlights of
important events recorded first-hand by the PD during his stay on Malalison Island.
The key institutions that played important roles in the institutional arrangements in fisheries co-
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Culasi Municipal FARMC, Culasi Sangguniang Bayan, Process Foundation, national government agencies
such as the Department of Agriculture (DA), Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)
and the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG), SEAFDEC and the local radio stations.
A total of 45 meetings and consultations were documented from January 9, 1995 to November 17, 1996.
The main activities during the PDR study period (1995-96) were the implementation of TURFs and the
construction and deployment of concrete ARs. The implementation of TURFs refers mainly to the
planning and formulation of specific resource management strategies such as the creation of a fish
sanctuary and the rules and rights embodied in the provisions of the policy in maintaining a fish
sanctuary. Other important events that happened on Malalison Island that were captured by the PDR
include:
(1)Declaration of a manifesto by the FAMI on the TURFs. The FAMI manifesto defines the TURFs
as the proper utilization, management and control by the FAMI of the body of water surrounding
Malalison Island as provided for by Municipal Ordinance 5-90. The two main components of the
TURFs are: 1) the creation of a fish sanctuary and 2) the deployment of concrete ARs. In the
enforcement of the TURFs, the FAMI agreed on a set of rules and guidelines regarding penalties
that can be imposed on violators caught fishing inside the sanctuary.
(2)Resource Management. In 1995, the Antique Integrated Area Development (ANIAD) Project,
funded by the Netherlands government, implemented a CBCRM project in all Culasi coastal barangays
except on Malalison Island. ANIAD, with the assistance of SEAFDEC, did a resource and social
assessment of the coastal barangays and at the same time held consultation meetings with barangay
leaders and residents of the 16 barangays to discuss the principles, methods and benefits of CBCRM.
(3)Construction and deployment of concrete artificial reefs. The construction and deployment
of ARs was a major intervention of the project to regenerate the natural corals destroyed over the
years because of destructive fishing practices.
(4)Third Malalison Forum (1995). The annual forums on Malalison Island provided an effective
venue to present assessments and evaluations of the CFRM project and to discuss problems and
issues affecting the success of the project.
(5) Creation of Barangay Malalison FARMC. As mentioned earlier, the Malalison FARMC was
created on June 24, 1995 in compliance with Executive Order No. 240 of the President of the
Philippines. There was, however, an already existing Barangay Coastal Resource Management
Council created in 1994 for the purpose of planning, formulating and implementing rules and
rights in the management of coastal resources.
(6) Declaration of Giob reef as a Fish Sanctuary. Ten days after the creation of the Barangay
Malalison FARMC, a series of meetings was held among the FARMC, the barangay council and
the residents of Malalison to finalize the declaration of Giob reef as a fish sanctuary.
(7) Lobbying for the approval of the Barangay Malalison Resolution No.1 (Fish Sanctuary
and Strict Prohibition on Fishing). The Malalison FARMC and barangay officials wasted no
time in working for the approval of the Barangay Resolution by the Culasi Sangguniang Bayan.
On July 14, 1995 the Malalison officials arranged a meeting with the Vice-Mayor acting as the
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discussed at the meeting were: 1) penalties imposed on violators, and 2) a consultation process
with the Malalison residents. Succeeding lobbying activities were undertaken to speed up approval
of the fish sanctuary resolution.
(8) Need for scientific data to support the fish sanctuary ordinance. In support of the Malalison
Ordinance on the fish sanctuary, SEAFDEC provided the officials of the barangay and FAMI with
the bio-resource data of Giob reef. The information included: 1) number of fish families (27) and
species (172) of reef fishes; 2) estimated and relative annual yield of reef fishes at Giob reef; 3)
list of coral species; 4) average cover of benthic life forms; and 5) average frequency of benthic
life forms. The value of scientific data for policy making has been demonstrated in the formulation
of the fish sanctuary ordinance.
(9) Approval of the Malalison Rresolution on the declaration of a fish sanctuary. The
Barangay Malalison Resolution No. 1 Series of 1995 on the declaration of a fish sanctuary was
approved by the Sangguniang Bayan by default. Its passage into law came about by the failure
of the Council to approve or disapprove the act within its mandated 30 days (statutory period).
(10) Enforcement of the Barangay Ordinance on “No fishing” in the fish sanctuary. The
enforcement of the provisions of the Fish Sanctuary ordinance requires physical, financial, and
manpower resources. The first priority was to define the boundary by setting up markers. The
second requirement was for mobility requiring a reliable boat for monitoring and surveillance
work. Lastly, there was a need for disseminating information to fishers, residents of Malalison,
and neighboring coastal barangays, who had traditionally fished in the area.
(11) Community-initiated survey on TURF. As mentioned earlier, the Municipality of Culasi granted
a TURF-covering area of 1 km2 located between the Culasi mainland and Malalison Island to the
FAMI as early as 1990, before the start of the CFRM project. There were, however, no rules and
rights defined in the use and management of the TURF areas. There was a need to gather
information about the perception of the fishers of the different coastal and island barangays
regarding TURF and the rules and rights that go with it. A community-initiated survey was done
in 1995 to ascertain whether: 1) fishers agreed to the conceptof TURF; 2) the types of fishing
gears that should be allowed in the TURF area; and 3) amount of fee that the fishers were willing
to pay the FAMI to defray operational expenses of overseeing the TURF area. The survey covered
146 respondents from Malalison and 6 coastal barangays facing Malalison Island.
(12) Draft of the Policies on Excursionists and Visitors to Malalison. In late 1996, Barangay
Malalison officials drafted an ordinance to regulate the activities of travelers and visitors to
the island. Salient provisions on the draft ordinance include designating a docking area,
charging an entrance fee from visitors to the island, issuing cleanliness guidelines for visitors,
andregulating the length of visitors’ stay onthe island.
Lessons learned on the PDR and institutional arrangements in fishery co-management
On process documentation research 1) The PDR as a methodology is a useful tool for development-
oriented projects because it provides current and useful information that will guide the project
implementers. 2) Process documenters must be neutral at all the times. Ideally, a process documenter
must not be involved in actual project activities to minimize bias; moreover, he or she must be a full-
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to the end of the project. This, however, could be expensive especially for long-term projects of three
years or more.
On institutional arrangements in fishery co-management Several lessons have been learned
from the Malalison PDR experience that contribute to the success of CFRM. These are: 1) the important
and effective role media (radio) can play in disseminating information and exposing violations in policies
and laws regarding resource conservation; 2) the need for local legislators to undergo training in
parliamentary procedures related to the Local Government Code; 3) the importance of scientific data
in policy-making; 4) linkages and networking as a cost-effective strategy in reducing the cost associated
with fishery co-management; 5) the need for beneficiaries of the project to share the cost/burden of
development; and 6) the need for holding an annual forum to provide information to all stakeholders
in the community about the project’s status and problems.
In conclusion, process documentation research methodology is appropriate for development projects
using community-based strategies such as the CFRM project on Malalison Island. The PDR reflects the
interactions and articulation of issues by the different players and stakeholders of a resource. It mirrors
the activities and events as they happen, where they happen, how they happen, when they happen,
and why they happen. It provides project implementers with current data for decision-making and
flexibility to adapt to any changes in the project.
4.3 Impact evaluation of community-based coastal resource management projects 10
A quantitative evaluation of CBCRM projects in the Philippines was undertaken. The project was
implemented because it was felt that the large number of CBCRM projects implemented in the country
since 1984 represented a vast pool of untapped information that could be analyzed to gain increased
knowledge about variables and conditions for successful planning and implementation of CBCRM.
The ultimate evaluation of a CBCRM project is its impact on the well-being of the coastal ecosystem,
including both human and non-human elements. Ideally, the evaluation would compare information
collected before project implementation (baseline data) after project completion. Also ideally, information
collected during both time periods would employ identical instruments or operational definitions of
the variables (or indicators) being evaluated. Unfortunately, many factors associated with the
implementation of projects result in a situation where the ideal evaluation is difficult, if not impossible,
to achieve. Baseline information is frequently unavailable or inadequate. Methods used in the baseline
may be inadequately described, making it impossible to ensure comparability between time-one and
time-two measurements. Finally, funding for post-evaluation may be inadequate to replicate baseline
methodologies. Impact evaluation is further complicated by lack of baseline information and limited
funding for post-evaluation that may be unevenly distributed across variables of interest. All these
factors have a negative impact on the precision and comparability of impact analyses, but they should
not inhibit attempts to estimate impacts using alternative methods.
Since the primary goal of this research was to determine factors influencing the success and sustainability
of CBCRM projects, the issue of cross-project comparability of evaluation methods are significant. It
is necessary to have common operational definitions of CBCRM project success, as well as factors
10 Condensed from an article by R.S.Pomeroy, R.B.Pollnac, B.M.Katon and C.D.Predo entitled “Evaluating factors contributing
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associated with success, to conduct this type of analysis. To accomplish this, a baseline-independent
technique for impact assessment was developed and used. This resulted in a standardized methodology
that could be applied to other CBCRM project impact assessments. Such comparability facilitates
quantitative analyses of variables impacting CBCRM project success.
“Well-being of the coastal ecosystem” is a fuzzy but intuitively understandable concept. Both human
and natural communities are included in the coastal ecosystem, so the notion of “well-being” applies
to both. Ideally, an aquatic ecosystem sould be assessed using indicators such as species richness and
composition, trophic composition, and organism condition and abundance. Karr et al. (1986) developed
a summary index based on a weighted summing of attributes of each of the indicators. Others (e.g.
Rapport 1984) have identified indicators of natural ecosystem stress, including evaluations of nutrient
loss, primary productivity, diversity and size distribution, and system retrogression. Costanza (1992)
suggests construction of an overall ecosystem health index composed of system vigour weighted by
indices for system organization and resilience, each of these indices being constructed from other
indicators. Clearly, assessment of “well-being” of the natural component of an ecosystem is a complex,
expensive process.
Assessment of human community “well-being” can likewise be a complex and expensive process.
Variables often mentioned as indicators include income, health and nutrition status, housing, and
education. If some of these variables are available from baseline studies, there are frequently reasons
to question the reliability of the measures used. For example, health and nutrition status is notoriously
difficult to assess in developing countries. There is mounting evidence to question the reliability of
informant recall as a method to obtain such information, and employment of biological and anthropological
techniques such as skin fold measurements would be both expensive and time-consuming. Income
information is also difficult to obtain, especially among fishers whose day-to-day catches vary so
extensively that informant recall is highly unreliable. This results in the use of complicated techniques
asking for income on good days, average days, and bad days, then trying to obtain information to
calculate the approximate number of each type of day per fishing season, etc., then calculating an
estimated income. More accurate information can be obtained from landing statistics, but they are
rarely collected and notoriously unreliable. Frequently, the estimate is made based on an “average”
(variously understood by individual fishers) fishing trip, which little information. Finally, estimates of
income are further complicated by the occupational multiplicity that characterizes rural areas in
developing countries. Education and housing are a bit easier to assess. Housing is frequently assessed
using some type of material style of life scale composed of house construction and furnishing attributes.
Sometimes these highly interrelated variables are combined in some fashion and referred to as “quality
of life”. A traditional single-item indicator of quality of life is the infant mortality rate. This is a fairly
good measure of general nutrition and health care, as are indicators concerning satisfaction with some
basic human needs, as well as indicators related to income and education. Newland (1981) writes “no
cold statistic expresses more eloquently the differences between a society of sufficiency and a society
of deprivation than the infant mortality rate”. Secondary sources might provide this information for
the CBCRMP target area, but it is most likely aggregated for some larger area, hence inappropriate for
estimating project impacts. Regional health services may have the disaggregated data that could be
used to calculate an index for the CBCRMP, but the population might be so small that an excessively
long series of data would be required to arrive at a reliable infant mortality rate, suggesting that attempts
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Clearly, the complexity and number of the set of variables appropriate for evaluating coastal ecosystem
“well-being” indicate that the entire set will rarely be available in existing CBCRMP baselines, and if
some are, there will probably be questions concerning reliability and/or cross-project comparability.
Unfortunately, most CBCRMPs are not, and probably will never be, in a position to conduct adequate
baselines and/or evaluations of the coastal ecosystem using such complex, expensive measures. Further,
with respect to the human component of the ecosystem, the indicators, while extremely important,
reflect for the most part material concerns (e.g. income, material style of life, etc.), food, and health.
These are basic needs, basic to maintaining life, but humans have other needs – social and psychological
needs such as family and community integration and self-actualization that are important to the “well
being” or “quality of life” of the human community. For example, satisfaction with one’s occupation
is based on the fulfilment of basic as well as other social and psychological needs. CBCRMPs have the
potential to impact these needs, and extensive research has related job satisfaction to a host of variables
impacting “well-being”, ranging from domestic violence and impaired social relations to psychosomatic
illness and heart disease.
With respect to impact indicators, the success and sustainability of a project are based in large part on
the participants’ reactions to the project. In turn, their reactions are based on user perceptions of
impacts, which are not always in accord with objective, quantifiable evidence. Hence, if there is an
interest in understanding the success and sustainability of CBCRM projects, it is essential to understand
perceptions of the present and possible future impacts of these projects. Perceptions of impacts may
explain some of the variance in the long-termand short-term project success. Impact indicators used
in this study are as follows:
1. Overall well-being of the household
2. Overall well-being of the resource
3. Local income
4. Access to resources
5. Control over resources
6. Ability to participate in community affairs
7. Ability to influence community affairs
8. Community conflict
9. Community compliance with resource management
10. Amount of traditionally harvested resource in the water
If the method is to be useful, it should be able to deal with variability in perceptions. It is clear that
different individuals within a community will be variously impacted by CBCRM projects, and this
influences their perceptions of impacts and their reactions to the project. The ability to evaluate these
differently perceived impacts will permit analyses to determine socio-cultural and socio-economic
factors influencing different perceptions. It will also facilitate analyses of distribution of perceived
project benefits.
Ideally, the method used should be able to take advantage of the human ability to make graded ordinal
judgments concerning both subjective and objective phenomena. Human behavior is based on graded
ordinal judgements, not simply a dichotomous judgment of “present” or “absent”. This refined level
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as well as permitting the use of more powerful statistical techniques to determine relationships between
perceived impacts and potential predictor variables. The technique chosen for use in the study is a
visual, self-anchoring, ladder-like scale that allows for making finer ordinal judgements, places less
demand on informant memory, and can be administered more rapidly. Using this technique, the subject
is shown as a ladder-like diagram with 15 steps. The subject is told that the first step represents the
worst possible situation. For example, with respect to coastal resources, the subject might be informed
that the first step indicates an area with no fish or other resources, where the water is so foul that
nothing could live in it. The highest step could be described as clean water, filled with fish and other
wildlife. The subject would then be asked where the situation was before the CBCRM project, where
it is today, and where he/she believes it will be 5 (or 10) years in the future. Perceived changes are only
one aspect of the evaluation. It is also important to determine individual explanations for the changes.
This was achieved by asking the subject why a given change has occurred. This open-ended type of
question provided valuable insights related to individual and community perceptions of factors
influencing perceived changes.
It was expected that there would be variability in perceptions of impact indicators and that these
perceptions would vary together with both project experience and other socio-cultural variables. A
review of the literature was used to identify a number of these types of variables that have been
implicated in project success. Nineteen independent variables, including basic demographic, occupational,
economic, resource, attitudinal, and project participation variables, were identified as likely to  affect
perceptions of project impacts. The variables are detailed in the following section.
Impact evaluation of community-based coastal resource management projects: the Central
Visayas Regional Project-1, Philippines 11
The Central Visayas Regional Project-1 (CVRP-1) was a response to the continuing degradation of
renewable resources and increasing poverty in rural communities. The CVRP-1 project was born out
of a need by the central government to decentralize the management of coastal resources to local
governments and resource users to increase the participation of resource users in management. It was
the first major foreign-assisted project in the Philippines to support regionalization. Early on, the CVRP-
1 recognized the imperatives of devolving many decision-making powers from the central government
to the regional level in order to address pressing resource management issues effectively. Designed
around the principles of participatory resource management and the devolution of power, the project
was meant to stabilize and improve the resource base.
From an overall perspective, the CVRP-1 sought to achieve a threefold objective, namely: (1) increase
incomes and living standards of small-scale fishers, farmers, and forest occupants; (2) improve the
management of the region’s marine, upland, and forest resources in critical watershed areas; and (3)
increase the capacity for regionalization of decision-making and program implementation. The near-
shore fisheries component, in particular, addressed the following: (1) establishment and allocation of
user’s rights to an extensive system of artificial reefs in the waters adjacent to the four upland sites in
the region; (2) establishment of effective coral reef management on the coral reefs at the four projectsites; (3) replanting of mangroves in all suitable sites, management of existing mangrove timberlands
by small-scale holders, and allocation of user’s rights to the areas; (4) strengthening of participating
government line agencies; (5) undertaking of special studies to support near shore habitat management
goals; and (6) conducting general surveys to provide the technical basis for project replication in other
areas. Six villages in three municipalities of the provinces of Cebu and Negros Oriental were selected
for the study. In consultation with former CVRP-1 staff, one “successful” and one “less successful” village
were selected from each of the three municipalities.
Analysis
As a first step in the analysis, mean values were calculated of the differences between current impact
indicators (t2) and those of the pre-project time (t1), A paired comparison t-test was calculated to
determine whether the mean differences between the two periods were statistically different (Table
13). The results of this analysis show  a statistically significant increase in levels of perception for all
indicators, except for the one on access. However, the results indicate some decreased access for the
sanctuaries, mangrove contracts, and exclusive access for members to artificial reef areas. Similar
analyses were also conducted separately between association members and non-members reflecting
statistically significant changes similar to those found in Table 13. Standard deviations in the analysis
indicate that there is a fair amount of variability with respect to evaluation of indicators. Since people’s
behavior is based on their perceptions, it is important to determine the correlates of variability in
perceptions to further our understanding of the factors that ultimately influence the sustainability of
behaviors associated with CBCRM.
Table 13. Perceived changes in indicators between the pre-project and post-project
periods. pre
Impact indicators t2-t1 s.d. t-value p
Access -0.42 5.15 1.14 >0.050
Compliance 3.67 3.87 13.39 <0.001
Conflict 2.80 3.49 11.34 <0.001
Control 2.64 4.61 8.08 <0.001
Harvest 1.93 4.12 6.59 <0.001
Household 2.33 2.83 11.61 <0.001
Income 2.45 3.43 10.09 <0.001
Influence 3.31 3.68 12.70 <0.001
Participation 3.22 3.81 11.91 <0.001
Resource 2.21 3.93 7.93 <0.001
N=199; d.f. =198
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As part of the process of achieving this goal, the next step in the analysis examines the relationship
between ten indicators and the 19 independent variables identified as potentially influencing CBCRMP
success.
The independent variables, listed in Tables 14 and 15, include basic social variables such as age, years
of formal education, household size, and length of the respondent’s  residence in the community. Job-
related variables include years of fishing experience, whether or not the respondent used to have other
occupation than fishing, and whether or not the respondent would change from fishing to another
occupation with similar income if given an opportunity. Income-related variables include whether or
not the respondent had income other than fishing, whether fishing was the most important source
among others. Another income variable was whether or not the household received income from
someone living outside the household (e.g. remittances from abroad or relatives living in the city).
Resource-related variables include whether or not the respondent evaluated the resource as being in
bad condition in the pre-project period (perceived pre-project resource crisis) and an estimate of their
ecological knowledge, based on the number of factors they cited as contributing to a healthy marine
resource. Cooperation-related variables include the respondent’s evaluation of the potential of community
members and fishers in working together to solve common problems, and whether or not the respondent
is a member of the project-sponsored association. Finally, project-related variables include whether
or not the respondent felt he or she had an influence on project planning or post-implementation
activities and whether the respondent attended project-training activities.Table 14. Correlations between perceived changes in indicators and independent variables
Indicators
Independent variables Access Comply Conflict Control Harvest
Age 0.01     - 0.13    - 0.04
0.01 0.06
Education      - 0.12 0.05 0.14* 0.07
0.13
Household size      - 0.03       -     - 0.02
0.06 0.08 0.06
Years of residence in community      -  - 0.03      -       -
0.14 0.09 0.05 0.08
Years of fishing experience      - 0.09 0.03      - -
0.08 0.06 0.04
Had occupation other than fishing      - 0.13 0.13 0.09 0.01
0.03
Willing to change occupation 0.07 0.02 0.05      - 0.10
0.06
Income sources other than fishing      - - 0.00      - -
0.01 0.10 0.05 0.13
Fishing most important income source - - - -
0.17* 0.07 0.10 0.09 0.05
Fishing provides over half the income 0.07     - - 0.15*      - -
0.04 0.12 0.08
Income from outside the household 0.01 0.13   0.15*   0.03
0.07
Perceived pre-project resource crisis - 0.00       - - -
0.05 0.02 0.19** 0.22**
Ecological knowledge     - 0.06 0.08 0.08
0.10 0.02
Community members can cooperate      0.26** 0.12   
0.22** 0.24** 0.21**
Fishers can cooperate            0.26** 0.08
0.19** 0.22** 0.25** 
Association member 0.01    - - 0.03 0.09 0.09
0.01
Had influence on project planning 0.04            0.04    0.13
0.13 0.22**
Had post-implementation influence 0.04            0.07 0.16*
0.11 0.23**
Attended project training 0.00   - 0.01 - 0.09        0.04
0.11
N=199; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01
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correlations with the amount of perceived change in at least one of the indicators, and each of the
indicators is significantly correlated with two to five of the independent variables. Attitudes toward
community and fisher cooperation are positively related to perceived changes in nine of the ten
indicators. Perceived pre-project resource crisis is negatively correlated with four indicators, indicating
that those who noted that the resource was in poor shape before the project tend to see little change
in the four indicators. Influence on project planning and post-implementation changes are positively
related to perceived changes in three and two indicators, respectively. Education and income from
outside the household are also positively related to two indicators. Age, importance of income from
fishing, and attendance at project training is related to one indicator each.
Table 15. Correlations between perceived changes in indicators and independent variables
Indicators
Independent variables House Income Influence Participation Resource
Age 0.06  0.16*      0.12 0.11 0.11
Education 0.14 0.06      0.14 0.06
0.19**
Household size - 0.06 0.01       - 0.08 - 0.04
0.04
Years resident in community 0.01 0.02       0.04 0.10
0.06
Years fishing experience 0.04 0.03        0.02 0.04
0.03
Had occupation other than fishing 0.05 0.00       0.00 0.04
0.07
Willing to change occupation - 0.03 0.04     - - 0.05 - 0.07
0.08
Income sources other than fishing - 0.04 - 0.03    - -0.07 -0.03
0.01
Fishing most important income source - 0.02 0.04      - 0.02 0.03
0.00
Fishing provides over half the income - 0.04 - 0.05      - - 0.06 - 0.07
0.06
Income from outside the household - 0.04 0.08      0.09 0.07 0.08
Perceived pre-project resource crisis - - 0.19** - - 0.04 - 0.14*
0.25** 0.03
Ecological knowledge 0.06 - 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.11
Community members can cooperate    0.28**       0.25** 0.28**
0.18* 0.22**
Fishers can cooperate    0.31**       0.20** 0.23**
0.14* 0.23**
Association member    0.10      0.11 0.12 0.13
0.15*
Had influence on project planning 0.08 0.03      0.18* 0.10
 0.15*
Had post-implementation influence 0.08 0.06      0.12 0.09 0.11
Attended project training 0.08 0.04     0.14 -0.04
 0.15*
N=199; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01
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between the independent and dependent variables, it is important to determine whether some insights
can be gained by analyzing patterns of co-variation within the set of indicator variables and relating this
co-variation to the independent, predictor variables. Hence, the next step in the analysis is to subject
the ten indicators to a principal component analysis (PCA) (with varimax rotation) to determine whether
relationships between the indicators were such that they could be reduced to fewer, composite indicators
for further analysis (Table 16). The number of components of the PCA was selected based on a scree-
test. The three rotated components explain 66 per cent of the variance in the set of indicators.
Table 16. Principal component analysis of impact indicators
Component
1 2 3
Compliance 0.82 0.12 0.07
Conflict 0.78 0.03 0.18
Participation 0.77 0.13 0.29
Influence 0.75 0.22 0.34
Control 0.57 0.40 0.12
Access         -0.25 0.72 0.17
Harvest 0.38 0.66 0.12
Resource 0.39 0.63 0.02
Income 0.34 0.51 0.55
Household 0.24 0.11 0.90
Variance 33 19 14
Indicators loading highest on Component 1 are perceived changes in community compliance with
resource regulations, community conflict, participation in community affairs, influence in community
affairs, and control over the resource. Indicators loading highest on Component 2 are perceptions in
changes in access to the resource, amount of traditionally harvested species, and overall well-being
of the resource. Finally, indicators loading highest on Component 3 are perceived changes in income
and household well-being. Impact indicators loading on Component 1 are described as indicators
dealing with behavior of community members. Indicators loading highest on Component 2 are resource-
related indicators. Finally, Component 3 is described as household well-being related indicators.
The next step in the analysis was to determine the relationships between the new composite measures
of the indicators (PCA) and the 19 independent variables listed in Tables 14 and 15. Independent
variables related (p < 0.10) to any of the three components were selected using an interactive step-
wise multiple regression analysis to determine the set of independent variables that explain most of
the variance in each of the three components. The step-wise regression used in the analysis is considered
interactive in the sense that partial correlations are examined at each step for indications of changes
that could be the result of multi-collinearity; the offending variable is not used in the regression analysis.
Results of the step-wise regression analysis are shown in Table 17.
67 CHAPTER FOUR • METHODS FOR IMPLEMENTING AND ASSESSING FISHERIES CO-MANAGEMENTThe result of the three regression analyses is statistically significant. Years of formal education, a source
of income from outside the household, and the attitude that community members can cooperate
account for about 9 per cent of the variation in the human behavior component. Two variables, perceived
pre-project resource crisis and the attitude that community members can cooperate, account for 8 per
cent of the variance in the resource component, and only one variable, perceived pre-project resource
crisis, was entered into the regression equation for the household well-being component.
As a final step in the regression analysis, scores for the three components were tallied, resulting in an
overall measure of perceived changes. This measure will be referred to as the total perceived impact
measure. The correlations of the total perceived impact measure with the 19 independent variables
were calculated, and only the variables manifesting significant correlation (P <0.05) with dependent
variable were selected for use in the step-wise regression. Result of the analysis is highlighted in Table
17. This analysis indicates that four of the independent variables – perceived pre-project resource crisis,
attitudes towards ability of both fishers and community members to cooperate with one another, and
having influence on project planning – account for 17 per cent of the variance in the total perceived
impact measure.
Table 17. Regression analyses of impact components
Std. Coeff. t-test Prob. 2-tail
Dependent variable: Component 1:
Human behavior
Education 0.191 2.802 0.006
Income from outside the household 0.153 2.247 0.026
Community members can cooperate 0.214 3.142 0.002
R=0.315; R2=0.099; Adj. R2=0.085
N=199; F=7.161; d.f.=3.195; p < 0.001
Dependent variable: Component 2:
Resource
Perceived pre-project resource crisis -0.157 2.294 0.023
Community members can cooperate 0.246 3.599 0.000
R=0.299; R2=0.089; Adj. R2=0.080
N=199; F=9.612; d.f.=2.196; p < 0.001
Dependent variable: Component 3:
Household well-being
Perceived pre-project resource crisis -0.198 2.828 0.005
R=0.198; R2=0.039; Adj. R2=0.034
N=199; F=8.000; d.f.=1.197; p < 0.005
Dependent variable:
Total perceived impact
Perceived pre-project resource crisis -0.165 2.487 0.014
Fishers can cooperate 0.143 1.718 0.087
Community members can cooperate 0.248 3.017 0.003
Had influence on project planning 0.132 2.020 0.045
R=0.432; R2=0.187; Adj. R2=0.170
N=199; F=11.128; d.f.=4.194; p < 0.001
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Discussion and Conclusion
In general, analyses suggest that the community-based coastal resource management projects under
CVRP-1 were successful despite partial or complete failure (destruction due to natural events) of some
of its objectives (e.g. artificial reefs, fish aggregating devices, shellfish culture, etc.). This highlights the
fact that fishers and project staff may have completely different perceptions of success. When CVRP-1
staff identified “successful” sites that were compared with “less successful” sites with respect to pre-
project and post-project changes for the ten indicator variables, they differed only with respect to the
perceived amount of increase in compliance with regulations, community conflict, influence in
community affairs, and control over the resource. Nevertheless, it should be pointed out that both
“less successful” and “successful” communities perceived increases in all four indicators.
The results of means tests applied to the impact indicators show that project community members,
association members as well as non-members, perceive positive and statistically significant improvement
in all indicators except for access. The sanctuaries, mangrove contracts, and exclusive access for members
to artificial reef areas resulted in some perceiving decreased access, thus resulting in overall perceptions
of no significant change.
Correlation and regression analyses conducted to determine the relationships between changes in the
10 indicator variables and 19 independent variables concerning factors influencing success of CBCRM
projects revealed that the most important among the independent variables is the pair reflecting cultural
attitudes toward cooperation. This variable was found to be related to nine of the ten indicators. The
attitude that community members can cooperate was significant in the regression analyses of the
human behavior and resource impact component as well as the total perceived impact measure. Other
important predictor variables found were perception that the resource was in poor shape and influence
on project planning, which entered into the regression models.
In conclusion, several important lessons have been learned from the analyses. First, evaluations of
project success by project staff and beneficiaries vary because they may use different criteria. Both may
be valid in their own terms. It appears that project staff was focusing more on easily observable impacts
of material interventions as a measure of success. Fishers on the other hand, defined “success” as being
given more sense of empowerment, more access to information and better skills to make decisions
to improve their life, being more integrated into the economic and political mainstream, etc. Second,
early and continuous participation of beneficiaries in project planning and implementation is related
to positive evaluation of impacts. Not only does this type of involvement serve to adapt project activities
to local needs, but participants also gain a better understanding of the problems involved and a sense
of empowerment. Third, positive cultural attitudes toward the efficacy of collective action were
consistently related to perceptions of positive change. The CVRP-1 training in organization and leadership
enhanced these attitudes, as reflected in fishers’ statements that they now know how to run meetings
and get something accomplished. Fourth, project cooperators, as well as non-cooperators, perceived
some positive changes, with little difference between the two groups. This “spread effect” is probably
the consequence of early, open involvement of all community members and subsequent face-to-face
interactions in the small community settings where everyone is aware of what is going on. Fifth, the
data indicate that fishers like their occupation and would not necessarily change to another job,
suggesting that the development of supplemental, rather than alternative, occupations may be the
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a large number of fishers, reducing rather than eliminating their fishing activity, and probably having
as great an effect, or greater, as trying to attract (or force) fishers into some alternative form of
employment.
4.4 Measuring project success in community-based coastal resource management projects12
Community-based coastal resource management projects abound in Southeast Asia, especially in the
Philippines. Between 1984 and 1994, more than 100 community-based coastal resource management
projects (CBCRM) were undertaken. An evaluation by Pomeroy and Carlos (1997) revealed that less
than 20 per cent of these projects were identified as being successful in the sense that the community
organization still existed and that at least a single project intervention was maintained after the project
terminated. Why the majority of projects failed is not clear. It may have been that the project components
were implemented at a time when the people were not ready for them, and/or it may have been that
the project components were not relevant for the people.
An earlier study by Pomeroy et al. (1996) showed that while projects could be unsuccessful in the eyes
of the implementers, the project participants did not necessarily perceive the projects as failures at all.
The analysis suggested that the CBCRM projects evaluated were successful despite partial or complete
failure (or destruction by natural events) of some project interventions (e.g. artificial reefs, fish
aggregating devices, shellfish culture, etc.). From the study it appeared that project staff were focusing
more on easily observable impacts, e.g. functioning fishers’ organizations, area of mangrove successfully
replanted, etc., while the fishers felt a sense of empowerment. The fishers stated that they had more
information with which to make decisions and improve their lives. They had more skills and felt more
integrated into the economic and political mainstream. Hence, evaluations by both project staff and
beneficiaries are important, but it is also necessary to understand that they reveal different results
based on different criteria of success or failure. It is, however, the evaluation by the community members
themselves that will influence their subsequent behavior and thus the potential sustainability of the
project.
From development to people-centered resource management
Indicators commonly used to measure success of development projects were designed at a time when
development focused on increasing (agricultural) production. Local people were merely recipients of
advice, training and technology essential in increasing their harvests and subsequently their well-being,
or so it was thought. The top-down, blueprint development approach, however, failed to stimulate
people’s affinity with such projects, and neither did it create a sense of responsibility or ownership
concerning the output. Failure of many of these projects during the 1960s and 1970s led to a shift in
development thinking. Attention shifted from a strictly production point of view to a farming systems
research and extension focus. It was acknowledged that without the support, consent and participation
of the target population, a project was likely to fail (Korten 1987). Technology and production, however,
were still regarded as keys to development.
Community-based management strives for more active people’s participation in the planning and71
implementation of natural resources management (Pomeroy 1998). CBCRM’s central concern is the
empowerment of groups and social actors and a sense of self-reliance. It starts from the basic premise
that people have the innate capacity to understand and act on their own problems and CBCRM builds
on this knowledge (Ferrer and Nozawa 1997). However, the recognition that the state cannot be ignored
in sustaining local actions, has led to co-management, a partnership between the government and the
community (Pomeroy 1998).
Shortcomings in evaluations
The social preparation process in CBCRM is time-consuming. It was concluded that for a truly participatory
project, the time required for people to master new skills for CBCRM would be at least 3 - 5 years
(Pomeroy et al 1996). Many projects, however, even if they include a social preparation process, are
planned for a shorter time span. The problem is that project activities are often carried out while the
beneficiaries are still in the process of developing the skills needed to actually understand and implement
the project interventions. As a result, the local community members are not prepared to carry out, or
fully accomplish, the project interventions, let alone sustain them. Consequently, at the end of the
project life, the interventions are not fully implemented and/or sustained. Thus, the project is deemed
a failure.
A second shortcoming in the measurement of project success is that although community-based
management is people-centered, project evaluation does not include the personal achievements of the
participants. Evaluation has remained focused on material indicators of project success. The less tangible
results of the project, i.e. the personal development of the beneficiaries; changes in attitudes, beliefs
and values of the participants; sense of empowerment, etc., are not measured.
The main reason why projects are often evaluated as being unsuccessful are: (1) the timing of the
evaluation is usually wrong, and (2) the criteria used to measure success are those which the project
implementers feel to be important, while overlooking those representing the experience of the
participants. There is a need to re-evaluate measures of success and develop new criteria to measure
success.
“Emic” and “Etic” views of success
The disparity between what is actually measured and the people's perceived impacts of the project can
be explained through a theory used in Anthropology. Harris (1991), for example, writes: “The problem
is that both thoughts and behavior of the project participants can be viewed from two perspectives:
from that of the participants themselves and that of the observers. In both instances, scientific and
objective accounts of the mental and the behavioral fields are possible. In the first instance, the observers
employ concepts and distinctions that are meaningful and appropriate to the participants; in the second
instance they employ concepts that are meaningful and appropriate to the observers. The first way of
studying culture (or perceptions of success) is called “emic” and the second way is called “etic”.
Borrowed from linguistics (Pike 1954), “phonemic” refers to what a sound signifies in the minds of the
users. “Phonetic”, on the other hand, refers to scientific descriptions of sound with no reference to
meaning, i.e. from the outside. “Etic” categories are those that the researcher employs for the purposes
of scientific classification, analysis, and understanding of human-environmental interactions (Lovelace
1984). “Emic” is concerned with the elements, aspects, and interpretations of the belief system as
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perceived or conceived by the members of the culture or society under consideration (see also de
Groot 1992 on the use of “emic” and “etic” in the perception of environmental problems).
The problem is that even though many projects claim to have a participatory approach, they do not
make a distinction between the “emic” and “etic” project results. In many cases, the project staff defines
and analyses project output in concrete, technical terms, which represent the “etic” indicators. Their
evaluation thus focuses exclusively on “etic” observations.
However, evaluations also need to include a set of “emic” or normative indicators. Strictly, “etic”
assessments are inadequate for projects that have socio-cultural impacts. During the process phase,
it is meaningful to determine how the people perceive the natural environment, the local problems,
the alternative solutions, and their abilities to intervene; but most importantly, their capabilities to do
this collectively (Pomeroy and Carlos 1996). In the absence of “emic” considerations, it is impossible
to discover these local conceptions and perceptions.
This does not mean that etic measurements cannot be used to measure success. The physical aspects
(i.e. the “etic” environment connected to the values and views of the project implementers) need to
be measured at a later phase. It is essential that the two types of project evaluation be measured at the
appropriate time. Even though the social preparation process takes place in the implementation phase
(when project activities are also carried out), this is the moment for “emic” considerations and not for
a focus on material output. Only after the project phases out and when the community has carried out
its interventions, is it adequate to measure the “etic” output. In order to measure success, it is crucial
to acknowledge and evaluate the non-material results that make the project successful in the eyes of
the people, and to measure them at the right time.
What to measure and when?
Important components of the social preparation phase are, amongst others, communication-mechanisms
and participation. Communication mechanisms are used to clarify and define the roles of participants
in different phases of the project. Exercises can help people to understand principles of adult learning
and community participation. Trainers and participants become aware of preconceptions about each
other; they learn about group behavior and role perceptions (see for example the FAO 1988; UNDP
1993). These exercises and other tools enhance participation. They help to establish a working climate
that stimulates involvement of various stakeholder groups and allows people to partake in decision-
making. The communication-mechanisms thus provide the proper conditions for active participation
and capacity building.
Several studies, guidelines and training manuals for a participatory approach provide possible indicators
that represent community attributes, i.e. awareness and capability (UNDP 1993; Pretty 1994; Pomeroy
et al. 1996; Borrini-Feyerabend 1997; IIRR 1998). It is important to distinguish accomplishments on
two levels: the personal/individual level and the community level.
FISHERIES AND COASTAL RESOURCES CO-MANAGEMENT IN ASIA: SELECTED RESULTS FROM A REGIONAL RESEARCH PROJECTPossible indicators that represent project beneficiaries' personal achievements and benefits are listed
below (Figure 7).
Figure 7.  Individual indicators for project success
Individual indicators for project success





Capability to express an opinion
to make decisions
to prioritize issues
to participate in a meeting
to write a proposal
to speak in public
to work in committees
Control over the process
over resources




Skills to repair and maintain technical equipment
to manage a project
to solve problems
Personal change in awareness




in generating new ideas
in willingness to deviate from customs and community values
in willingness to take risks
73 CHAPTER FOUR • METHODS FOR IMPLEMENTING AND ASSESSING FISHERIES CO-MANAGEMENTFor the community as a whole, other issues may be important. The community viewpoint is naturally
concerned with general benefits and achievements. Sets of indicators to identify changes at the
community level are listed below (Figure 8).
Figure 8. Community indicators for project success
Community indicators for project success
Communication commitment of stakeholders
recognition of stakeholders
understanding between stakeholder groups
expression of different viewpoints
level of open disagreement
Representation of various stakeholders
of various social groups
of women and children
of socially marginalized groups
Collaboration among individuals
among neighborhood groups
among various social (differentiated) groups
Trust among staff members
among staff and the government
among staff and the project beneficiaries
Support of higher government levels
of the local leaders
of a NGO
of the project staff
of village-based organizations
It is assumed that a measurement of the individual and community indicators, right after the social
preparation process or implementation phase, will lead to a positive assessment where people feel
they have achieved something, and to a negative outcome where this is not the case. This early “emic”
evaluation has the advantage that it allows the project to adapt over time and thus prevent possible
failures.
Since the social preparation process is part of the implementation phase, it is possible to include
material and physical project indicators in the preliminary evaluation (Figure 9). This evaluation typically
focuses on the process of project planning and development. It will show whether the project goals
are appropriate, need to be modified, adapted, or omitted altogether. The advantages of this early
measurement of physical indicators are that it: (1) enhances the self-esteem and awareness of participants,
and (2) reveals priorities of the project participants. Hence, it further stimulates internalization of the
project objectives, which makes it more likely that the selected activities will be carried out.
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phase. Not only are the physical outputs of the project (i.e. the degree to which project goals have
been achieved) measured in a quantitative way, but also the organizational (non-material) success
factors are quantified, such as the intensity of group involvement and the functioning of the management
system and enforcement mechanisms (Figure 9).
Ideally, indicators are selected by the project participants during the implementation phase of the
project. In reality, however, the indicators are predefined in a project proposal drafted by the implementing
or funding agency. Even though this may be the case, it is still advisable to lead all participants through
a process in which the goals and objectives are discussed and prioritized. This is essential if the project
goals are to be internalized locally and, most importantly, not imposed on the participants. Thus, the
definition of success for both the implementers and the participants is expected to be similar. This final
evaluation will truly represent the project’s success.
Figure 9. Project indicators of success
Project indicators of success
Success in terms of material output size of yields
catches per unit of effort
hectares of protected areas
hectares of mangroves/forests replanted
non-occurrence of destructive practices by local people
Success in terms of human involvement number of people attending the training activity
number of participants in the project
frequency of staff meetings
size of the network
Success in terms of project benefits division of benefits
economic opportunities
well-being in terms of physical and mental health
well-being in terms of income
flow of investments
higher education level
Success in terms of  management institution designed and active
management structure management plan and regulations designed and 
implemented enforcement structure in place
conflict-solving mechanism in place
leadership
Success in terms of participation  type of participation
dimension of participation
Methodology
The last question to be answered is “how to measure project success and by whom?” The emic and
etic measurements require a standard methodology that is valid and allows for comparison. There are
various ways to measure project success and operationalize the indicators. The methodology to measure
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people’s perceptions of success depends largely on whether the evaluation is action-oriented or is part
of an academic exercise. Anthropological fieldwork directed at the development of a set of indicators
leads to scientifically valid outcomes. However, it can be time-consuming, especially when it involves
a long list of indicators. Where time, funds and the availability of skilled researchers are limited,
alternative methods need to be used, for example, participatory evaluation methods. 
The core of the evaluation is people’s perceptions. It is essential to use the correct method to measure
these perceptions, especially since for a number of these indicators no baseline data are available. The
measurement of people’s perceptions is complex. Social science research is based on defining variables,
looking for associations among them, and trying to understand whether one variable influences another
(Bernard 1994). Even though social scientists are recognized as important counterparts in projects,
economists are often favored over anthropologists and sociologists owing to their preference for
quantitative indicators. As a result, perceptions and attitudes of people, not being part of the conceptual
framework of economists, are usually neglected or measured in a non-valid way.
Perceptions cannot simply be measured by asking people “what they think”, as happens in many studies.
These kinds of questions do not reflect the complexity of people’s thoughts and the subconscious.
Emic indicators (e.g. perceptions, attitudes, etc.) are non-material and qualitative yet quantifiable, and
demand a certain approach in order to be measured (Bernard 1994). To measure perceptions, for
example, requires the operationalization of a cognitive component (what do people know about the
subject), an affective component (what do people feel towards the subject), and an action component
(what is the behavior of the people towards the subject).
As part of a survey used in the ICLARM Fisheries Co-management Project in Indonesia (Novaczek and
Harkes 1998), fishers in Maluku Province were asked questions on job-satisfaction (Pollnac and Poggie
1988, Pomeroy et al. 1996). From the answers provided, it appeared that fishers have profound
knowledge about the fishery in terms of decline, fish-species, marketing and prices (cognitive aspects).
They expressed concern about the risk of fishing, while they also said they loved fishing because it
“was in their blood” (affective aspects). Generally, job-satisfaction seemed high (more than 80 per cent
were satisfied). When asked if they would actually change their profession if they could, or if they would
like their children to become fishers (action component), the responses were lower. If given the
opportunity, 36 per cent of the respondents would change their job, and less than 10 per cent of the
fishers actually wanted their children to become fishers (Novaczek and Harkes 1998). So, only the
combination of the three components reflects the true perception of the fishers. Proper operationalization
is thus required in order to carry out quantitative analyses and valid measurements.
Another example of a method to measure project impacts is a visual self-anchoring ladder scale also
used by ICLARM (see this chapter). This baseline independent technique employs non-parametric
statistical techniques and builds on the human ability to make graded ordinal judgments. Fishers are
asked to answer questions about the state of the resource, fish-catches, personal well-being, income,
occurrence of conflicts, and collective action. The method uses a picture of a ladder with ten rungs
as a visual aid. The lowest rung represents the worst possible condition; the highest rung represents
the best. In the study, fishers’ perceptions were recorded of past conditions, current conditions, and
degree of optimism for the future. The technique deals with the variability of perceptions over time
and facilitates analysis of the perceived project impacts.
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This is only one example to illustrate the use of participatory techniques, scaling, and ranking systems.
There are several other techniques (Figure 10). These techniques allow a great deal of input from
participants and are very useful to quickly understand the local situation (Drijver 1993; Mosse 1994).
Participatory research can also be conducted to collect and analyze baseline data on the community
and its natural resources (Pomeroy 1998). The techniques can easily be adapted to measure personal
change and development derived from the project, and outcomes can be quantified and compared.
For the easily quantifiable indicators of project success, a more straightforward method could be used,
e.g. observations, enumeration (census) and surveys.
Figure 10. PRA techniques (adapted from Jiggins and de Zeeuw 1992; Pido et al. 1996b)
1. Visual scoring and ranking systems can measure changes in wealth and well-being, development
of skills, representation of social groups etc.
2. Time lines can represent significant changes in the village, as well as on the individual level.
3. Seasonal patterns can show the relative magnitude of the workload; they can also illustrate
project activities and extent of involvement in the project.
4. Venn- and linkage diagrams can represent social relationships or the importance and influence
of different individuals or institutions.
5. Visual estimations and quantification record such things as yields and prices, but can also
be used to measure skills, initiative, commitment, etc.
Post-implementation activities include evaluation of project activities and adjustment of plans and
activities as needed. Every CBCRM project should have a schedule for the phase-out of external assistance
for the project. At this point, the CBCRM arrangements become truly self-sustaining (Pomeroy 1998).
After a management authority is handed over to the people, and the project is terminated, sustained
management efforts indicate that the project and project activities are really relevant to the people.
As can be concluded from the above, there are three points of attention: (1) the acknowledgment of
a social preparation process, (2) the need to define project goals communally, and (3) intermediary
measurements of various sets of project indicators. If these three aspects have become an integral part
of CBCRM projects, it is more likely that management efforts will be sustained over a longer period
of time.
Obstacles to measurement of “emic” success
Current development structures make no allowance for the extra set of indicators needed to evaluate
project success on the “emic” level. Often, targets are set by those outside the community. Only in a
few cases have the opinions of the participants played a major role in project design, implementation
and evaluation. Furthermore, in many cases, projects are carried out in too short a time, without a clear
or sufficient social preparation process, and with material interventions started too early. Hence, it is
not surprising that the material interventions are either not sustained or never implemented at all.
Consequently, and this is crucial, the project fails to measure the non-material successes that are
experienced by the participants.
Without “emic” assessments, the evaluation of a project is not complete. This measurement is only
possible when donors are prepared to change their approach, away from predefined, entirely material
goals. The implications for donors are significant. It means a restructuring of the project plans to include
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a redefinition of its goals, and possibly a longer implementation period. This has financial consequences,
but more importantly, changing the approach would imply a drastic shift in authority and autonomy
over the project. Numerous evaluations and studies of failed projects are a clear indicator that these
changes are required to increase the likelihood of project success in the short term, and so ensure
sustainable resource use in the longer term.
Conclusions
Over the last decades development projects have shifted their approach from production to a people-
oriented approach. The central concern of CBRM and co-management is the empowerment of groups
and social actors. The approach requires extensive participation and the development of local capability.
Project participants develop the skills required to manage their resources. However, the personal
development of project participants is not evaluated and project evaluation remains focused on material
outputs exclusively.
Apparently, project success depends largely on what is actually measured, when, and by whom. As a
means of evaluating project success as perceived by both the participants and teh implementers, The
indicators used to evaluate the project need to be adapted. The personal development of the participants
in terms of increased involvement, access, control, capability, skills, and personal change are reflected
in an emic evaluation. These skills are largely acquired during the social preparation process and the
appropriate moment to measure these non-material project impacts is right after the implementation
phase (see Pomeroy 1998).
A main issue tackled in this chapter is the requirement from external agencies and donors for quantifiable,
objective measurements. Social anthropology is one source of methods to operationalize concepts
such as “perception” into measurable, quantifiable components. However, measuring people's perceptions
as an academic exercise is time-consuming. If time is limited, people’s perceptions and personal
development can also be assessed through participatory techniques, such as ranking- and scaling
techniques (Pomeroy et al. 1996; Blauert and Quintanar 1997). These methods allow non-material
project results to become apparent and numerical and allow for statistical analysis. The fact that the
material project goals are defined collectively with the assistance of the government, NGOs and donor
agencies, leads to internalization of these material project goals by both parties. Consequently, the
“emic” perception of success coincides with the etic viewpoints, i.e. the project’s perspective and the
second measurement is objective and truly represents project success.
As said earlier, project success will prove itself in the long run. An early “emic” evaluation has the
advantage that it allows the project to adapt strategies and adjust project goals, and thus prevent
possible failures (see also Pollnac 1989). It also provides a picture of the performance of the project
over time, which will result in a more accurate assessment of what the project has achieved. In this
way, the chances of project success will not only increase, but it is also more likely that after the project
terminates, the participants will continue the project activities.
This, however, is only possible when donors are prepared to change their approach away from easily
quantifiable, physical project goals. It is essential that projects include a clear process phase, intermediary
measurements and an open agenda. This requires time and money, as well as reallocation of authority
over the project to local people, i.e. the new managers in the field.
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CHAPTER FIVE
Evaluation of Fisheries Co-management Performance
A number of hypotheses exist concerning the advantages of co-management, especially when co-
management is compared with centralized management systems. Several of these hypotheses were
empirically tested during both phases of the project including:  (a) whether regulatory compliance
levels under fisheries co-management are higher than under centralized management; (b) whether or
not transaction costs associated with fisheries co-management in the long run are lower than centralized
management costs; (c) how adaptive and resilient are community-based coastal resource management
institutions and how capable are they in responding to and managing change; and (d) whether co-
management leads to greater stakeholder roles and participation in management. In addition, in Phase
2, the issue of “scaling-up” from a single community to larger geographic or political scales was studied.
This chapter presents results of the testing of the hypotheses listed above and of the issue of “scaling-
up” co-management.
5.1. Enforcement and compliance
This section highlights the theoretical and empirical dimensions of enforcement and compliance in
four Southeast Asian countries. It summarizes research undertaken by Kuperan et al. (1997) in Malaysia,
Indonesia and the Philippines; Susilowati (1998) in Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines; Siason
(2002) in the Western Visayas, Philippines; Masae et al. (2002) in Southern Thailand; and Susilowti in
Central Java, Indonesia (2002).
5.1.1.Enforcement and compliance with fisheries regulations in Malaysia, Indonesia and
the Philippines 1
Fisheries are regulated to mitigate over-exploitation and conflicts among user groups. Often, the over-
fishing resulting from open access to the fishery is addressed with regulations that restrict gear and
vessel types, set minimum fish size limits, specify the time and area of closures and quotas, and require
licenses to fish. User conflicts are often addressed with gear prohibitions or restrictions and zones to
separate competing user groups.  Fishers, like most regulated economic agents, typically are controlled
through monitoring, surveillance and enforcement. Frequently, the most costly element of fisheries
management programs is enforcement, which accounts for a quarter to over a half of all expenditures.
Compliance with regulations is usually far from complete, seriously jeopardizing the effectiveness of
management. This raises questions on whether there are ways to improve the cost-effectiveness of
traditional enforcement and secure compliance without heavy reliance on costly enforcement.
Most modern analysis of compliance behavior centers on deterring rational individuals from violating
rules. Individuals acting in the pursuit of self-interest can impose harm on others. It has been argued
that social harmony can be realized only by controling aspects of human behavior. The basic deterrence
model assumes that the threat of sanctions is the only policy mechanism available to improve compliance
with the regulations.
This deterrence model, however, has at least two important shortcomings. First, the model does not
explain the available evidence very well. Second, the policy prescriptions are impractical. The model
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assumes self-interested individuals weigh the potential illegal gains against severity and certainty of
sanctions when deciding whether to comply. If the illegal gains are greater than the profits from legal
fishing, the expected penalty should be large enough to offset the difference between legal and illegal
gains. Since enforcement is costly, the probability of detection and conviction should be kept low and
penalties high. When the probability is low in practice, the typical odds of being caught violating a
fishery regulation are below one percent. Penalties, on the other hand, are not high enough to match
illegal gains.
Raising fines to the point where the expected penalty offsets illegal gains generally is not feasible. The
courts are not willing to mete out sanctions that fit the crime, as measured by the illegal gains realized
or the social harm caused by the detected and proven violation. The basic deterrence model predicts
that the generally modest sanctions will not be an adequate deterrent to illegal fishing. Despite this
apparent weakness, however, most fishers normally comply with the regulations. Data show that 34
percent, 81 percent and 30 percent of fishers in Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines, respectively,
comply with the zoning regulation.
When asked why they continue to comply when illegal gains are much larger than the expected penalties,
many fishers expressed a sense of obligation to obey a set of rules. This moral obligation may be a
significant motivation that explains much of the evidence on compliance behavior. Other factors
determining compliance are severity and certainty of sanctions, individuals’ perceptions of the fairness
and appropriateness of the law and its institutions, and social environmental factors. Compliance is
linked to both the internal capacities of the individual and external influences of his environment.
Fisheries law enforcement activities by and large determine the extent of compliance with laws and
regulations. In line with that, compliance is directly related to the effectiveness of fisheries enforcement.
Therefore, enforcement activities really have to be done in order to achieve the goal of fisheries
management. To provide for enforcement is costly.
In summary, the literature identifies the following factors determining compliance: potential illegal
gain, severity and certainty of sanctions, individual moral development and standards of personal
morality, individual perception of how just and moral the rules are being enforced, and the social
environment.
Enforcement and compliance models
In an attempt to overcome the shortcomings of the basic deterrence model, this study tests an extended
model of compliance behavior (Figure 12) in which rational individuals are driven by intrinsic and
extrinsic motivations. The model integrates economic theory with theories from psychology and
sociology to account for both tangible and intangible motivations influencing individuals’ decisions on
whether to comply with a given set of regulations. Specifically, the model accounts for morality,
legitimacy, and social influence in addition to the conventional costs and revenues associated with
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Econometric framework
The general econometric model used to test the relationship between illegal activity and a set of specific
intrinsic and extrinsic conditions is simply:
Yi = ßxi + å [1]
Where Yi measures the ith individual’s non-compliance with the zoning regulation, and xi is a vector
of conditions reflecting the individual’s perceived potential illegal gains and risk of detection and arrest,
and measures of morality, institutional legitimacy, and social influence.
Equation [1] may be derived from a model in which a utility-maximizing individual decides whether
and how frequently to violate a regulation. The individual’s utility is a function of the net income from
fishing (legal or illegal), his personal moral standing and his social standing. On the one hand, the
individual’s personal moral standing is assumed to depend on whether and how much he violates the
regulation in conjunction with his morality and the legitimacy he accords the regulatory institution.
The individual’s social standing, on the other hand, depends on how much he violates the regulation
in conjunction with the values and behavior of his peers.
With intrinsic and extrinsic motivations in the model, the total and marginal conditions for utility-
maximizing behavior are differentiated to generate a set of testable hypotheses. The following hypotheses
are derived from the total condition (i.e. an individual will violate if and only if his expected utility from
the violation exceeds the utility from not violating) and are stated in the context of a random utility
framework.
The lower the probability of an individual violating a regulation,
1. The higher the probability of detection and sanction (or greater the enforcement inputs);
2. The greater the penalty if sanctioned
3. The less profitable violating when compared to complying;
4. The higher the morality of the individual;
5. The more legitimate the regulation as perceived by the individual; and
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Figure 11. Determinants of compliance (Kuperan et al. 1997)
Key dependent variables in this study are the violation decision variable (VIOLT), and the number of
days a fisher has fished in the prohibited zone (NFINS). The violation decision is estimated using a
Probit model while the number of days fished inshore (NFINS) is estimated using a Tobit model (Probit
and Tobit models are linear regression models that enable analysis of dichotomous measures, such as
yes or no response options, or discontinuous data).
The basic deterrence model
A fisher’s decision to violate is modeled as a function of factors that affect his utility from fishing in the
prohibited zone (inshore areas). The equation for estimating the violation decision in the basic
deterrence model is:
VIOLT = f (CONSTANT, CPUEO, CPUEI, OPROB) [3]
Where VIOLT: equals one for a fisher who fishes at least once inshore during the year and zero
otherwise.
CONSTANT : the intercept in the equation.
CPUEI : the catch per unit of effort in the inshore area.
CPUEO : the catch per unit of effort in the offshore area
OPROB : the overall probability of detection, arrest and conviction if caught violating.
Compliance
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Estimated probabilities
The overall probability of detection and conviction is expected to be a function of enforcement and
evasion inputs, i.e. the subjective probabilities each fisherman may have on his own expenditures on
capital inputs (such as larger engines and faster boats, detection evasion equipment, etc.), as well as
his assessment of enforcement inputs. The perceived enforcement inputs include the number of patrol
boats a respondent thinks are operating in the area, the number of times he has seen enforcement
personnel at sea, and the frequency of his actual contact with enforcement personnel in terms of
boarding or checking. The estimated overall probability of detection and conviction is modeled as:
HOPROBi = f ( NPBOATSi , NENFORi , EXPEVAi , HPi ) [4]
Where,
HOPROBi : the estimated overall subjective probability of detection and conviction for fisher i
NPBOATSi : number of patrol boats fisher i believes to be in operation in his area
NENFORi : number of times fisher i has seen enforcement personnel at sea
EXPEVAi : expenditure on evasion activity by fisher i
HPi  : horse power rating of engine in the ith fisher’s boat
The extended compliance model
The compliance model is extended to include the effects of moral obligation and social influence on
compliance behavior. The moral obligation to comply is assumed to depend on the individual’s moral
development and on the perceived legitimacy of the regulatory institution. Kohlberg’s Standard Issue
Moral Judgement Interview and Scoring System (Colby et al. 1987) is used to rank fishers according
to their level of moral development.
Legitimacy accorded to the regulatory authorities by fishers is measured by 12 variables reflecting the
individual fisher’s assessment of the outcomes and procedures associated with the regulation. The
outcome variables are CONSERVE (zoning regulation is to conserve and protect the fishery resource),
CONFLICT (zoning regulation is to avoid conflict between inshore and offshore fishers), JUST (zoning
regulation is a just regulation), EVERYONE (zoning regulation improves the long-term well-being of
fishers), INSHORE (zoning regulation enhances the well-being of inshore fishers), and OFFSHORE
(zoning regulation improves the well-being of offshore fishers). For each of these variables, the
respondent ranked the level of agreement with each statement (Table 18) on a scale of one to five,
where a higher score indicates stronger agreement. The theory is that individuals that agree with these
outcome variables are also likely to accord a higher level of legitimacy to the enforcement agency and
thus exhibit greater compliance with the regulations. The six process variables are RIGHT (government
is doing the right thing in imposing the regulation), VIEWS (views of fishers are taken into account in
formulating fisheries regulations), NONCONST (zoning regulation is not enforced consistently),
NODETECT (many trawler fishers who fish inshore are getting away), PENALIFT (penalties given to
trawler fishermen caught violating the zoning regulation fit the offense), and ENFORADQ (enforcement
in the inshore fishing areas is adequate). These variables represent legitimacy toward the enforcement
and regulatory authorities as perceived by the individual fisher. Usually people tend to legitimize and
obey the institutions that produce positive benefits for them. The response for legitimacy questions
is in the form of an ordinal scale with five ranks of agreement and disagreement.Other variables used in the analysis include PERTVIOL and CPUEI. PERTVIOL indicates the percentage
of fishers perceived to be violating the regulation. CPUEI reflects the potential income differences
between offshore and inshore fishing. Figure 12 presents the complete conceptual framework for the
extended model.
Table 18. Probit estimation of the extended compliance model
Variable Malaysia Indonesia Philippines
1991 1995
CPUEO -0.00440*** 0.0002099 0.00004276 -0.00040
(-2.757) (1.4066) (0.53779) (1.57460)
CPUEI 0.00896*** -0.00032118* 0.06013***
(6.698) (1.7079) (7.4783)
HOPROB 4.650*** 1.8822 0.000000010 0.0000012
(6.710) (0.65179) (0.12270) (1.1262)
MCODE 0.781*** -0.31462 -1.1092*** -0.32150**
(-4.992) (-0.73898) (-4.1945) (-2.1785)
PERTVIOL 0.0122*** 0.58233 0.015708*** 0.00537*
(2.286) (1.2809) (2.9489) (1.7032)
CONSERVE 1 0.0475 -0.031223 0.11196 0.28555
(0.376) (0.28559) (0.55126) (1.20930)
CONFLICT 1 -0.305*** 0.42076 0.19321 -0.37020
(-2.328) (0.37882) (0.65182) (-1.27030)
JUST 1 0.212** 0.032939 -0.22436 -0.06008
(1.758) (0.27089) (-0.81140) (-0.41782)
EVERYONE 1 -0.405*** 0.14076 -0.23644 0.48175***
(-2.630) (1.0330) (-0.78247) (2.6700)
INSHORE 1 -0.947 -0.20401 0.40735 0.08162
(-0.748) (-1.5163) (1.5652) (0.40982)
OFFSHORE 1 -0.191 0.1278 0.16478 -0.16248
(-1.568) (0.90822) (0.73762) (-1.00160)
RIGHT 2 0.139 0.15694 -0.032829 0.06508
(1.150) (1.2143) (-0.10976) (-0.00447)
VIEW 2 -0.146 -0.12554 0.17106 -0.00447
(-0.156) (-1.0011) (0.78112) (-0.03910)
NONCONST 2 0.106 -0.26006*** -0.18141 0.10017
(1.353) (-2.0238) (-1.3921) (0.93416)
PENALIFT 2 0.0785 -0.07693 0.16076 -0.26736*
(0.822) (-0.61089) (1.2103) (-1.9534)
ENFORADQ 2 0.0691 0.82910*** 0.082951 -0.00170
(0.764) (4.5534) (0.58502) (-0.1157)
CONSTANT 1.242 -1.7114 -1.0516 1.3000
(1.493) (-1.4540) (-0.79063) (-1.35990)
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Variable Malaysia Indonesia Philippines
1991 1995
Log-likelihood -100.19 -64.198 -88.080 -177.42
Likelihood Ratio test 160.52*** 49.925* 66.959* 148.95**
McFaddens R2 0.412 0.279 0.275 0.4226
N 318 138 187 259
Note: t-ratios in ( ) * significant at 10% P ** significant at 5%P *** significant at 1%P
Results and policy implications
The problem examined in the study centers mostly on the high incidence of non-compliance with
regulations by fishers under a condition of limited enforcement. Incomplete compliance affects the
effectiveness of fisheries management. The study examined non-compliance behavior of fishers in
Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines.
The results from the study provided some support for the traditional enforcement policy. Results show
that a higher rate of detection and conviction arising out of enforcement activities has the potential
to discourage people from committing illegal activities. Similarly, more expensive penalties and fines
imposed will make fishers comply with rules and regulations. In practice, however, the probability of
detection is low and violations are rarely detected, especially for Indonesia and the Philippines, given
their limited resources and vast geographical area. In theory, levels of compliance can be improved
by increasing the probability of detection and conviction or penalty rate. However, this course is not
very practical because of the large financial requirements needed to attain such goals. With this in
mind, it is recommended that a government should pay more attention to enhancing enforcement
resources and increasing the penalty rates to deter violators. Adequate enforcement and severe penalties
would be important in enhancing fishers’ regard for the law and law enforcement institutions. A number
of respondents in the study perceived the penalties to be low and insufficient to deter violation. It is,
therefore, necessary to increase the burden of penalties and fines of violations to make it more costly
for fishers who commit such acts.
According to the compliance theory, the willingness to comply, stemming from moral obligations and
social influence, is based on the perceived legitimacy of the authorities charged with implementing
the regulations. Other evidence suggests that a key determinant of perceived legitimacy is the fairness
built into the procedures used to develop and implement the regulatory policy. To the extent that this
is valid, enforcement authorities should determine what policies and practices are judged fair by
segments of the population subject to the regulation. This may mean that civil penalties and other
sanctions should be comparable in value to the greater harm done or gains realized. Policy makers and
enforcement authorities, therefore, need to reveal to violating fishers and the society at large the extent
of damage the violations cause, so that the procedural and consequential aspects of the law are clearer
to the fishermen.
Although legitimacy is seen as one of the determinants of compliance, results from the study do not
provide unanimous support for the theory. However, one of the legitimacy variables i.e. OFFSHORE
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1 Siason (2002)
empirical support for the legitimacy variables could be due to the difficulty in measuring variables that
respondents may not have fully understood. The difficulty in understanding the concept of legitimacy
may have contributed to the weaker performance of the legitimacy variables. Another possible reason
for the poor performance of the legitimacy variable is that other factors not captured in the model,
but important enough to influence the normative factors of legitimacy, may have been overlooked
(factors such as institutional problems and enforcement weakness).
Overall, the results show that basic deterrence, morality, and social standing variables in all models are
statistically significant in determining the violation behavior of fishers in the selected study area. Not
all legitimacy variables were significant. The study found sufficient support to demonstrate that personal
moral development plays a more important role than the legitimacy variable in securing compliance.
Under the Tobit model, process variables representing the legitimacy parameter are more important
in explaining compliance compared to the outcome variables. Such a conclusion is consistent with
Tyler’s finding (1990) that process variables play a more important role compared to outcome variables.
Such a result has important implications for co-management. It is often iterated in the literature that
co-management as an approach for governing fisheries resources is likely to receive greater legitimacy
from a fishing community, as the communities are closely involved in the process and outcome aspects
of governing the system. This strengthens the moral obligation of individuals in the fishery to comply
with regulations imposed on the fishery and thus reduces enforcement costs and the need for elaborate
enforcement institutions and structures.
This finding thus supports the general belief that co-management may lead to higher levels of compliance
with fisheries regulations, even with lower levels of enforcement. In a co-managed fishery there is a
greater moral obligation on individuals to comply with rules and regulations. This greater moral
obligation comes from the fact that fishers themselves are involved in formulating, rationalizing and
imposing the rules and regulations for their overall well-being.
5.1.2.The effect of co-management processes on enforcement and compliance with fisheries
regulations in the Western Visayas, Philippines 1
Compliance behavior among fishers is influenced not only by the economic gains of the fisher, but also
by social and personality characteristics, including moral reasoning, social influence and legitimacy
factors. In view of the increasing use of co-management as the strategy for addressing urgent issues
of marine resource depletion and poverty in artisanal fisheries, it is hypothesized that co-management
may involve processes that would promote better enforcement and compliance. Co-management is a
partnership in which responsibility and authority for fisheries management are shared between the
government and the local fishing community. Community-based coastal resource management is a
central element of co-management and involves not only the decentralization of management of coastal
resources to the stakeholders and resource users, but also the greater active participation of the fishers
in the planning and implementation of fisheries management.
This study tested the extended model of deterrence when the variable of level of co-management is
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experience, management’s capability to enforce, moral reasoning, probability of enforcement, social
influence, fish catch, perceived legitimacy) on compliance is expected to be stronger in the sites with
longer experience with co-management. The general model of compliance is summarized as:
COMPLIANCE = f(deterrence, economic, social and psychological factors, level of co-management)
The hypothesis, that there are differences in the responses among the three levels of co-management
on the aforementioned variables, was also tested. The direction of difference is for higher variable
values (more positive end of the measure) to characterize sites with longer experience with co-
management.
Methodology
Three study sites in Iloilo Province in the Philippines were selected. Level 1 or High co-management
is represented by Banate Bay area with its six years of experience. Level 2 consists of sampled Northern
Iloilo municipalities with its three-year old management council. Level 3 consists of Southern Iloilo
municipalities that had no existing co-management scheme. Proportionate to the number of fishers
in the study areas and from a random draw of barangays, 326 respondents were selected. Interviews
were conducted to obtain responses for the study variables. The fishing regulations for which compliance
was measured were the prohibitions on: the use of fine mesh nets, use of explosives and poisonous
substances, and fishing without a license. Two approaches to data analysis were applied. The Probit
regression analysis tested the compliance model, while differences in the values of independent variables
across the three levels were estimated using the analysis of variance (ANOVA).
Results
The results of the ANOVA show that violation and enforcement are highest in Banate Bay, which
represents a high level of co-management. However, contrary to expectation, Banate Bay registered
lower scores on the social measures of perceived management capability to enforce, fishers’ involvement
in decision-making, social influence and moral reasoning. The higher scores were registered by Level
2 respondents. The aforementioned belies the hypothesis that the positive effects of co-management
would be highest where co-management of coastal resources is more established.
The Probit regression on the pooled sample from the three areas shows that Level 1 is a significant
predictor only for the basic deterrence model. Contrary to what was hypothesized, fishers who live
in Level 1 with its greater experience of co-management tend to violate more under conditions where
the only existing information pertains to the economic utility derived from the fishing activity. However,
when social variables are included through the extended model, the effect of being in a high co-
managed area disappears. The Level 2 area is also a predictor of violation, though at a lower alpha
significance (.10), with the result likewise moving against the direction of the study’s hypothesis that
higher levels of management would predict better compliance. It is not clear why those in co-managed
areas tend to be more candid about their fishing practices, including those that are recognized as illegal.
The reasons may be different in each level. Level 1 may be reporting their violations because they are
confident about the ineffective enforcement and how they are able to escape arrest. However,
those in non-co-managed areas are cautious about  reporting their fishing practices.
Involvement in decision-making is a significant predictor, but not in the expected direction; thus,
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variable “perceived management capability to enforce” is not a significant predictor. Both involve
processes that are promoted by co-management, and thus are expected to have been instrumental in
influencing compliance.
There is better appreciation of the outcomes of the regulations than the efficiency and effectiveness
by which the regulations are enforced (process legitimacy). The higher the perceived outcome legitimacy
is, the less likely the violation.
Contrary to expectations, an arrest experience significantly predicts violation, meaning that those with
greater arrest experience violate. As to the ‘age’ variable, the older the fisher is, the more likely he is
to violate. Catch per unit of effort is a weak predictor of violation and loses significance when the social
influence variable is factored in. Moral reasoning is not a significant predictor of violation.
On the other hand, the following hypotheses were supported. The lower the perceived percentage
is of obeying the regulation (social influence variable), the more likely will a violation occur. On perceived
legitimacy, the greater the agreement is on the outcome of the regulation, the less likely will a violation
occur.
The more promising model indicated by the slightly higher R-squared or variance explained (49 per
cent, compared to the basic deterrence model of 46 percent) is that which includes age, arrests, catch
per unit of effort, perceived legitimacy of outcomes, and involvement in decision-making.
Separate Probit regression was run on Level 1 data, to test the hypothesis that the effect in the co-
managed areas would be stronger. However, results showed few predictors of violation. One significant
predictor is involvement in decision-making, though not in the expected direction. Further, in the basic
deterrence model, the probability of being accosted was the only significant predictor, an effect which
disappears when social variables in the extended model are incorporated. The better model is that
which yields an R-square of 63 per cent (compared to 39 per cent for the basic deterrence model). This
model yielded significant predictors in involvement in decision-making, perceived management capability
to enforce, and moral reasoning, the latter two not obvious in the pooled sample. Except for moral
reasoning, these variables confirmed the expectations.
In Level 2 Probit regression, only the deterrence model manifested variables as significant predictors.
These include catch per unit of effort, number of years fishing, and age of fisher. The greater the catch,
the more the fishers will violate. The older the fisher, the more likely s/he is to violate. The higher the
number of years fishing, the less the violation is.
Discussion
Despite high enforcement in Level 1, the level of violation was still the highest among the study areas.
Enforcement does not appear to deter violation. In fact, arrests reflect violation. The probability of
being accosted for infraction appears to mediate the relationship between arrest and violation. In Level
1, the greater this probability, the less likely is violation. The probability variable does not show any
significance in Level 2.
Although a supposedly more stable management council is in place in Level 1, its practice of involving
fishers in decision-making bears further examination. Do fishers’ opinions really count, especially in
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experience of fishers in Level 1 may have given rise to clear instances when the motions of consultation
are made, but where ultimately their opinions do not count in the decision. Such experience may have
resulted in disillusionment, which explains their lower scores in involvement in decision-making. On
the other hand, Level 2 respondents who experience the novelty of the council demonstrate more
optimism in their responses.
The poorer relative scores of Level 1, compared with Level 2 on perceived management capability to
enforce, may be attributed to higher awareness and, consequently, higher expectation in terms of
governance. In Level 2, on the other hand, the early stages of awakening to elements of co-management
would make the highly publicized campaigns on enforcement become impressive.
Those with arrest experience tend to violate. Although one would expect that previous arrests would
deter violation, perhaps the consequences of arrest might not really deter because penalties are minimal,
not imposed, or  negotiable.
The expected association between the level of co-management and social influence (perception of
how prevalent compliance is among fellow-fishers) is confirmed in the study. Fishers’ compliance
behavior is influenced by what they see others do, particularly evidenced in the pooled Probit analysis.
The overall pattern of the ANOVA results shows Level 1 to have significantly lower scores on all social
variables, especially compared to Level 2. These social variables are assumed to be the effects of having
co-management structurally in place. That the findings point to a lower level of effect, compared with
an area where co-management has been instituted for a shorter time period, raises questions about
the effectiveness of co-management. The few studies that have reviewed the implementation and
outcomes of coastal resources management (CRM) use an interview method asking respondents to
give their perceptions of changes brought about by CRM. In this current study, the research design
allows for a comparison of effects across varying levels of co-management. It is able to capture possible
transitions and phases.
The analysis of this cross-section of respondents representing varying time points in the implementation
of co-management revealed unexpected results. It is speculated that the putative effects of co-
management undergoes phases that move from a zero level of the effect variables to a phase of initial
optimism and hope created by the expectation of positive outcomes (the promise of co-management,
such as expressed in the legitimacy of outcomes). However, this is followed by a phase of disappointment
after enough experience shows that the promise has created problems among fishers. The level of
optimism is evident in the responses of Level 2, while the unexpected lower scores of Level 1 reflects
such disappointment. Thus, it would seem that the effects of co-management do not follow a straight
line in terms of the values of the effect variables. For example, perception of capability to enforce does
not necessarily improve over time. Rather, the community response goes through stages, where the
initial stage is marked by a level of hopefulness (as shown by Level 2), emerging from the baseline of
conditions where there is no institutional effort to manage the coastal resource (Level 3). However,
the second phase may represent a period of disillusionment.
The test of the deterrence models reinforces the results from the ANOVA. The result in the Level 1
area predicts violation, inasmuch as it has the highest violation among the study areas. The other major
predictors of violation are social influence, perceived legitimacy of outcomes, arrest and involvement
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each level, raises questions on the consensus of community response to co-management. Stakeholders
may speak with divergent voices, especially after a more prolonged experience with attempts to co-
manage the coastal resource.
Recommendations
The results of this study point to the need to recommend that projects should constantly monitor the
involvement of the community. In addition, the dynamic perceptions and experience with co-management
of fishers should be recognized and allowed to influence policy. Implementers have to realize that co-
management is an ongoing and reiterative process that is never completed. At the beginning of the
implementation of co-management, much effort and dedication may be expended on community
consultation and dialogue, which after apparent success may then be prematurely relegated to the
background. At that point it is possible that the empowerment of fishers has not yet reached the critical
stage where they can express and channel their discontent in functional and effective ways. Research
can also document and analyze more closely the approaches used in involving fishers and communities
in dialogue. The research, in fact, can assess whether the processes empower fishers to become assertive
about their social-economic needs vis-à-vis the requirement of sustaining coastal resources.
5.1.3.Development, enforcement and compliance with fisheries regulations: A comparative
study between communities under co-management and conventional management
in Southern Thailand 2
This study investigated the difference, if any, between the level of regulation enforcement and fishers’
compliance with the regulations in two communities in Southern Thailand, one with co-management
and the other under conventional state-led management. The two communities, Ban Mai (with co-
management) and Ban Hua Khao (with conventional management) are located at the lower part of
Songkla Lake, close to the city of Songkla. Ban Mai is categorized as the co-management community
owine-g to its experience in working with a local NGO to actively manage fishery resources in collaboration
with the local government. An important output has been the establishment of a fishing reserve
managed by community members. Ban Hua Khao, on the other hand, has fisheries that are managed
by the Department of Fisheries without participation of the local fishers.
A survey of 40 households in Ban Mai and 160 households in Ban Hua Khao provided data for the
analysis. Ban Mai is a much smaller community and thus the sample of households was smaller than
in Ban Hua Khao.
Results
The fisheries co-management arrangements in Ban Mai village emerged under conditions with no
apparent policy and institutional frameworks. Therefore, it characterizes a special form of co-management
that is based on local initiative, without formal recognition of the government agencies concerned.
The development of local regulations and adjustment of existing government regulations related to
fisheries management has not taken place. The involvement of the government agencies, especially
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existing fisheries laws and regulations rather than to actually develop and implement a form of co-
management.
The emergence of co-management in Ban Mai village does not affect clearly a reduction in the number
of fishing violators, as the proportion of violators was not significantly different between the two villages
studied. However, it affected a change in the type of violation. At the time of the study, only a small
proportion of fishers used set bag-nets and none of them used a push-net. These two types of fishing
gear had been commonly employed before the community involvement campaign against destructive
fishing practices. At the time of the study, set bag-nets were still widely used by fishers in Ban Hua
Khao, but the employment of push-net was minimal. Most violators in Ban Mai used a sitting cage for
their fishing. This type of gear is restricted for use only in permitted areas that are generally 1 000
meters from the shore line. The main difference between Ban Mai and Ban Hua Khao was the removal
of the set-bag nets. This level of achievement in removing the gear was a consequence of the people’s
attempt to stop destructive fishing practices according to their perception. The continuity in using
sitting-cage gear was complicated since fishers in Ban Mai have limited job opportunities besides fishing,
and the set bag-net was the second best type of fishing gear in terms of economic returns. Moreover,
fishers in Ban Mai showed a higher degree of agreement on the danger of using set bag-nets than that
of employing sitting cages.
The level of fishery regulation enforcement was not significantly different between the two villages.
This implies that the co-management arrangements in Ban Mai did not improve the enforcement of
fishery regulations. The change in fishing practices by reducing the use of set bag-nets and stopping
push-net fishing was a consequence of active fishers’ group in the community, together with a generally
strong campaign of the DOF to stop push-net fishing country-wide. The low probability of seeing
surveillance and arrest among fishers in both communities reflected indifference in the degree of
regulation enforcement by the officials concerned. The improvement in fishing practices among fishers
in Ban Mai was a result of social pressure rather than cooperation between fishers’ organizations and
officials to improve the regulation enforcement.
The level of fishers’ compliance with regulations was found to be low in both communities, but the
value was significantly higher in Ban Mai than in Ban Hua Khao. This implies that the co-management
arrangement in Ban Mai brought about the improvement in fishers’ compliance, although this
improvement was minimal. For both communities, this conclusion is supported by data on probabilities
on non-compliance, which were opposite to those on compliance.
The improvement in fishers’ compliance with fishery regulations in Ban Mai correspond to their higher
level of agreement on the regulation concerning the illegality of the set bag-nets as compared to fishers
in Ban Hua Khao. At the same time, the level of agreement score on the regulation concerning the
illegality of sitting cage gear was not different between fishers in the two communities. Although it
cannot be simply concluded from these findings that the higher compliance level among fishers in Ban
Mai is associated with their perception   about legitimacy of fishery regulations since there is inadequate
statistical support, the overall varying views about the agreement on statements concerning fishery
regulations that Ban Mai fishers showed higher scores than Ban Hua Khao fishers reflect somewhat
the correspondence between legitimacy and compliance.
There is no evidence of short-term improvement in catch and value of catch resulting from the co-
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co-management brought about difficulties in assessing economic benefits resulting from the co-
management. The finding that fishing violators generally had higher returns per unit of effort was
discouraging for the promotion of legal fishing.
Despite shortcomings, fishers in both communities generally had positive views towards co-management
and its expected outcomes in various aspects. This implies that there is a good opportunity for
introducing co-management arrangements at the local level.
Recommendations
The overall findings of the study indicate several benefits of co-management. However, these benefits
are not clear in a quantitative sense since the co-management arrangement in Ban Mai is still relatively
new. This immaturity could not generate crucial differences in improving fishers’ livelihoods and fishery
resources compared to the community without co-management.
To make fisheries co-management more effective, the government must have a clear policy framework
to continually support communities that want to establish co-management. Such a framework should
cover the institutional arrangements that encourage cooperation among the government agencies
concerned, fisher groups, and NGOs. The support should be wide ranging and allow for the development
of co-management systems established in each community to mature.
5.1.4.Evaluation of compliance behavior of fishers in communities with different levels
of participation in co-management: A case study in Central Java Fisheries, Indonesia 3
The main objective of the study was to examine non-compliance behavior of  fishers towards fisheries
regulations in communities with different levels of co-management in Central Java. Evaluating non-
compliance behavior is an important stage in formulating an improved fishery regulatory program. The
fisheries regulations studied cover restrictions on gear, area or zoning; means of fishing; and fishing
permits. Pemalang and Demak regencies in Central Java were selected to represent the areas with high
and low levels of co-management.
Methods
Violation decisions were hypothetically thought tt comprise factors including deterrence, biological,
economic, and non-economic factors including psychological, social-environment, legitimacy and
communities’ characteristics. It is assumed that biological conditions such as weather, water salinity,
and so on remain unchanged. The non-compliance model can be written as follows:
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The definitions of the operational variables and their measurement are summarized in the following
table.
Table 19. Operational variables and their measurement
Variable  Code Definition Measurement
Dependent/Endogenous 
Non- NONCOMP Non-compliance decision of - Dummy
compliance fishersto fish in prohibited zone, (1= if respondents violate
with restricted gear and/or means, any one of the observed
or withour fishing permits  estrictions; 0= if otherwise)
- Intensity = frequency of
   violation for the respective
 restrictions or rules)1/
Independent/Exogenous
Age AGE Age of the respondent In numerical value (years) 
Numbers of TFAM Numbers of family members under In numerical value (persons)
family members the responsibility of  respondent  
Work experience LONG The length of the respondent’s  In numerical value (years)
work experience as a fisher
Horse power HP Capacity of boat engine In numerical value (HP)
representing fishing effort.  





Economic SEAKG Economic opportunity or values In numerical value (kg)
opportunity earned by fisher from violating the
observed regulation  
Moral PSYCHO Psychological indicators of the In Likert scale 2/(MI)
development morality of individual fishers
Social- PERTVIOL Social environment influencing In numerical value (%)
environment the violation of individual fishers
Legitimacy 3/ LEGITIM Outcome and process variables In Conventional scale
representing legitimacy accorded (1 to 10) 4/(MI)
by the individual fisher to the rules,
regulations or legal authorities.
(The variables used by Kuperan
(1992) and Susilowati (1998) are
adopted with modification and
enhancement.)
Level of Co- LEVEL Dummy variable representing the Dummy (1=if fisher belongs
management level of co-management practiced to the high CMPs
Process (CMPs) in the fishers' communities community; 0=otherwise)
1/ Rational choice of respondents that engage in non-compliance activity (it is estimated with Probit
model). Violation intensity of non-compliance behavior is measured by the frequency of violation
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2/  It has been consulted with the competent panels such as religion and community’s leaders.
3/  Detailed component of the legitimacy variables was determined after pre-survey.
4/  It is explored in an in-depth interview.
MI: it is measured from several items.
In Indonesia, the conventional scale (1 to 10) is more widely used by people as an evaluation scale
measurement.
The multi-stage sampling method was used to select 168 respondents. The sample allocation was 85
respondents from Pemalang Regency and 83 respondents from Demak Regency. Economic models of
non-compliance behavior using Probit and Tobit techniques were estimated. The Probit model was
applied to estimate the violation decision of each individual fisher; the Tobit model was used to indicate
the intensity of violation committed by all the fishers. The extended model using the Tobit estimation
technique gave better performance in explaining the violation decision of fishers. Susilowati (1998)
also found that the Tobit model was suitable to estimate the intensity of fishers’ violations.
The model was applied to small- and large-scale fishers from high and low co-management processes
(CMPs) in their community. The study examined the compliance behavior of fishers with different
levels of CMPs participation. The CMPs in this study are classified into two levels, namely high and low.
The study area of Pemalang Regency (West coast) was selected to represent fishers’ communities with
high CMPs, while Demak Regency (East coast) represents communities with low CMPs.
Results
The problem raised in this study is the high incidence of non-compliance with regulations by the fishers
under a condition of limited enforcement in the fisheries and a different level of fishers’ participation
in co-management processes. The non-compliance of fishers to the regulations observed in the study
area was high. About 62.5 percent of the respondents (105 out of 168 persons) have committed violation
in their fishing activities.
The results show that most of the independent variables, such as demographical factors, fishing effort
(HP), deterrence (DDETECT), moral development (PSYCHO), legitimacy (LEGITIM), and the participation
level of CMPs (LEVEL), have expected signs, although they are not statistically significant. Nevertheless,
the model reveals the phenomena of violation behavior of fishers in the study areas. The intensity of
non-compliance behavior of the individual fisher has negative relationships with the level of participation
of fishers’ community in CMPs.
This study suggests that although enforcement is costly and the authorities are faced with declining
budgets, fisheries management authorities should also explore alternative approaches for managing
fisheries, such as community-based or co-management approaches. In addition, while violation behavior
is something quite subjective to the individual fisher, it is valid to the universal case. Further, individuals
have multiple motives and interests, thus it is not a simple task to predict the compliance behavior of
people. Violation behavior tends to be influenced by the contextual situation and condition of the
individual fisher. This study concludes that the strategy to secure compliance for a certain target of
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Policy implications
The policy implications and recommendations provided by the study are outlined based on the
determinant factors of fishers’ violation behavior such as demographical, fishing effort, deterrence,
economic, moral development, social-influence and legitimacy factors.
Deterrence. One of the reasons why fishers violate the regulation as claimed by the respondents is
due to the low deterrence of the penalty and sanctions imposed. Theoretically, a higher probability
of detection and conviction arising out of enforcement activities discourages people from committing
illegal activities. Further, higher penalties or fines imposed make people comply with rules and
regulations. With limited resources for enforcement and a large geographical area to cover, higher
compliance is hardly achieved in the short term. Nevertheless, a lot more effort should be put on it.
One way is to increase the probability of detection and conviction, and penalties rate. This can be done
by either improving the enforcement process and/or decreasing the violation’s intensity. With a
decreasing enforcement budget from the government, better formal enforcement in Indonesia may
not be practical for the next couple of years. In order to improve fishers’ compliance in the study area,
there is a need to use other determinants of compliance such as morality and social environment, etc.
Influencing the morality of fishers is not easy because it deals with human beings with multidimensional
motives.
Morality. One of the strategies to secure compliance is through bridging resource overexploitation
and degradation to moral development of the stakeholders. Based on the survey, many fishers do not
understand the relevant regulations, and their contents. Moreover, most respondents found in the
study area can be classified as pre-conventionalist and conventionalist. Thus, extension services and
educating people are necessary in order to improve the moral level of the fishers. Socialization of
regulations and/or other rules (perhaps followed by a proper extension service) is necessary to raise
the understanding of fishers about the rules of the game that should be followed when conducting
fishing activities. Furthermore, with higher moral development, fishers are expected to be more
compliant. In addition, extension and education to link resource degradation to aspects of personal
morality has the potential for increasing compliance levels. Of course, there are avenues for governments,
political leaders and industrial leaders to make the links through formal and informal speeches and
development program for fishers.
Social-environment. The influence of the social-environment (such as society, friends, and peers)
plays an important role on the individual fishers’ decision to engage in non-compliance activities. In
the study, this variable is represented by what the fisher believes to be the percentage of fishers violating
the regulations (PERTVIOL). Sociologists emphasize the impact of social relations and normative values
as important bases for influencing one’s behavior. It is very practical from a policy perspective that
socio-religious leaders can wield some influence in encouraging a higher level of compliance by publicly
praising compliers and exposing non-compliers. Thus, fisheries authorities should cooperate with the
competent fishers’ leaders to spread some development messages including the implementing of a
compliance culture and other management programs in fisheries.
Legitimacy. Although legitimacy is seen as one of the determinants of compliance, the results from
this study did not provide unanimous support for the theory. The weaker empirical support for the
legitimacy variables could be due to the difficulty in measuring these variables. This study tried to
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reasons that may explain such a condition: (1) respondents might not have fully understood the
definition of the variable; (2) there is an indication from the survey that many fishers are dissatisfied
with the performance of the authorities in managing the fisheries resources and relevant matters. On
the other hand, people consider the government to be the resource manager (because this party has
enough facilities to do so, compared with other stakeholders). Therefore, people (fishers) were
ambivalent to valuate the government’s legitimacy. Based on these arguments, therefore, the authorities
should improve their performance to materialize the management system with a good governance
concept, and in this way, can perhaps improve the perception of the fishers towards the legitimacy of
the government.
Demographical factors. Old age does not ensure more maturity and greater compliance. Theoretically,
a mature person tends to be broad-minded. However, it is too naïve to think that younger fishers tend
to be more non-compliant. The average age of the respondents in Pemalang is relatively lower than
that of the fishers in Demak, but the violation rate committed by the fishers in Pemalang is lower than
in Demak.
5.2 Transaction cost in fisheries co-management
Fisheries co-management as an alternative to centralized command and control of fisheries management
is often suggested as the solution to the problems of fisheries resource use conflicts and over-exploitation.
With fisheries co-management there is a transfer of costs from society to collective groups and individuals
and also a shift in the magnitude of transaction costs of operating a different management system. By
identifying the major components of transaction costs in this management system, fisheries managers
have a clearer idea of the total costs involved in implementing the management option. In doing so,
the net benefits of the management option can then be accurately evaluated and compared with the
existing management system. This section is a summary of two papers. The first is a journal article by
Mustapha et al. (1998) and the second is a paper by Kuperan et al. (1998).
5.2.1 Transaction costs framework
Coase (1937) first discussed transaction costs economics in the economics literature in his seminal
paper “The Nature of the Firm”. Coase proposed that the decision whether to have a transaction within
a firm or in the market place will be determined by transaction costs (Coase 1937). This theory suggests,
if given a choice, individuals will choose the set of institutions, contracts or transactions that will
minimize the (transaction) costs of doing business. As Libecap (1991) points out, having lower transaction
cost is a necessity rather than a sufficient condition for adoption. It is, therefore, appropriate to examine
transaction costs when evaluating the potential of new institutions as alternatives to existing institutions.
Transaction costs are difficult to define precisely. A basic premise of economics is that individuals
choose from options they have available to them to maximize their utility. Williamson (1973) makes
the point that it is this opportunistic behavior, when combined with incomplete contracts, that leads
to transaction costs. Randall (1972) defines transaction costs to include the following: i) the cost of
obtaining information, ii) establishing one’s bargaining position, bargaining and arriving at a group
decision, and iii) enforcing the decision made. Dahlman (1979) separates transaction costs into: i)
search and information costs, ii) bargaining and decision costs, and iii) policing and enforcement costs.
According to the transaction cost economics framework, the institutions with the lowest transaction
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fisheries co-management system, vis-à-vis the centralized management system, one needs to identify
some of the components of the transaction costs involved in instituting this new concept of co-
management. This process is envisaged for future empirical work that will address the viability of the
proposed fisheries co-management system.
Transaction costs in fisheries co-management
When multiple individuals are involved in environments where complex activities must be coordinated
across space and over time, they may attempt to reduce the substantial uncertainties faced through
various forms of implicit or explicit agreements. These contracts involve costly activities expended in
the processes of achieving agreements before and during coordination of activities after an initial
agreement is reached in an uncertain environment. Williamson (1985) identifies the costs associated
with contracting activities as ex ante and ex post transaction costs. Using the generic of the Williamson’s
transaction cost economics, the transaction costs in fisheries co-management can, therefore, be broadly
categorized into three major cost items: (1) information costs; (2) collective fisheries decision-making
costs; and (3) collective operational costs. The first two categories are ex ante transaction costs while
the latter is defined as the ex post transaction cost. This breakdown is largely based on anecdotal
information and the schematic flow diagram of the transaction costs in fisheries co-management is
shown in Figure 12. The transaction costs arise from the problems of information, coordination and
control that stem primarily from the fact that fisheries resource management decisions involve multiple
actors with different interests in the long-term, interdependent and uncertain processes.
One of the many challenges facing the fisheries co-management regime is how to get the fishers to
reach some level of consensus on certain contract or collective actions with regards to resource
management. The collective fisheries decision-making costs include dealing with fishers’ problems,
participating in meetings, making policies, making rules and regulations, communicating decisions to
the community, and coordinating tasks with local and central fisheries authorities. As individual fishers
have different sets of information and interests that seldom match, it will take a special effort just to
bring them together, let alone reach an agreement on some uncertain processes. Even if they agree
to meet, some actors will behave strategically or opportunistically so that they obtain maximum benefits
from the proposed project. In the event that they manage to draw up “acceptable” rules and regulations
for all resource users, they still have to communicate the decisions to their peers, and some form of
coordinating mechanism with local and central fisheries authorities has to be planned. Coordinating
actions of diverse actors requires that considerable time and other resources be devoted to the process
of gaining agreement, monitoring activities and evaluating performance. These are some of the
transaction costs in the collective fisheries decision-making process.
The third major component of transaction costs is the collective fisheries operations costs. This
component can, in fact, form the strongest counter-argument for the centralized resource management
system. It is argued that if the resource is to be managed by both the central agency and the community,
the operations costs can be quite substantial to ensure that rules are followed, conflicts among users
are resolved, and the reward system from the new institution is fair and equitable. There is validity for
this line of reasoning. Operation costs can be quite significant in carrying out a management regime.
These costs come in three forms:
(a) Monitoring, enforcement and compliance costs;
(b)Resource maintenance costs; and
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Figure 12. Schematic flow diagram of the transaction costs in fisheries co-management
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Monitoring, enforcement and compliance costs include the monitoring of fisheries rules,
monitoring the fishing areas, catch record management, fishing inputs, conflict management, and
resolutions and sanctions for rule violations. In resource maintenance costs, the transaction costs result
from fishing rights protection, stock enhancement activities and resource assessment work to ensure
that the stocks in the area are not over-exploited. Resource distribution costs include the costs
of distributing the fishing rights to the appropriate stakeholders and the costs of managing the
participation of the stakeholders and administering the rights to the fishery.
It may be argued that under a co-management system the enforcement and compliance costs may be
lower as there may be increased compliance realized from the increased legitimacy of the regulations
and allocation procedures adopted by the community. However, enforcement and monitoring requires
substantial resources and there are likely to be economies of scale from the use of monitoring and
enforcement vessels by a larger fishing community as represented by the centralized management
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The co-management system, therefore, represents a shift in the burden of financing the costs of
governance of common property resources from the central or public purse to collective groups or
individuals involved in managing the resource. This shift in the costs from the central authorities to
user groups has implications for the overall management costs and the capability of user groups to
bear such costs. The benefits from such a shift are obviously improved compliance and lower management
costs. It is the ability of user groups, especially in over-exploited fisheries, to bear the costs of governance
from the minimal rents from such fisheries that is often questionable.
In many fisheries systems the costs of maintaining and enhancing the resource through material
interventions involves large investments and long gestation periods to realize the benefits. These costs
are often incurred by national agencies in most countries. A move towards co-management systems
calls for the community to spend resources for such maintenance and replenishment interventions.
Most communities are reluctant to incur such costs as the benefits may often accrue to future generations
and others, since fish are migratory resources. Such investments are important for the long-term
sustainability of the resources and may not have been considered in co-managed systems.
New institutions often require members to sacrifice time and effort to bring people together for decision-
making and enforcement. Since the benefits of such institutions flow to all members irrespective of
participation, the free rider and the nature of institutions for the public good can pose problems for
co-managed institutions.  Unless some form of benefits is readily available to members who sacrifice
their time, the durability of the institutions will be at stake. In addition, the equity and fairness aspects
of the allocation of the benefits and costs of running the institutions will be affected. In over-exploited
fisheries, the resource rents might be so low that fishers may not be able to maintain the institution.
The costs mentioned above may not be readily apparent, but their identification is crucial in determining
the sustainability of fisheries co-management systems. In centrally-based management systems, the
funds for operating and maintaining the system most often come from the general tax revenue and
the element of cross-subsidies from other sectors of the economy may be in effect. In co-managed
systems, the costs often have to be borne by the resource users and the community, and obtaining
subsidies from another sector may be difficult. A thorough examination of the often hidden transaction
costs is necessary in an assessment of the feasibility of co-management as an alternative fisheries
management approach.
Measuring transaction costs
An approach to measuring transaction costs of fisheries co-management systems looks at a co-
management system in terms of processes in both a static and dynamic senses. By process is meant
looking at the details of the activities involved in the development of the co-management system over
time (Figure 13). The activities involved in the process include, in a simplified sense: 1) recognition
of need for new management regime, discussion and meetings, information collection, organizing and
leadership, defining the management objectives and strategies, and development of institutional
arrangements; 2) community education and adjustment of institutional arrangements; and 3) monitoring
and enforcement, maintaining institutional arrangements, adjudicating conflicts, sanctioning violators,
and making adjustments in the institutional arrangements. Some of these activities are one time, i.e.
recognition, while others are continuous, i.e. information collection or adjustment. The sum of all
these activities will be the total transaction costs of initiating, implementing and maintaining the co-
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The process can be viewed in terms of a time frame in which we could look at three basic stages (see
Figure 13). The first is the stage of devising, creating, obtaining information and decision-making. The
second is the implementing stage, which involves dissemination of information and explanation of
how the community system will work. The third stage includes maintaining, monitoring, enforcement,
adjudicating and sanctioning activities, as well as meeting the costs of making decisions within the
current set of rules, and the costs of making decisions to revise the rules themselves as conditions in
the fishery change.
In general, a co-management system can be evaluated in a two-step procedure - the static and dynamic
analysis. The first step is a static analysis whereby costs and benefits are quantified for activities involved
in stage 3, which represents the current stage (time t). This is the stage in which many of the on-going
fisheries co-management initiatives worldwide are. The second step involves the dynamic analysis of
costs and benefits in stages 1 and 2, and involves backtracking to time 0. Time 0 refers to the initiation
of the process involved in getting the system off the ground. It in some sense is a dynamic process.
The combined static and dynamic analyses will provide a “complete” picture of the transaction costs
involved in the whole process of co-management.
Figure 13. Process of moving towards co-management
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As suggested by Feeny (1995), a standard cost-benefit framework can be used to evaluate the net
benefits and net costs of a co-management system. The measurement process can be carried out as
follows. The first step is qualification; that is the identification of the amount of resources or time used
in each process activity. The second step is quantification; that is, the valuation of the time or resource.
However, there are some issues with regard to how the time spent should be valued. For example
questions may arise as to whether all of the time spent in meetings by the stakeholders is necessarily
for managing the resource. Time could be spent on producing more than one outcome, and fishers
would also consider meetings as consumption goods that, for example, enhances their sharing of
fellowship, exchanging of gossips or ingesting of coffee, as suggested by Berkes (1992). This points
to the fact that a more workable method for allocating time spent simultaneously on more than one
production process should be developed. There are obviously many challenges in the development
of appropriate measurement conventions and the appropriate wage rates that can be used for valuing
time spent in organizing, implementing and maintaining a fisheries co-management system.
5.2.2 Measuring transaction cost of fisheries co-management on San Salvador Island,
Philippines
One of the purported advantages of co-management compared to centralized management is that it
will reduce transaction costs - the costs of gaining information about the resource and what users are
doing with it, reaching agreements and coordinating with others in the group with respect to the use
of resources, and enforcing agreements that have been reached. Hanna (1996) points out that a
centralized approach is often associated with low program design costs, but high implementation,
monitoring and enforcement costs as the management regime may have little legitimacy with user
groups. A co-management approach, on the other hand, is associated with high program design costs
as effective participation is time-consuming and therefore costly. However, co-management is likely
to lead to lower implementation, monitoring and enforcement costs as legitimacy of the regime is
greater.
The objective of this paper is to provide some measurements of the transaction costs in a co-managed
fishery. A comparison of the transaction costs with a centralized system of fisheries management is
made and some implications for public policy on the choice of centrally versus co-managed systems
are discussed.
Overview of the fisheries co-management experience on San Salvador Island
San Salvador, an island barangay (village) of Masinloc municipality in the province of Zambales, is
located on the western coast of Luzon in the Philippines. It does not have a well-defined tradition of
fisheries management of its own, having been inhabited largely by farmers who came from the mainland
of Zambales Province. Consequently, an indigenous tradition of fish stock management is virtually non-
existent.
Fishers recall that, before World War II, San Salvador had abundant marine resources, non-destructive
fishing methods, and a relatively homogeneous population. Consequently, there was no need for
property rights and rules to govern fishing activities. Competition for resource use was not a problem,
owing to the rich fishing grounds, a small population, and non-integration of the village economy into
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During World War II (early 1940s), Japanese troops occupied San Salvador Island and sometimes used
explosives to catch fish, marking the early beginnings of blast fishing in the area. After World War II
and until the 1960s, most village fishers continued to use non-destructive, traditional fishing methods
such as hook and line, improvised spear guns, and gill nets. Also used was kunay, a beach seine with
a long scareline of coconut fronds for herding fish from the reef flat into a fine mesh net (5-cm net).
Women often gleaned fish in shallow reefs. Local fisheries during the 1960s easily met the subsistence
needs of the village residents. Farming provided additional livelihood for the island’s residents.
The1970s ushered in an influx of Visayan migrants who were searching for better fishing grounds and
who decided to settle on San Salvador, particularly in Cabangun (now Purok Maligaya), where they
purchased a piece of land. Relatives soon joined the initial batch of Visayan migrants. The decade saw
a pronounced shift to non-traditional and destructive fishing operations such as blast fishing, aquarium
fish collection using sodium cyanide, and spear fishing with air compressors, which eventually devastated
San Salvador's fishing grounds. The increased deployment of fine mesh nets aggravated the indiscriminate
harvest of large and small fish alike. The 1970s also marked the integration of San Salvador into an
export-oriented market for aquarium fish via middlemen who visited the village. The Visayan migrants,
in particular, were catching aquarium fish for a growing market in Europe and the United States.
Historically, aquarium fish gatherers used sodium cyanide, which damages the reef.
The lack of knowledge of marine ecosystems and the long-term effects of destructive fishing methods
could have led to irreversible damage, were it not for the timely intervention of external catalysts. In
March 1987, Patrick Christie arrived in San Salvador as a Peace Corps volunteer working with the Bureau
of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR) under the Department of Agriculture (DA). For about a year,
he was instrumental in assessing the needs of San Salvador, the level of environmental awareness of
village residents, and existing reef conditions. He initiated dialogues with village officials, the municipal
mayor, non-government organizations, and the BFAR. In the process, Christie drummed up support
for rehabilitating the fishery resources of San Salvador. Thus, the concept of a marine sanctuary emerged
in 1988.
A project proposal on the Marine Conservation Project for San Salvador (MCPSS), prepared by Patrick
Christie, was approved and funded by the Netherlands Embassy and the Jaime V. Ongpin Foundation
from 1989 to 1991 for US$17 000. Additional financial support beyond the two-year period came from
the World Wildlife Fund Debt-for-Nature Swap program until 1993. The Haribon Foundation, as the
implementing non-governmental organization (NGO), provided personnel and logistical support to
the project. Haribon was one of the first Philippine environmental groups to recognize the role of the
community in managing and sustaining resource management projects. The MCPSS may be regarded
as a milestone, being the first marine sanctuary established in Luzon  (a major geographical region in
the northern part of the Philippines).
The subsequent passage of Municipal Ordinance No. 30, series of 1989, by the Municipal Government
of Masinloc lent legitimacy to the effort to protect and rehabilitate San Salvador’s remaining resources
as well as to apprehend violators. It also provided an opportunity for the municipal government and
the village of San Salvador to cooperate on fisheries management.
From 1989 to 1993, the Haribon Foundation, Municipal Government of Masinloc, and the San Salvador
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to the people's organization (PO) it helped establish, known as the Samahang Pangkaunlaran ng
San Salvador (SPSS), in an emotional ceremony that ended four years of community work. The SPSS,
whose beginnings could be traced to the LTK, formally evolved from the core group established by
Haribon and registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission in 1993. Despite the phase-out
of the Haribon Foundation in 1993, project initiatives continued to be sustained by the village and
municipal government, demonstrating that they could share responsibility for fisheries management.
The MCPSS, which adopted a community-based approach to resource management, was a vital
springboard for making co-management prosper in San Salvador.
Methodology
The data collection method had several steps and processes aimed at collecting cost and time-spent
information in running the marine conservation project in San Salvador from its inception in the late
1980s to the present. The time horizon for the marine conservation project of San Salvador was divided
into three stages. Stage I was the inception stage wherein people in San Salvador started conceptualizing
and implementing the first phase of the marine conservation project (Year 1988-89). Stage II was
defined as the stage wherein the local island organization (LTK/SPSS), in partnership with the Haribon
Foundation (Environmental NGO), went ahead with the full implementation of the project (Year 1990-
93). Stage III was the stage wherein management of the sanctuary was completely turned over by the
Haribon Foundation to the SPSS to be run autonomously by the local people’s organization (1994-
present). Cost and time-spent information and data from all stages were gathered through literature
and key informant interviews, surveys, and accessing files of government and municipal offices, and
NGOs involved in the project.
Results
The results obtained from the San Salvador area for the period 1988-96 as shown in Table 20 indicate
that the difference in the total costs of fisheries management between centralized government
management and co-management is not significant. However, there is a significant difference in the
costs at different stages of management. In Stages I and II, which are the stages of initiating a new
management regime and community education, the costs are higher for the co-management approach
compared to the centralized government approach. The costs are, however, lower in the third stage
for a co-managed approach when monitoring, and enforcement and conflict resolution become
important. These findings appear to be consistent with Hanna’s (1996) view that the downstream or
implementation costs are likely to be lower for a co-managed approach (Table 21). This is because the
cost of monitoring and enforcement are likely to be lower as community members are more likely to
comply with rules and regulations developed by the community as a whole, as opposed to regulations
imposed by an external regulatory authority. This is important from a policy perspective, as the
implementation costs are those costs encountered on a perpetual basis as management institutions
are implemented. This could result in an overall lower cost of managing the fisheries resources for the
society.Table 20. Costs of alternative fisheries management on San Salvador Island
(In Phil.Pesos;  40 peso = 1US$ in 1996)
Total Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3
(1988-96) (1988-90) (1991-92) (1993-96)
Govt Mgt
National Govt 3 351 330 438 575 450 902 2 461 853
Local Govt 393 954 8 320 16 640 368 994
Total 3 745.284 446 895 467 542 2 830 847
Co-Mgt
Direct cash infusion 1 430 522 737 272 573 250 120 000
Counterpart labor 2 430 000 810 000 540 000 1 080 000
Total 3 860 522 1 547 272 1 113 250 1 200 000
Table 21. Transaction costs in centralized and co-managed systems
Resource management activities Centralized mgt. Co-management
Information seeking Low High
Decision-making and setting management objectives Low High
Resource distribution among users High Low
Resource distribution over time High Low
Monitoring, enforcement and compliance High Low
Resource maintenance High Low
The break down of time spent on various activities in a co-management system (see full report) shows
that monitoring takes up the bulk of the time because it is a continuous day-to-day activity and is crucial
for the maintenance of the institution. The fact that monitoring takes up more than half of the total
time of the fishers involved in a co-management project indicates the importance of this activity and
also helps to explain the lower cost for co-management in Stages II and III as discussed previously. If
the rules are well received by the members as in the case of co-management, the resources spent on
monitoring could be lower, thus explaining the lower costs for co-management in Stage III of the
project as compared to government management. When seen in monetary terms, the monitoring
activity again emerges as the activity responsible for more than half of the total costs of all the activities
involved in co-management.
Policy implications
The general theoretical argument that transaction costs may be lower under a co-managed system
appears to have some support from the data used in this study. Although direct comparisons between
co-managed and centrally managed systems are difficult to make as clear-cut examples of that nature
are hard to come by in the real world, in this study a small island in the Philippines that has experimented
with the idea of co-management provides an opportunity for such comparisons. However, there are
serious problems with comparisons of this nature as both the co-managed arrangement and the
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centralized government-based management are present at the same time. The results from this study
indicate that since monitoring costs are the major transaction costs and are met by the community,
there is an opportunity for these costs to decline over time as community acceptance of the rules and
regulations for managing the common property is legitimized. Moreover, costs data (see full paper)
show that the costs associated with managing common property are lower in the later years (e.g. fifth
year onwards) under a co-managed regime than under a purely government managed regime.
5.2.3 Transaction costs in fisheries co-management at Oxbow Lakes (Baor) in Bangladesh. 4
Under the pretext of the problems of centralized-management system, government policy-makers
designed the Oxbow Lake Co-management Project (OLP II) in 1988 following the guidelines of the New
Fisheries Management Policy (NFMP). This project was completed in July 1997 with funding by the
International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), and with a Technical Assistance grant from
the Danish International Development Agency (Danida). The co-management arrangement followed
in these oxbow lakes was a partnership arrangement between the government and the fishers where
a non-governmental organization, BRAC, was involved  to obtain external support.
In these lakes, the government and BRAC work together to ensure institutional, organizational and
financial support to both listed and fishing license holders. Fishers in each lake are organized in a group
called the Lake Management Group (LMG). These fishers elect their LMG committees. As per the LMG
rules, income and costs are shared equally among the members, with an acknowledgment that the
contribution to fishing labor is the basis for earning a share of the income.
In this study, the comparison presents a problem because the two institutions did not start their
operations at the same time. In the case of co-management, the project started in the oxbow lakes
during 1988-89, whereas the centralized-management institution was established in 1979-80. In the co-
management process, the period from 1988-89 to 1993-94 is considered as the first stage, whereas for
the centralized-management institution, it was from 1979-80 to 1985-86. To avoid the problem of
inflationary effect, this study uses the consumer price index to convert the costs of the first stage of
centralized management to 1993-94 prices. As there is a difference in location between co-management
and centralized management lakes, as well as a time difference in the first stage, the comparison is
based on a per-year and per-hectare basis in every stage. In centralized management, the period from
1994-95 to 1996-97 is considered as the second stage, and 1997-98 as the third stage similar to the co-
management process. It is mentioned here that in the centralized management scenario there is no
such division as stage two or three as that in the co-management project.
The transaction costs involved in the co-management and centralized-management institutions are on
the basis of recurrent or continuous costs involved in the management process over the said duration.
Costs incurred by the external agencies are ignored in the analysis. Only recurrent costs are included
for this analysis. In the case of co-management lakes, the costs included for the analysis are mostly
collective operational costs, such as provision of security, entertainment, fisher allowance, general fund,
court cases and the unspecified costs that are mainly the costs for the group leader’s salary, subscription
of different organizations, lubricating payments to government officials (mainly for licensing purposes),
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formulation of policies, decision-making and conflict resolution. Considered also as a cost for the
analysis are meetings costs. The costs that the fishers incur themselves include attending different
management activities. In the case of government-managed lakes, the government employed several
staffs to manage the lake resources. The costs outlined in Table 8 include the provision of security,
employee salaries, traveling allowances, festival bonuses, etc. Other costs in government-managed
lakes cover unspecified costs such as subscription fees, entertainment and meeting costs, etc. In both
institutions, the fisher spent a lot of time in management activities. The opportunity costs of the time
spent are included in Tables 22 and 23. The sum of the costs mentioned above, which are shown in
Tables 22 and 23, are the total transaction costs involved for running the co-management project and
centralized-management institution over the years.
Table 22. Transaction costs (Tk/ha) in co-management lakes (525 ha) 1993-1998
Activity 1993-94 1994-95 1995-96 1996-97 1997-98
Security 434 505 383 532 603
Conveyance 138 1 562 132 107 235
Monthly meeting costs 16 75 29 39 52
Entertainment 11 0 33 47 133
Fishers’ allowance 76 23 0 73 16
G. T. Fund 0 0 0 0 2
Court Cases 0 43 11 425 303
Pocket costs of fishers 23 52 55 39 35
Opportunity costs of fishers 345 629 672 578 626
for participating in
management activities
Others 1 601 938 852 732 932
Total transaction costs 2 645 3 826 2 167 2 572 2 938
Source: Published Statistics 1996-97 (Danida, BRAC, Bangladesh Government), in Jahan et al., 1999.
* Costs in different stages are adjusted to 1996-97 prices.
Table 23. Transaction costs (Tk/ha) in government-managed lakes (589 ha) 1993-1998
Activity 1993-94 1994-95 1995-96 1996-97 1997-98
Security 1 679 1 713 1 788 1 855 2 120
Employee salary 1 683 1 710 1 565 1 618 1 770
Traveling allowance 180 184 164 161 180
Entertainment / festival bonus 202 215 194 188 211
Pocket costs of fishers 7 7 7 7 9
Opportunity costs of fishers 134 134 134 135 156
for participating in
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Table 23. Transaction costs (Tk/ha) in government-managed lakes (589 ha) 1993-1998
Activity 1993-94 1994-95 1995-96 1996-97 1997-98
Others 158 240 169 277 228
Total transaction costs 4 043 4 204 4 022 4 242 4 675
Source: Published Statistics 1996-97 (Danida, BRAC, Bangladesh Government), in Jahan et al., 1999.
* Costs in different stages are adjusted to 1996-97 prices.
The results in Tables 22 and 23 indicate that there is a significant difference in the transaction costs
between co-management and centralized management over the years. Transaction costs involved in
the co-management project is much lower than the centralized management institution. The costs
involved in Tables 22 and 23 are recurrent or continuous, which implies that the co-management
approach reduces the overall costs of managing the fishery.
Recommendations
Although the analysis provides support for long-term institutional sustainability of co-management in
terms of cost-effectiveness, the transaction-cost analysis presented earlier has, nevertheless, indicated
some problems that require careful attention. These are as follows:
• It is evident from Table 23 that the costs of monitoring the fishing areas (lake guarding) are rising
over the years, albeit expected to decline when the co-management system is established. One
reason for this increasing cost is attributed to the fact that Bangladeshi fishers generally come from
the lower stratum of society; therefore, it is sometimes not possible for them to refrain from
poaching. This is the reason that locals are employed as guards, which results in huge costs. State
action against the poachers and the mobilization of the fishers to create some form of "Social
Fencing" around the lakes can, therefore, reduce these costs by a substantial amount.
• Land conflict with outsiders is another problem present in almost all the oxbow lakes. Delays in
the demarcation of the lake areas have given the opportunity to these outsiders to illegally encroach
into lake land. However, persons who illegally occupy the lands in the lake areas are often powerful
individuals of society. Fishers incur a lot of expense for legal fees and court cases for initiating legal
action against persons encroaching and sometimes against poachers as well. The government may
provide administrative support to the fishers for these purposes.
• It is also expected that the co-management institution becomes transparent in all of its activities,
but conversely, as shown in Table 23, unspecified costs in the co-management lakes are also rising
alarmingly. It is the project’s rule that financial audits should be checked by the Thana Fisheries
Officer (TFO) concerned and the Area Manager (AM) of BRAC, with appropriate measures taken
against those responsible for disparities, either informally or formally. A respondent noted also that
at times, the collaboration of corrupt government officers motivated several LFT leaders to manipulate
financial matters written as unspecified costs in the accounts. The central policy-maker should,
therefore, seriously consider this issue.
The LFT account audit is essential on a regular basis to assist the LFT committee to maintain proper
accounting in order to institute greater transparency pertaining to the costs incurred and income
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Policy implications
This study evaluates the transaction costs as a method for evaluating the co-management project and
centralized-management institution in the case of the oxbow lakes fisheries in Bangladesh. The results
show that the transaction costs involved in managing the fisheries resources in the co-management
system is lower than the centralized-management institution over the years. It reduces the overall
management costs of managing the fisheries resources. The Bangladesh government may, therefore,
consider it an important instrument that saves huge costs for the government to effectively manage
the inland fisheries resources.
5.3 Institutional resilience and fisheries co-management
This section reports on two studies. The first is an institutional analysis of Sasi Laut in Maluku, Indonesia
by Novaczek and Harkes (1998). The second is a study of resilience and equity in co-management in
the Western Visayas, Philippines (Fernandez and Carnaje 2002).
5.3.1 An institutional analysis of Sasi Laut in Maluku, Indonesia
Co-management and community-based resource management systems have been heralded as important
alternative resource management systems. Much has been written about the success of these systems
in managing natural resources. These systems exhibit close linkages between social and ecological
systems. Their success also appears to be related to how adaptive and resilient the institutions are and
how capable they are of responding to and managing change. A critical question in designing and
implementing co-management systems is: how can adaptability and resilience be built into institutions
so that they are capable of staying operational over time?
This section will present the results of research on institutional resilience, with the focus on one
community-based management system, the “sasi” system in Maluku Province, Indonesia. Even though
sasi has survived for over 400 years in various parts of Maluku Province, it is in the process of dying
out in many areas. This section presents an analysis of when sasi, or aspects of sasi, disappeared, which
factors caused its decline, and which factors have made it survive. Understanding this process and the
factors behind it will help to develop, maintain and revitalize sasi, and, hopefully, provide generalized
principles that can be applied to building resiliency into co-management systems.
Resilience
Resilience is defined as “the ability of a system to cope with change without collapsing” or “the ability
of a system to absorb perturbations by actively adapting to an ever changing environment” (Folke and
Berkes 1995). Pollnac (1994) adds that the degree of adaptability depends on the specific circumstances
of a system. Thus, it is important to understand not only the institution but also the social-ecological
system in which it is nested. Reduction in resilience means vulnerability increases, with the risk that
the whole system flips from one equilibrium state to another (Folke and Berkes 1995). In other words,
where institutional resilience is low, the management system is likely to collapse. To avoid such situations,
there is a need to develop institutions with the ability to respond to and manage change and to cope
with unexpected environmental occurrences.
Institutional resilience is evaluated here as structural adaptation, rule flexibility, and community structure.
To be resilient, the management process must be adaptable to changes in various social, economic and109 CHAPTER FIVE • EVALUATION OF FISHERIES CO-MANAGEMENT PERFORMANCE
political conditions. The process should lead to rules that are flexible enough to respond to changing
conditions in the economy or resource. The process must accommodate changes in the community
social structure and individual motivations for resource use and management.
Methods
The study of institutional resilience is part of a larger study on the performance and impact of the sasi
system, with particular focus on marine sasi (sasi laut), in the Moluccas (Novaczek and Harkes 1998).
The overall study comprised four components: 1) identification of the extent and operation of marine
sasi in Maluku Province; 2) a performance and impact analysis of the marine sasi system; 3) comparative
institutional analysis of case study villages; and 4) policy recommendations.
The information for this study is based on an inventory of 61 villages on the Lease Islands, Ambon and
a part of Seram. Additional key informant interviews covered questions on: 1) the objective of sasi; 2)
the rules and regulations; 3) the role of traditional village institutions; 4) boundaries; 5) compliance
and enforcement; and 6) external factors having an impact on the institution. The analysis describes
the process of decline of sasi and the mechanisms behind this process.
Sasi systems
Based on traditional adat law, sasi rules regulate the use of natural resources, both terrestrial and
marine. Adat is the Indonesian term that describes custom or customary law: “The rules, standards,
concepts, and principles pertaining to all fields of social activity: to the construction, allocation and
transmission of political power, to the right to make and change rules and to make decisions, to validate
transactions, to acccess, distribute and transmit economic resources, to social arrangements like
marriage and kinship…” (von Benda- Beckmann 1995). One conspicuous manifestation of adat law
in Maluku is sasi, described by Zerner (1994) as “a varied family of customary practices and laws (or
rules) which establish limitation to access to individually or collectively controlled territory and/or
resources.”
To place sasi on an area means to put into effect a time-limited prohibition on entry and harvesting.
Marine sasi (sasi laut) mediates access to coral reefs and inshore marine waters through demarcation
of clan or community-managed fishing grounds, ritual closures, prohibitions on certain kinds of gear
and behavior, regulation of the timing and manner of harvest, limits on the number of persons having
access, and the size or amount of fish, shellfish or other marine products (e.g. sea cucumbers, mangroves,
construction materials such as coral rock or sand, etc.) that can be taken (see also Nikijuluw 1995).
When sasi is opened, a portion of the proceeds from the harvest are usually used as a  source of village
income, to finance costs of local government and development projects, or to be directly distributed
amongst the villagers.
There are as many forms of adat in Indonesia as there are local cultures. However, a paramount value
of adat is balance: between humans and nature, between individuals and community, and between
community and cosmos. Important “adat values” include consensus, reciprocity, service, and the “social
function” of land, labor and resources. In Maluku, sasi forms a natural basis for resource management
because it is based on the idea that people are a part of nature and that acts against nature will be
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institutions. In its present-day form, sasi combines the official authority of the village head (kepala
desa) with the moral authority of religion and adat. It is, therefore, a logical institution for management
and conservation, especially for inshore waters that lie within the village territory.
The origin of sasi is not clear, but it is said that sasi was invented to protect natural resources against
outsiders during and before Dutch colonial rule in the 16th century (von Benda-Beckman et al. 1995).
After an initial prohibition, the colonial powers used sasi as an instrument to control the local population
and (spice) trade. Following alternate periods of decline and revival, over the last decades the system
has become part of the wider social, economic and political processes in the province. By its nature,
sasi tends to optimize the use of natural resources, but currently, in certain cases, sasi is manipulated
by the local elite through the sale of harvest rights. Sasi is under stress in many parts of Maluku Province.
While sasi is still valued in many parts of the Lease Islands, Ambon and Seram, fully functioning systems
are becoming more rare.
Patterns of loss of Sasi
Loss of the entire sasi institution
Of the 61 villages studied, in 19 villages the entire sasiinstitution was lost, that is, marine sasi, land sasi,
and adat sasi; the latter being the most traditional form of sasi. Most losses occurred in the 1990s on
Ambon and Saparua. On Haruku Island, by contrast, some form of sasi has survived in every village.
There is no difference between Muslim and Christian villages; the loss of sasi has been steady in both.
There is, however, a clear difference considering village size. The size classes are class 1: <1000 people;
class 2: 1000 - 2000; class 3: 2000 - 3000 people; and class 4: > 3000 people. Losses have been greatest
in size class 4, and more stable in size class 3.
Loss of adat sasi
As most villages have sasi on coconuts arranged by the church (sasi darat), adat sasi was identified
as the type of sasi concerning terrestrial resources. Out of 47 recorded losses of adat sasi, over half
occurred before the 1960s. Losses were moderate in the 1970s and 1980s, but have become more
severe in the 1990s. The trend by island is not significant.
Recent losses in the 1990s of adat sasi have occurred in both Muslim and Christian villages, but are
concentrated in villages of size class 2 (1000 - 2000) on Saparua and Haruku. Since Law No. 5/1979*
was passed to restructure the village level administration, small villages have the status of a “dusun”
or sub-village under a larger administrative entity. This means that there is no independent village
government to execute sasi, which probably caused adat sasi to dissolve.
*UU No.5/1979 was a National Administrative Law issued to restructure the village government according
to a model as prescribed by the national government in Jakarta. The introduction of the law has often
been referred to as undermining the existing village structure because no provisions were made to
include and acknowledge the traditional adat institutions (Abrahamsz and Hetarie 1994).
The 1940s - 70s saw losses of adat sasi focused on large villages (class 4) on Ambon Island. Population
statistics from that period are unfortunately not available, but it is possible that Ambonese villages
started to reach some critical threshold of population during those decades. Today, adat sasi persists
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The erosion and loss of marine sasi
Active marine sasi(sasi laut) institutions are hard to find. Out of 61 villages inventoried, only 17 had
some form of marine sasi, but it was effectively dormant in some of these. In the past, marine sasi was
much more prevalent. Eighteen villages were identified that just lost marine sasi in living memory; this
means that at one time at least 35 villages (57 per cent) had this institution. In four villages (Seith, Ouw,
Seri, and Rutah), one or more fishers interviewed thought sasi was either in force or had been in place
at one time. In the other 22 villages, either marine sasi never existed or it has been totally forgotten.
In over half of the cases where marine sasi has been lost, the loss occurred prior to 1970. Since then,
marine sasi has been relatively stable compared to other forms of sasi. Most losses in the 1970s to
1990s have been in either Class 1 or Class 4 villages, and in the 1990s, the only recorded loss was on
Ambon Island.
Factors influencing the activity of sasi
The level of activity of sasi on terrestrial resources was measured using indicators for the presence of
sasi attributes, seasonal closures, consistency in the application of sasi, and local effort (enforcement).
Similarly, marine sasi was scored using indicators for presence, closed areas, written rules and monitoring.
Using this system it was found that land sasi is significantly more active in size class 3 villages (p =
0.01).
In Maluku, fishing villages are most often homogeneous in terms of religion. The six villages where
marine sasi was most active (score 10-12, see Table 21) were all homogeneously Christian or Muslim,
i.e. with at least 95% of the population being of the dominant religion. Out of 17 cases of marine sasi,
three were effectively dormant (score = 3) and another three were weak (score 6-7). One of the cases
of dormant marine sasi occurred in a relatively non-homogeneous village and a second case was in a
Christian dusun of a predominantly Muslim village (desa). Homogeneity thus seems to be important
for the resilience of this traditional institution.
The existence of marine sasi is also linked to the fate of other parts of the institution. Villages with
marine sasi usually have active land sasi. Likewise, where marine sasi has been lost for some reason,
the land sasi institution that is left behind is also weak.
Resilience of marine sasi is also linked to the interplay among governing authorities. In the Muslim
villages where the institution is neither adat nor church (sasi gereja), it has been more stable than
in Christian villages. In a number of villages, sasi of marine resources was abandoned (Akoon, Ameth,
Leinitu) or weakened (Haria, Ulath) when adat sasi was taken over by the church, which is predominately
involved in land sasi. Compared to marine sasi of the traditional adat or “other” type, marine sasi in
villages where sasi is taken over by the church is significantly less active (p<0.05). Additionally, where
adat sasi has survived, losses of marine sasi have been half that of villages where only church sasi
remains.Table 24. Factors related to activity of sea sasi in central Maluku. Homogeneity status: 1
= 95-100% are of dominant religion; 2 = 60-80% are of dominant religion
Name Dominant Homogeneity  Administrative Notes Size Activity score
religion Status Class Land Sea
Nolloth Christian 1 Desa 3 12 12
Haruku Christian 1 Desa 3 11 12
Pelau Muslim 1 Desa 4 12 12
Siri Sori  Muslim 1 Desa 3 n/a 12
Morela Muslim 1 Desa 3 11 12
Itawaka Christian 1 Desa 3 11 10
Amahai Christian 1 Desa 3 12 10
Kabau Muslim 1 Desa 3 n/a 9
Ihamahu Christian 1 Desa 2 12 9
Tengah- Muslim 1 Desa 3 12 9
Tengah
Hatusua Christian 2 Desa 2 9 9
Porto Christian 1 Desa 4 10 7
Paperu Christian 1 Desa 3 9 6





Makariki Christian 2 Desa 2 12 3
Rohua Christian 1 Dusun in a  3 12 3
Muslim desa





Reasons for loss of sasi between 1940 and 1997
During the inventory of the 61 villages, the informants were asked if they could remember when some
aspect of sasi changed or was lost, and why this had happened (Table 22). Explanations were often
quite explicit and included contextual information pertaining to the evolution of socio-political systems
in Maluku. The comments were only applicable to villages where sasi actually was lost or transformed.
The numbers represent the number of comments, not the number of villages.
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Table 25. Reasons causing sasi to become (partly) non-functional
Cause for the decline of sasi #
Poor leadership led to decline in enforcement and compliance 8
Take-over of adat sasi by church 8
Conflict over leadership 1
Conflict between church and adat 1
Economic pressures led to non-compliance 4
Change in administrative boundaries 3
Conflicts over land 1
Urbanization and degradation of resources 1
Collapse of clove price increased fishing pressure 1
Other 3
Weak leadership and conflicts are key elements in the erosion of sasi. In the opinion of villagers, conflicts
within the village government, conflicts between the village leader and traditional authorities (adat),
conflicts between the village leader and the traditional law enforcers (kewang), conflicts among church
organizations, and conflicts over land all resulted in partial or complete loss of the sasi institution.
Conflicts between traditional adat leaders and village government leading to the erosion of sasi were
typical for Christian villages, while they never occurred on Nusa Laut.
Confusion over land and rights was, in some cases, due to changes in government unit boundaries as
a result of the new government structure under Law No. 5/1979. In addition, pressure from worsening
economic conditions has been mounting since the collapse of clove prices in the early 1990s. Crop
failure and decline of the resource were also mentioned as causing sasi to collapse. Changes in
administrative boundaries and the effects of World War II were most prevalent on Ambon and Nusa
Laut.
The lack of effective enforcement, in combination with economic needs, political turmoil, and urbanization
provided the incentives for people to violate sasi. Compliance and enforcement problems were more
prevalent in Christian villages, and particularly on Ambon. In eight cases, the village government
delegated the authority over sasi to the church, causing adat sasi and marine sasi to decline. As of
1997, political or religious conflicts were documented as affecting 12 of the remaining sasi villages. In
other words, in about a quarter of the remaining sasi villages, the institution is under stress.
Results of the comparative case study
For the comparative case study, six villages were selected for study. Two villages were selected with
strong sasi (Nolloth and Haruku), two villages where sasi is lost, but about to be revitalized (Tuhaha
and Hulaliu), and two villages where sasi was lost in living memory (Seri and Hutumuri-Toisapu). The
findings from the in-depth interviews underscore the linkages among the different components
(objectives, rules), the players and the external context of the sasi institution, and illustrate the
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Comparison of villages
Nolloth and Haruku villages, on Saparua and Haruku islands, respectively, were both characterized as
having a strong sasiinstitution. The cases, however, are distinct. Whereas Nolloth can be described as
a system designed primarily to provide resource rent for the village government (that is, revenues are
for the village as a whole), Haruku’s sasihas more to do with fair distribution of fish resources and
conservation (everybody shares in the catch). Nolloth is a stable village, with legitimate leadership and
strong representation of traditional authorities. The kewang (traditional enforcers) are functional and,
together with the kepala desa (village head), serious in the prosecution of offenders. The harvest
rights of sasi are reserved for the village cooperative (KUD), and income accrues to the village
government and the harvesters. Other peoples benefit indirectly through local development projects,
such as road construction and the construction of a fresh-water system - projects for which the village
government also gets funding from the national government.
In Haruku, the harvest is communal and distributed among the villagers, people thus benefit directly
and benefits of sasi are clear. There, a more important role is ascribed to the kewang and relatively
less to the village head. Kewang members feel a strong responsibility towards sasi. Recently, the villagers
in Haruku have become divided as a result of the installation of a new kepala desa. This leader, elected
with a slender majority, supports sasi,but also favors mining development that threatens the resources
under sasi. This has led to confusion and a dysfunctional village government, a situation that in turn
poses a threat to sasi.
In Hulaliu (on Haruku Island), conflicts between the kepala desa and the kewang, and in particular
problems with accountability for the use of resource rents in the past, lie at the root of the decline of
sasi. The current leader is trying to revitalize sasi, but his position is unstable because he lacks the
support of a large part of the village population. The revitalization process is thereby threatened.
In Tuhaha (on Saparua Island), where there were problems in the past between formal and traditional
authorities, there is also a movement to revitalize sasi, but the relationship between the village
government and traditional authorities first needs to be restored. The village government, which is
only partly functional, has to be reorganized before a kewangcan be installed.
In both Seri and Toisapu-Hutumuri on Ambon Island, sasi has been lost and fisheries management is
minimal or lacking. Traditional village structures are to a large extent replaced by formal structures at
the village level (desa), but less so at the sub-village (dusun) level. Artisanal fishers have to compete
directly with large-scale fishers who roam the inshore waters for tuna, a feature less common around
Haruku and Saparua Islands. Both villages lie on Ambon and close to regional markets and hence are
more in contact with modernization and urbanization, the processes that affect local socio-cultural and
economic structures.
The remainder of this section will describe the various elements of sasi and provide an analysis of how
sasi functions and persists under different conditions.
Objective of sasi
The general objective of sasi,as articulated by villagers, is to protect resources from theft and destruction.
Theft is prevented through active monitoring and enforcement. To maximize yields, immature shellfish
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Nolloth for example, there are lengthy closed seasons and a minimum legal size for lola shells (Trochus
niloticus) harvested. In Haruku, destructive and overly efficient gear types are banned. Thus, in these
cases sasi does have a conservation objective. In addition, Haruku kewang leaders expressly identify
equitable distribution of fish, particularly the support of the village poor, to be an objective of their
revitalized sasi institution. In their 1995 study, von Benda-Beckman et al. wrote: “throughout history
the objectives of sasi have changed from limiting access and the regulation of power, to defining social
conduct and the increase of economic benefits.” The use of sasifor economic purposes, which has a
long history in Maluku (von Benda-Beckmann et al. 1995), is illustrated in Nolloth by the use of lola
shells. Lola were formerly important as a food source. When in the 1960s the shells became commercially
important, the village government of Nolloth replaced the communal harvest with a system that allowed
the village government to auction the harvest rights. This was done to the dismay of the villagers who
saw their personal direct benefits decrease.
A shift from communal harvests to the sale of marine harvest rights occurs in most villages where sasi
is revitalized by a local government with commercial interests. Although in most villages the principle
of sasi is valued and sasi is perceived as a “good thing”, a majority of the fishers interviewed object
to the auctioning of marine sasi harvest rights, especially to outsiders. Both Tuhaha and Hulaliu village
heads plan to auction the harvest rights and use sasirevenues for village development. However, fishers
have declared that they would respect sasi only if they  get direct benefits from a communal harvest.
Villagers may be kept satisfied with village development projects, but there also may be problems
because the village income and expenditures are not transparent. For example, at one point in the
1980s, when profits appeared to be used for the village head’s personal benefit rather than the public
good, sasi in Nolloth nearly broke down.
Rules and regulations
In order to regulate the harvest, certain rules have to be in place. Nolloth, Haruku and Hulaliu have
written sasiregulations. The operational rules specify the products and marine species under sasi, gear
restrictions, the timing of the harvest, etc. These operational rules are the base on which the fishers
make their day-to-day decisions over compliance. The operational rules are nested in a set of collective
rules that define the decision-making process around opening and closing of seasons, how to regulate
access, and how enforcement is arranged. On the third level - the constitutional level - the structure
of the sasi institution is defined through adat. Adat prescribes who is involved in the process and what
their role is, for example, which clans and persons are responsible for decision-making, conflict
resolution, execution of ceremonies and enforcement.
The process of decline involves non-compliance with operational rules, but this in turn is directly
dependent on the effectiveness of the collective choice rules. For example, in Hulaliu there was a
conflict between the kepala desa and the kewang because the kewang’s rights were neglected - a
collective choice level problem - and this was the root cause for sasi to decline. Subsequent problems
with compliance (at the operational level) were secondary, that is, the result of lack of kewangenforcement.
Adat,as part of the village culture, however, persisted, and thus the constitutional rules remained intact.
Over the last decades, operational rules have been modified. Boundaries of sasi areas, frequency of
open and closed seasons, division of benefits, restrictions on gear use, etc., all may and do change.
In practical management terms, this modification affects the function of sasi, but does not threaten
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authority from the kewang to the church, the loss of the kewang, the introduction of police as formal
enforcers, and the promulgation of national fisheries legislation), the structure or legal basis of the
sasiinstitution has changed. This has led to disappearance of part or all of a local sasiinstitution.
Adaptation of constitutional rules may also, however, strengthen sasi. For example, in Haruku, where
sasi on marine resources is enforced by the kewang, there is also sasi on coconuts and clove, which
is enforced by the church. The reason why these commodities are under church sasi is because the
people asked the church to become involved at a period when theft was significant. Since that time,
the church has played a role that is distinct from, but supportive of, that of the kewang.
Because operational and collective rules may be lost more easily, they are less resilient than constitutional
rules. However, the fact that operational rules, and to a lesser extent the collective choice rules, can
be changed or abandoned and then revived, is an important feature contributing to adaptiveness and
resilience of the larger institution.
Some sasi operational rules overlap and support national fisheries laws on destructive gear types. In
Haruku and Nolloth, formal regulations on mesh-size, the use of poison, blast fishing and bagansare
included in the sasi rules. As is typical of non-sasi villages, Seri has only a few informal rules, while
Toisapu-Hutumuri has no fisheries regulations at all. A lack of effectively enforced government rules
has provided an incentive for fishers in Hutumuri to push for local management that can protect their
fishing grounds against outsiders. Under national law, local adat institutions and village governments
are allowed to pass local rules as long as they do not contradict national or provincial law. What is
lacking is the motivation for village leaders to act in the absence of direction from a higher level.
Role of traditional institutions
Even though Law No. 5/1979 is thought to have caused confusion in the village, in the perception of
ordinary villagers it had no dramatic and immediate impact. The fact that the traditional village structure
was no longer acknowledged posed the village government with a dilemma as to how to meet the
demands from Jakarta without violating the traditional social structure. Apparently, the requirements
of the law, i.e. replacement of the traditional government structure by a formal one, were often
implemented at a pace and in a manner suited to the local situation. In most cases, the local government
basically incorporated the traditional structure into the formal one, and thus change was not clearly
visible.
Some villages have been quite successful in melding the formal and traditional government structures.
In Nolloth, for example, the sasi area is nearly fully overlapping with the traditional government structure
(saniri negeri). Also, the village headman is elected according to traditional guidelines. In other villages,
however, the introduction has been less smooth and a cause for conflicts. Traditional authorities have
become marginalized, as in Tuhaha. Where newcomers enter the local government through elections,
villages become politically unstable. In all villages, there is some degree of overlapping between formal
and traditional authorities, but the extent to which the traditional authorities are represented and can
exert their influence varies.
The sasi study shows that the degree of overlapping is decisive for the continuation and stability of
sasi. In Nolloth, where the traditional authorities function within the new system, the sasiinstitution
is strong. The villages where sasi has ceased to function had problems with village leaders who did not
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acknowledged but had to modify their role according to the new structure, sasi has disappeared. In
Tuhaha, the new village leader has to honor the traditional authorities and allow them to take a place
in the village government before sasi can be revitalized. In Hulaliu, the village government neglected
the kewang’s rights and caused sasi to decline. The village head now has to reconcile the differences
in order to reintroduce sasi. Haruku is a different case. The introduction of the government structure
took place in a period when sasi was just about to be re-institutionalized. Here, revival and reconstruction
of sasi was an initiative of the kewang, but with support from a village head (kepala desa)who was
also a raja (from the traditional “royal” clan).
Knowledge of sasi, or rather the body of knowledge, is passed on from father to son within certain
lineages and persons, i.e. kepala kewang (head of the kewang) and kepala adat (traditional village
leader). The rituals and knowledge are secret and involve an almost extinct indigenous language
(bahasa tana). In order to preserve traditional sasi, it is imperative that the process of passing down
knowledge is perpetuated. “The keepers of sasi knowledge” were mentioned by a number of respondents
who commented that the older generation is dying and taking sasi with them. At the same time, the
process of “modernization” accelerates as the younger generations leave to study in Ambon city where
adat is regarded as a superstitious belief. As a result, many youngsters lose interest in sasi, even in
villages where sasi is strong (i.e. in Nolloth).
The support and participation of the younger generation, however, is necessary for the success of sasi
as a viable management institution. Especially in the villages where sasi is weak or has ceased to
function, the inability to preserve the knowledge of sasi is a threat to its continuation. Of all the case-
study villages, Haruku is the only one where knowledge of sasi is actively communicated to the new
generation through the mini-kewang so that they learn about sasi and the role of sasi in resource
management.
Leadership
Village officials appeared poorly informed about local issues and the activities and programs of village
organizations. In such cases, government decision-making may rest almost exclusively with the kepala
desa. Thus, the modern kepala desa may hold a very powerful and authoritarian position. As such,
he is a key decision-maker and in many cases the dominant decision-maker in the sasi institution.
Before 1979, the position of village leader was hereditary through the royal raja line. Nowadays, the
people elect the kepala desa and, in theory, anyone can be elected. However, Nolloth is a fine example
of a situation where the kepala desa was selected because he is the raja. He was inaugurated not only
by the village government, but also by the adat leaders, and assumed the sacred function of kepala
adat, an important traditional position. This allows him to lead the modern village government and
to be fully and legitimately involved in traditional ceremonies. The results of the research support those
of Volker (1925) and Riedel (1886) who maintained that compliance to sasi rules depended largely on
strong and tactful leadership. The kepala desa must be honest and respected or sasi is undermined.
This was illustrated by former leaders who abused sasi harvest profits in Hulaliu and Nolloth, and
caused sasi resources to decline or crumble. In addition, local legitimacy is very important and this
still stems largely from being part of the raja family line.  In some villages, formally elected leaders are
not legitimate either because they are not from the right family or because the people think a different
member of the raja line would be more competent or more attuned to villagers’ aspirations. Where
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In Haruku, for instance, the kepala desa is not a long-term village resident and is said to represent the
interests of the pro-mining lobby. Hence, although he is a formally elected leader and many say he is
of the raja clan (others disagree), he lacks local legitimacy to play a guiding role in sasi. This situation,
wherein the kepala desa and the kewang represent the two opposing groups in the village, seriously
undermines the local institution. In Hulaliu, the initiative of the kepala desa to revive sasi
is also hampered by a lack of legitimacy, apparently from the level of local political opposition.
External interests may influence the election of a kepala desa, as was reported in both Haruku and
Hutumuri. Elections can be manipulated either in favor of or against traditional leaders. Under the
Indonesian system, all candidates must be screened and approved by the government. Popular candidates
may be disqualified at this stage, or some votes may simply be neglected during the election process.
On one hand, lingering adat structures may make nonsense of the concept of democratic elections.
On the other hand, traditional leaders with broad popular support may also be vulnerable.
Boundaries
The term “marine sasi” is generally applied to shallow inshore areas. Outside the sasi area, other parts
of the village territory, including deep water beyond the fringing reef, may also be rented out to
outsiders. Generally, boundaries of the sasi land are clearly defined, have remained largely the same
over the years, and are usually accepted. Fishers may accept areas of restricted access without complaint,
but they do have reservations. For some non-sasirented areas, the lack of legitimacy is compensated
for by a strong enforcement mechanism (in Tuhaha). Crucial in the acceptance of boundaries of
restricted areas is the legitimacy of the leaders, direct benefits for the excluded users and a strong
enforcement mechanism.
Enforcement and compliance
Enforcement of sasi regulations is carried out by the kewang, the police, and/or the village government.
In Nolloth and Haruku, the kewang is strong, and plays an important role in the enforcement of
regulations. In coastal villages there is still a firm belief that ancestral spirits and God guard the sasi
regulations. Even in cases where the village government is responsible for enforcement, traditional
sanctions can still play a role. “The offender can be lucky and escape from the kewang or police, but
he still may get sick”, a fisher in Tuhaha explained. “Before long, he will seek either the church minister
or tuan negeri (in more traditional villages) to confess his mischief because only a prayer or ceremony
can relieve him from his burden.”
The traditional kewangis highly legitimate because they enforce the law without showing favoritism.
The police have the formal authority to implement the rules, but act arbitrarily and are not trusted by
the people. In villages that have no active kewang,but rely on the police for enforcement, as in Tuhaha
and Hulaliu, enforcement is difficult. Not only are the police mistrusted, but their effectiveness is also
hampered by the fact that they reside far from the village; and when they are needed, they take too
long to arrive.
In villages where sasi is gone and/or where the kewanghas been abolished, authority has shifted from
the traditional enforcers to the formal village government. In Christian villages the government may
have enforcement support from the church. In Haruku, Hulaliu and Tuhaha, the church is only involved
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and the kewang, and he is also present at adat ceremonies including those of the marine sasi. In non-
sasi villages, the church is not seen to play a role in supporting the enforcement of fisheries rules
although it may, as in Seri, be called upon to bless fishers and their boats. The reason why the church
is only directly involved in the land sasi and not in the marine sasi is that fishing is of too high importance
to the people. The power of the church and God is considered strong, and the church minister thinks
that if the church were involved in enforcement of the marine sasi, the punishment would be too
severe. Therefore, the church does not want to be responsible for marine enforcement
Where sasi is functional, compliance with fishing rules in general (both sasi and other regulations) is
higher than in non-sasi villages. Non-compliance by local villagers is not usually a threat to the sasi
institution, but is a sign of decline that is likely based on problems at the collective choice or constitutional
levels, which can threaten sasi. Non-compliance may also be directed at an authority figure rather than
at the sasi institution per se. In Hulaliu, the uses of destructive fishing techniques by a contra group
were meant to undermine the authority of the village leader. Non-compliance by either locals or
outsiders, which threatens the very existence of local resources and is not effectively controled by the
kewang,is, however, a threat to sasi because it is an incentive for people to abandon local management.
Usually, however, intrusion in sasi areas is low (an offender is caught two or three times a year).
However, in times of economic and political stress, the rate of non-compliance can increase.
Externalities
The infrastructure, communication and transportation links of the villages on the islands of Haruku
and Saparua are limited compared to the Ambon (non-sasi) villages. The minimal levels of in- and out-
migration and tourism have no impact on the village demography and appear to pose no threat to
traditional institutions. Tourism in Haruku, stimulated by sasiceremonies, may even help support the
institution. Seri and Hutumuri on Ambon Island are, by contrast, heavily influenced by their proximity
to Ambon city. Apparently, the greater involvement of people in the process of modernization and
globalization, the greater the appreciation that people have for sasi and traditional structures. It is here
that the loss of adat ideology and tradition is largest. The tradition of collective action and other
indicators of social sustainability are also relatively weak. This is an important aspect to take into account
when reinstitutionalizing sasi or developing a comparable management institution that is widely
applicable.
Pollution and resource degradation resulting from modern development also pose a challenge to local
resource management. The villages on Ambon have seen their resources decline due to pollution from
fish and plywood factories. The environmental impacts of these operations are such that they would
be beyond the control and influence of a traditional style village kewang. Revitalized local institutions
require information management, networking and lobbying skills, and links to government departments
having jurisdiction in environmental protection.
A related issue is that of the impact of large-scale development. Haruku is the one village that is
influenced by mining exploration for copper and other base metals, as well as silver and gold. This
enterprise seriously affects the political stability in the village and also emphasizes the limits of a village-
based management institution that is not linked to higher levels of government. The sasi institution
does not offer villagers the ability to intervene in regional development planning and licensing of
mining operations. The kewang is powerless to prevent pollution from mining activities affecting sasi
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National laws and programs are implemented through the provincial, district and sub-district government
offices, but information on fisheries and environmental law rarely reaches the village level. Knowledge
of fisheries regulations is fragmented and usually fisheries regulations are poorly implemented. There
are no government patrol boats in the area. When it comes to protection of fishing rights, the villages
are left to their own devices. This may motivate people to work together in defense of local resources.
On the other hand, if sasi as an institution remains disconnected from governmental power centers,
people may give up local operational rules because they are ineffective against externalities.
The revival of sasi in Central Maluku
Currently, fisheries management is not yet a burning issue in most villages because reduced catches
are compensated for by high fish prices. Few village respondents have any clear idea of what fisheries
management would entail, and rather think that the answer to declining catches is to upgrade their
boats and gear. Nevertheless, all fishers in sasi villages said that sasi is useful and important, as did 90
per cent of fishers in villages where sasi is being revived and 70 per cent of fishers in non-sasi villages.
In 14 villages, respondents expressed their desire to re-introduce sasi (land, marine or both), or
strengthen existing sasi practices. Plans for revitalization were found in villages of all sizes and on every
island. In some cases, definite plans with timelines had already been developed; in other cases, the
indication to revitalize was based on wishful thinking. Most of the villages interested in revitalization
were Christian.
The tendency to revitalize sasi is fed by the appreciation of sasiby the people, not just as a management
system but also as a cultural phenomenon. In Nolloth and Haruku, where sasi is still alive, people
explained: “Sasi has a spirit, and everybody carries it because it is adat and part of their culture.” The
constitutional rules of sasi are based on and are part of adat, and because they cannot be separated
from the local culture, it is at this level that sasi as an institution has its strongest resilience. This explains
why sasi is still spiritually and ideologically significant, even where the practical execution of sasi has
vanished.
Two villages that are seriously attempting to revitalize sasi are Hulaliu and Tuhaha. In both cases, it is
not fishers but village elites (government staff with the partial involvement of adat leaders) that are
pushing the process forward. The reason for revitalizing sasi has less to do with its spiritual significance
and much more to do with the possibility of controlling common property resources to generate
government income. In considering revitalization processes, it is useful to look back to what caused
the loss of operational sasi in the first place.
The main reasons for the collapse of sasi in both Tuhaha and Hulaliu were political problems, lack of
trust among the village leaders, and the subsequent withdrawal of the kewang. The practical execution
of sasi was abolished, but sasi remained part of the village ideology. The process of revitalization builds
on this cultural base and re-establishment means re-installation of the traditional authorities and re-
activation of collective choice and operational rules. Kewang members have to be chosen and inaugurated,
tasks delegated between the formal and traditional authorities, and operational rules designed. To be
successful, the proponents of sasi renewal will have to pay attention to history and be careful to avoid
past practices that led to breakdowns.
In recent years, local NGOs, such as Yayasan Hualopu, have been working in the Lease Islands. They
provide villagers with information on sustainable fisheries development and encourage local leadersto embark on the management of village territorial waters. Yayasan Hualopu, for example, is currently
engaged in a program of mapping village marine territories and facilitating the development of local
management plans. In this work, they hope to capitalize on the basis that sasi provides by encouraging
the reinstallation of kewangs and the revival of the island-level Latupati institutions (traditional meetings
of village leaders) with an emphasis on conflict resolution and management planning. The general plan
is to promote the development of a new law at the provincial level (“Perda” or “Peraturan Daerah”),
which will give legal recognition to the right of villages to enter into marine resource management and
establish kewang-style management organizations. The aim of these supporters of sasi is clearly resource
management and conservation.
Thus, in the process of revitalization, there are three streams of thought that should be reconciled:
1) the wish of the village fishers to preserve adat culture and share in the benefits from fisheries
resources while protecting their territories from outsiders, 2) the desire of local governments to extract
resource rents, and 3) the push by academics, environmentalists and managers to develop viable local
fisheries conservation and management.
Synthesis
Before the 1970s, a large number of villages lost sasi because of post World War II social, administrative
and economic changes, internal village conflicts, and other reasons that were difficult to trace. The
more recent breakdown of sasihas occurred in two distinct periods and villagers are able to articulate
reasons for its decline in their village.
The 1970s, at the eve of the introduction of the new formal government structure, were a period of
decline. A fundamental factor was confusion in the village or conflict between village authorities, which
undermined the legitimacy of the village leader or the institution itself. Political instability and/or a
dysfunctional kewang invited non-compliance and led to the abandonment of operational rules. Sasi
was taken over by the church, either because of such conflicts or in an attempt to improve compliance.
The church, interested only in land sasi on coconuts, did not get involved in marine sasi, which in
some cases then declined.
The 1980s were a period of relative stability. Villages where sasi was functioning remained stable. In
some other villages, there was a tendency to revitalize sasi. The 1990s, however, were a period of
further decline of sasi. The period between the 1970s and 1990s covers one generation. Modernization
and commercialization as a result of improved communication, infrastructure and education, and the
expansion of market relations, influenced the local culture and especially younger generations. The
generational change, together with the rapid rate of social, economic and political change in Maluku
in the 1990s, is most likely the reason why sasi is now suffering such a relatively rapid decline.
The contemporary decline of sasi largely stems from conflicts. Conflicts can, in some cases, be related
to the social change that has resulted from the introduction of the new village structure by the national
government. Also, the election system has opened up possibilities for opportunists with vested interests
to take the position of village leader. On the other hand, where traditional authorities (saniri negeri)
merged into the new government (LMD), adatand sasi have remained a significant aspect of village
life. Overlapping between the traditional and formal governments proves to be essential in the
prolongation of sasi.
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The continuing presence of sasi is affected by village size and proximity to a large urban center. This
is clearly illustrated by the early and rapid decline of sasi recorded on Ambon Island, which has
historically been the government center and most densely populated island in the study area.
Ostrom (1990) writes that the likelihood of users designing successful common property institutions
will be improved if the group is relatively small and stable, and if it is relatively homogeneous. This
research confirms this, for sasiis most resilient in homogeneous villages of fewer than 3 000 people.
Villages close to the capital, where sasi no longer functions, have exceeded a critical size, become
heterogeneous, and shifted from subsist ence fishing and farming to large-scale fishing and urban
employment.
Of all the forms of sasi, the marine sasi, although less prevalent, appears to be relatively robust. Whereas
sasi generally has suffered severe decline in recent years, the marine sasi has been relatively stable and
even showed signs of revitalization during the 1990s. This revival comes basically out of the heartfelt
attachment of people to adat in general, and sasi in particular, but also the commercial value of marine
products such as Trochus niloticusand sea cucumber for foreign markets. The process is being further
facilitated and reinforced by intervening NGOs, governmental and academic supporters who see the
potential value of sasi as a resource management system.
Where the people do not expect to benefit directly, they seem uninterested in the revitalization of sasi.
 A lack of transparency in the distribution of benefits further hampers the process. There is a risk that
in villages where sasi is being used as a tool to extract resource rents, that sasi then turns into “a
government thing” controlled by local elites.  This is a disincentive for fishers to follow the new sasi
rules.
Church sasi is the most common type of land sasi in Christian villages. The church also has the potential
to play an important role in the marine sasi. Church sasi derives it strength from the strong religious
beliefs of rural villagers. The church is more stable than ever-changing village governments and is
independent of political conflicts. This form of sasi, currently applied only to coconuts, provides direct
individual benefits to the people and so is valued. Past shifts of authority over the land sasi from adat
to the church helped to shore up the effectiveness of the institution when the kewanglost the
enforcement capacity. In many cases, villagers believe that the threat of sanction by God is a more
powerful deterrent than the sanctions imposed by the kewang. When this happens, as shown in the
inventory,  adat sasi and the marine sasi may be lost. However, Haruku and Nolloth provide examples
where the introduction of church sasi actually strengthened the local institution. Therefore, in sasi
systems that are being revitalized, the church can play an important supporting role.
In some Muslim villages, sasihas evolved away from adat. Ceremonies and inherited positions have
been abandoned, and religious leaders also have not developed a direct role in the institution. Sasi
has become more of a commercial agreement between the village government and whoever wins the
auction for resource harvesting rights. Nevertheless, this also appears to be a stable and resilient
institution. The benefits and drawbacks of this form of sasi require further investigation, but a limited
analysis did show that this sort of arrangement leads to problems in compliance when local fishers see
benefits accruing only to elites.
It is clear that sasi flourishes where the village leader is legitimate (kepala adat) and collaborates
harmoniously and honestly with the other adat institutions and the church. Ostrom (1990) mentionsreciprocity and trust as important conditions for successful common property institutions. This study
would add legitimacy as another key factor for success. Apparently, the discrepancy between the theory
of formal administrative structure and the de facto power structure that involves traditional authorities
makes village politics susceptible to manipulation and instability. Amendment of the law on village
government (Law No. 5/1979) may be required to accommodate the need for legitimate adat authority
figures in rural villages and to increase stability of local governments.
Because the constitutional rules are part of adat, and “adat is something that cannot be changed”, as
village officials in Nolloth stated, the process of revival concerns the re-establishment, adaptation of
operational rules (harvest regulations and access rules) and collective level arrangements (re-establishment
of the kewang). Adat still forms the basis of sasi, but a redefinition of responsibilities and involvement
of non-adat institutions, such as the church, the police and higher government levels, is possible. Such
adaptation of the constitutional rules carries certain risks and must be advanced with care and tact.
Sasi must adapt to modern society or it may, at the operational level, cease to function. According to
Ostrom (1990), well-functioning local management systems are dependent on the enforcement,
protection and legal recognition of local rights by higher levels of government. As a village organization
active in enforcement, the kewang is more effective than the police. However, the kewang has never
obtained formal enforcement powers. In cases where the kewang is being revitalized, their mandate
needs to be formalized, and both the kewang and the police need to collaborate within a legal framework
under provincial law. One possible model is that of Itawaka, where, as a result of a village proclamation
in 1995, the kewang became part of the official government. On the other hand, an arms-length
relationship with the local government also has certain advantages. Various models need further
investigation. Wherever the local institution is placed, it will still require legal recognition and support
from higher government levels.
Conclusion
Berkes and Folke (1998) claim that institutional resilience is a built-in mechanism to react to external
influences. Various social-ecological practices mentioned by these authors are found in sasi, for example,
temporal restrictions on the harvest, inter-generational knowledge, role of stewards, taboos and
regulations, and sanctions and ceremonies. However, this study shows that these are not the mechanisms,
but the components of the institution itself. As a consequence, they are apt to change. What makes
the institutionand all these components strong (and thus resilient) is the linkage among these
components, i.e. legitimacy, trust, collaboration, and transparency. Additionally, relations between
those who benefit from the institution and those who manage it need to be sincere and transparent.
A shared notion of the relevance of the institution stimulates a common objective to maintain it, in
spite of external influences and in a situation where the temptation to abuse the system for personal
benefit is strong. The extent to which external factors affect the social structure in the village depends
on the feedback mechanisms, that is, the degree to which the local institution itself can mitigate the
effects of external perturbations. Sasi has already outlived repeated predictions of imminent demise
(Volker 1925, Cooley 1962) and is clearly both adaptive and resilient. There is, therefore, hope of
rebuilding the institution in the form of co-management, in which the needs and aspirations of the
various actors (fishers, local governments, adatleaders, environmentalists, and fisheries managers) can
be successfully accommodated.
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contribute positively to the resilience of sasi as a local institution and, therefore, should be considered
during the process of revitalizing and modernizing the institution.
1. If the head (kepala desa) of a village descends from the raja line and if he is kepala adat, his
position is more legitimate than in villages where this is not the case. This legitimacy contributes
positively to the execution of his authority with regard to sasi.
2. Where the kepala desa is elected with only a small majority, this results in fragile leadership and
subsequent political instability. This seriously hampers sasi as well as any revitalization process.
3. A large overlap between the traditional and formal authorities in the village government (LMD) is
a strong indicator that sasi, as part of the traditional structures, will be prolonged.
4. Vital for the process of revitalization is acknowledgement of the traditional village authorities within
the new structure.
5. Where traditional institutions such as the kewangand tuan negeriare acknowledged, enforcement
of sasi regulations is more effective. If collaboration with the police or other formal institutions is
required, a clear definition of rights and mandates should be developed and approved by higher
government levels.
6. It is important that the formal and traditional institutions collaborate closely with religious authorities,
such as the church or Muslim institutions that are generally stable and not involved in village politics.
Where there are strong bonds among these institutions, sasiis highly resilient.
7. It is necessary to define the sasi structures, powers and responsibilities within the framework of
provincial and national legislation, to provide local institutions with more capacity to deal with
external threats and become involved in development planning, execution and evaluation.
8. In newly installed sasi systems, sasi regulations are considered more legitimate if the villagers profit
directly. In villages where sasi rights are auctioned and people have no control over the revenues,
there is no incentive to comply with the sasiregulations.
9. Collaboration requires a shared value system, in this case adat. The support and participation of
the younger generation is necessary for the survival and effective operation of sasi.
10. Collaboration, trust and legitimacy are functions dependent on village size and homogeneity. When
the population exceeds 3 000 people and/or the village becomes heterogeneous, the cohesive
mechanisms break down. In these villages, another type of management institution, i.e. not traditional
sasi, tends to be established.
11. While revamping the institution to increase functionality in resource management, it is useful to
retain traditional titles and structures, as well as elements of ceremony, to provide a strong spiritual
and cultural basis. However, care must be taken not to alienate new generations of fishers.
Thus, several factors are important for institutional resiliency. These include: leadership; linkages
between traditional and modern social, economic and political structures; legal support for local
institutions; benefits of the management system received by the majority of actors; shared values for
collective action among the actors; and small, homogeneous communities.
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In order to perpetuate the cultural core of sasi, the sacred knowledge and rituals in the indigenous
language must be passed down before they are forgotten. Loss of interest of younger generations and
the subsequent loss of sasi knowledge linked to adat is a threat to sasi as a cultural institution and
could, therefore, undermine its effectiveness as a resource management structure. Berkes and Folke
(1998) mention traditional ecological knowledge as the basis of management practices. Sasi,although
it limits resource use, is in most cases not explicitly a management system, that is, a conscious effort
to manage and conserve the resource. Detailed knowledge of the resource base and related natural
systems is lacking, whereas non-scientific and superstitious explanations for resource decline are still
current. Although villagers have a notion of over-exploitation, harvest restrictions are mainly based on
tradition and aim to maximize yields. In this case, it is the loss of traditional knowledge concerning
sasiritual, not local loss of ecological knowledge, which is a threat to the resilience of the sasi institution.
 The trend to loss of adat-related knowledge was already clear decades ago when Cooley (1962)wrote:
“Christianity and education were the primary forces that caused the local language to die out. The loss
of the language was a direct blow...to adatfor two reasons. First, it is widely held that to be valid adat
must be performed in the indigenous language”. Secondly, he maintained, without the language, “it
is already doomed for even though it may be continued for a time, the ceremonies are devoid of content
and seem purposeless”. Cooley concluded that sasi“as part of the adat system... seems completely
doomed in the very near future”. It is interesting that over three decades later we are witnessing not
only stability but also resurgence in at least one form of adat institution: marine sasi. This brings up
the questions: just how important is language and ritual, and how much needs to be incorporated into
a revitalized institution?  If proponents insist on returning to traditional style and ceremony, this could
strike a patriotic chord in these times of national turmoil replete with calls for regional autonomy, if
not outright secession. On the other hand, too much emphasis on adatcould alienate younger generations
of fishers and inhibit the introduction of science-based management tools.
5.3.2 Resilience and equity of coastal areas and fisheries co-management in Western
Visayas, Philippines: the Case of Concepcion, Iloilo and Sagay City, Negros Occidental
before and after 1998 5
The focus of this study was to assess levels of resilience (i.e. the ability of institutions to adapt to changes
and shocks while still providing stability and meaning to social behavior) and equity (i.e. the degree
of fair distribution of the costs and benefits of management among stakeholders) in two local government
units facing the Visayan Sea in the Western Visayas, Philippines in the hope of unlocking key factors
that can improve the lives of subsistence fishers. The civic science approach was used in the study.
This approach is a form of science that is deliberative, inclusive, participatory, transparent, open to
learning from errors, built on consensus, and designed to promote equity and minimize losers. Its
purpose is to reveal that various political and interest groups in society have to be involved in decision-
making if more equitable decisions are made by increasingly more resilient institutions to address
complexity and integrated concerns.
Major policy trends in the past
The analysis of secondary and field data has revealed that at the national, regional and local levels,
coastal areas and fisheries resources have been subjected (especially during the colonial period and
5 Fernandez and Caranaje (2002)the Marcos regime) to a “tragedy of exclusion and enclosure” rather than a “tragedy of the commons”.
In this process, colonial interests and business and/or multilateral institutions, with the aid of the state,
denied grassroots civil society actors and their institutions access to common property resources that
may be regulated by communal rules and practices. In effect, the local commons and management
regimes were taken over by allied or networked private or business interests using the legal and political
powers of the state; or by the state for large-scale commercial exploitation by its own agencies and
other private enterprises. The policy model of “command and control” guided economic and natural
resource development initiatives well after the end of World War II. Policy-makers viewed development
as a process in which modernization, industrialization and gross national product growth would lead
to increasingly prosperous and democratic societies. The means to achieve these lofty goals was to
address “gaps” in the development process through the means of public investment and centralized
national planning that saw the pouring in of foreign assistance funds and expertise, as well as the
construction of necessary infrastructure. Unfortunately, policy-makers and analysts did not pay much
attention to the setting of checks and balances to central power through fair and open legal systems,
transparent procedures and an active civil society. The result of the policy and practice of development
and management has been dismal in improving socio-politico-economic and environmental conditions.
Shift in policy orientation and rise of local elite networks
What has become more pronounced, since the enactment of the Local Government Code of 1992 and
the Fisheries Code of 1998 in the Philippines, is the ability of peoples’ organizations to act independently
or in concert with local government and/or civil society organizations to coordinate the use of official
local, national and even international forums with determined and creative local direct action. This has
happened in the wake of decreased local livelihood opportunities due to environmental deterioration
or encroachment from public and private interests that extract natural resources. The cases of Sagay
and Concepcion illustrate that the crisis of coastal and fisheries resource deterioration, perceived by
local leaders and communities as more pronounced in the 1970s and 1980s, gave rise to assertive local
policy networks to create resilient, and hopefully, equitable co-management regimes. Interviews and
statistical analysis reveal that in leading hubs of coastal area and fisheries development in the Western
Visayas, there is a general improvement in co-management indicators in the post-1998 period. The
veering away from the centralized control of the national government has been spearheaded by policy
networks and alliances led by the chief executives of  Sagay and Concepcion.
The policy networks in Sagay and Concepcion are institutional players that trade information and share
the burden of decision-making. The coalitions establish formal and informal partnerships with other
stakeholders, generate and mobilize financial means, coordinate key power brokers in the area, formulate
and disseminate a clear and visionary image of the island in its pristine state, and mobilize large segments
of the local population while portraying an image of dynamism and success to the outside world. The
network creates order by focusing on coastal areas and other related concerns, and simplifies the policy
process by limiting the number of problems to be addressed and options considered.
On a larger scale, such phenomena were observed in the creation of inter-regional alliances such as
the NIACDEV (based in Concepcion) in 1998 and the Northern Negros Aquatic Resources Management
Council or NNARMC (based in Sagay) in 2000. An inspiration for the creation of NIACDEV and NNARMC
is the establishment and success of an earlier policy network in the mid-eastern portion of Iloilo Province
called the Banate Bay Resources Management Council Incorporated (BBRMCI) in 1996. BBRMCI was
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considerable training in community organizing and coastal area dynamic). After a series of informal
meetings of the emerging policy network, a funding outlay for capability building was provided by the
cooperating municipalities, the Province and the Canadian government. Technical advice was later
sought from academic and government agencies. The BBRMCI achieved a tremendous track record
in capability building, community organizing and linking with other related agencies and in 1998 the
BBRMCI received the “Galling Pook” national award as one of the most successful development-oriented
rural organizations in the Philippines.
Following a relatively similar pattern as that of the BBRMCI, the establishment of NIACDEV in 1998 can
be attributed to the friendship and initiative of three mayors, led by the mayor of Concepcion, who
was a former owner of a commercial fishing fleet. The creation of NNARMC in 2000, on the other hand,
was spearheaded by the Maranons of Sagay who also had commercial fishing interests. However, the
creation of these larger policy networks illustrates the closed and consensual nature of the policy
process. Important policy decisions, such as the creation of the networks, are made in informal settings
outside the reach of formal democratic controls such as legislative scrutiny and bureaucratic controls.
The increasing importance of such elite configurations in shaping the socio-economic trajectory of
Western Visayas is closely associated with certain contemporary processes. First, in the context of
globalization, specific local conditions and calls for area-specific development or management strategies
are playing a much more important role in the determination of the competitive position of locales
and regions. This gives greater prominence to regional networks, relations and institutions. Second,
the shifting and less interventionist position of the national state and hence the weakening of national
regulatory prescriptions, moves the center of gravity for fostering and promoting a growth-oriented
political economic framework to the sub-national scale. These have become the pivotal domains for
launching proactive development activities. The often non-democratic and opaque organizations and
decision-making procedures and mechanisms at these scales of governance turn them into implicit
or explicit elite playing fields that permit shaping territorial trajectories in the image of dominant or
hegemonic elite coalitions. These new, elite-based and led institutions and networks have become key
forms of governance and have - at least to some extent – replaced the Philippine national government
(often with its implicit or explicit consent) as rule making, policy formulating and implementing, and
even executive organizations with powers that influence and shape a broadening range of socio-
economic aspects.
Strengths and weaknesses of newly emergent policy networks
The insider information of policy and institutional networks, such as those found in Sagay and Concepcion
and in the larger regional alliances they forged, are significant and have consequently been used
effectively. The active and coherent policy and growth networks operate with other local politicians,
the media, leaders of public and semi-public institutions (academies, Chambers of Commerce,
environmental NGOs), and others, with a view towards generating a coherent vision and strategy. The
underlying rationality, of course, is that the collective promotion of the town/city/municipality/region
and forms of cooperation also benefit the individual agent.
However, institutional and individual benefits through the activities of larger policy networks can be
easily disrupted during local or national elections. In the cases of the NIACDEV and NNRMC, their co
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2001 Philippine elections. Thus, even the capacity of these kinds of policy networks to sustain and
effectively scale-up CRM efforts remain uncertain. The phenomenon was not observed in smaller
networks set up in Sagay and Concepcion due to the absence of local leadership change during the
elections. Nonetheless, there is  still growing concern among some key residents of Concepcion that
the current gains in co-management and sustainable development may not be sustained in the absence
of a potential pool of local leaders who encourage community organizations and the establishment of
village-based management councils.
Nevertheless, the case studies provide evidence that a key factor for attempts to sustain and scale-up
coastal and fishery resource management and development in Western Visayas is the presence and
activities of policy alliances and networks. This study provides a useful perspective to better understand
the political and economic processes that affect the nature of local co-management efforts in municipal/city,
as well as in larger bio-regions in the Western Visaysa. It is revealed that enabling legislation and
decentralized policy alone is insufficient to explain co-management regimes before and after 1998. In
fact, wider international and national socio-economic factors and local elite-based alliances have helped
shape policy and decision-making in coastal areas and fisheries co-management in Sagay and Concepcion.
The current co-management frameworks in Sagay and Concepcion is a product of decentralization
trends that also influence the trajectory of policy regimes in coastal areas. Interest in decentralization
and participatory development efforts on the global and national levels have opened up theoretical,
legal and financial avenues to create locally-based decision-making systems. It has also strengthened
the political and economic position of globally alert and locally embedded elite coalitions engaged in
the institutionalization of inter-regional coastal and fisheries programs and projects. In the Philippines,
such configurations have been aided by decentralization laws such as the Local Government Code of
1991 and the Fisheries Code of 1998. These pieces of legislation have devolved natural resource
management functions and finances from the national to the local level. In other words, the co-
management systems in the Western Visayas are products of a wider and more market-oriented political
and economic context and are institutionalized by elite alliances that are supportive of sustainable
development and profit-oriented schemes. The legitimacy enjoyed by co-management systems, coupled
with the improvement of fish stocks and catches, have resulted in an improved perception of policy
performance in the post-1998 period.
Co-management as a discursive arena
The institutionalization of co-management efforts in the Western Visayas appears to be a discursive
arena for various actors and their institutions on the ground. Behind the many actors and institutions,
however, are alliances and counter-alliances that help shape and benefit from coastal areas and fisheries
co-management policies. Notwithstanding the seemingly undemocratic nature of the elite-based policy
and institutional alliances, the people still accept the systems. To do otherwise would be to put
democratic procedures above the ultimate democratic goal – the improvement of livelihoods and the
common good. As long as the livelihood of people is enhanced, no matter how little, civil society calls
for more participation in the decision-making process, and increased equity in the distribution of gains
from the CRM program or projects will remain muted. In regions and periods of economic privation
and insecurity, participatory development and democratization processes do not fare well, giving ample
opportunity for informal policy networks to build and benefit from coastal area and fisheries co-
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increased participation of local stakeholders and civil society organizations to sustain resilient or adaptive
and area-specific efforts to address complex and integrated problems in coastal areas and the Visayan
Sea.
5.4 Scaling-up
The scale for co-management will vary a great deal depending on the community and the priority
issues. Scaling-up refers to the transferability of concepts, methods, and organizational and governance
structures from one level to another in the dimensions of space and time, for example, scaling up from
a single community to several communities to manage a bay-wide area through a co-management
organization such as a bay-wide council that represents the different communities. Scaling-up may also
be undertaken to address issues of ecosystem-based management and broader social and economic
links in the area. Questions related to scaling-up include whether the same principles that guided the
community-level co-management program hold at the larger scale and what are the costs and benefits
involved in scaling-up and on community participation. Two studies on scaling-up co-management in
the Philippines are presented below (Siar, Baticadoa and Garcia 2004 and Baylon 2002).
5.4.1 The scale question in co-management: the experience of Malalison Island and
LIPASECU Bay Management Council, Inc. in the Philippines 6
Coastal resource management has been carried out in the Philippines for over 20 years to abate the
deteriorating habitat and declining fish catch. CRM started with the management of mangroves and
coral reef fisheries surrounding small islands and barangays (villages) through the initiatives of the
government, NGOs, and research and academic institutions. In recent years, CRM projects have
expanded towards the establishment of integrated management councils.
The Local Government Code (Republic Act 7160), which decentralizes the authority for the management
of most natural resources to the municipal governments, provided impetus for acceleration of these
projects. Moreover, Executive Order No. 240 institutionalized CRM through the formation of the
BFARMCs and MFARMCs. This was further reinforced by the Fisheries Code of 1998, which mandated
the creation of integrated management councils for waters shared by contiguous municipalities. The
Fisheries Code also gives the municipal governments jurisdiction over near-shore waters up to 15 km
offshore with the option of allowing commercial fishing in the area between 10.1 and 15 km.
The LIPASECU Bay Management Council, Inc. was formed as a means to discuss and resolve conflicts
affecting the use of coastal resources by four contiguous municipalities in Pandan Bay, Antique. Drawing
its inspiration from the SEAFDEC/AQD community-based fishery resource management project in
Malalison, Culasi, Antique and from BBRMCI in northern Iloilo, the Council adopted as one of its
management intervention measures the establishment of marine protected areas in each of the four
municipalities.
Site profile
Located on the northwestern part of Panay Island, central Philippines, LIPASECU consists of four
contiguous coastal municipalities in the province of Antique. LIPASECU is an acronym for Libertad,
6 Siar, Baticados, and Garcia (2004)
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Pandan, Sebaste, and Culasi that share the Pandan Bay covering 1,950 sq km (Fig 1). Malalison is under
the jurisdiction of Culasi municipality.
More than two-thirds of the population in LIPASECU resides in coastal areas, with a total of 12,173
coastal households. Of 107 barangays, 56 (53.3 per cent) are coastal. There were 3,288 registered fishers
in 2001, representing 18.8 % of the total number of households (Table 1). Fishing is the dominant
occupation in coastal areas, followed by fry gathering, shell gathering, and seaweed farming. There are
more non-motorized (1564) than motorized (417) fishing boats in the area. The average catch per
fisher per month is highest in Libertad.
Figure 14. Map showing areas covered by LIPASECUTable 26. Profile of LIPASECU
Registered Average Number
Coastal fishers catch of marine
No. of  Household Coastal household (as of June (kg/person/ protected
Municipality barangays population barangays population 2001) month) areas
LIPASECU 107 88,539 56 61,344  3, 288 18
Libertad 19 12,952 14 10,968   820 300 8
Pandan 34 27,638 15 16,236    742 240 4
Sebaste 10 14,956 8 14,380     692 135 2
Culasi 44 32, 993 19 19,760 1,034 210 4
Source of data: LIPASECU Bay Management Council, Inc. and National Statistics Office.
History of LIPASECU
The four municipalities used to regulate their coastal waters independently despite sharing the same
resource base - the Pandan Bay. It is an open access resource except for marine waters around Malalison
Island, Culasi, where islanders were granted territorial use rights in fisheries, that enabled them to
reverse the declining trend in fish stock (Baticados and Agbayani 1998) resulting from the Community
Fishery Resource Management Project initiated by SEAFDEC/AQD in 1991. The project implementation
in Malalison Island served as a catalyst for Culasi to become interested in CRM. Thus, it was not difficult
for the ANIAD Foundation, Inc., a non-profit service-oriented organization funded by the Royal
Government of the Netherlands, to convince the local executives of Culasi and the PROCESS Foundation,
an NGO, to collaborate with its pilot program on community-based coastal resource management in
1995.
In 1996, the LGU of Pandan requested ANIAD to include the Pandan municipality, and the local
executives of Libertad and Sebaste followed in 1997. ANIAD collaborated with the Antique Development
Foundation (ADF), also an NGO, to handle community-organizing and institution-building activities
in Pandan and Libertad; PROCESS was in charge of Culasi and Sebaste. On the other hand, the LGUs,
through the Municipal Agriculture Office, were responsible for the formation of BFARMCs/MFARMCs
in their respective municipality.
The Technical Working Group composed of LGU representatives from each municipality, PROCESS,
ANIAD, and the fishers through their FARMCs found similar issues and problems in the four municipalities.
 A series of inter-municipal consultations led to the formation of the LIPASECU Bay Management Council
in 1997. The Council was patterned after BBRMCI, an LGU-initiated CRM program in the Province of
Iloilo. Each municipality committed to provide PhP 100 000 per year for the operation and maintenance
of the Council, plus the salary of the employees running the office. LIPASECU became a venue for
planning and implementing coastal resource management of Pandan Bay for the benefit of the
marginalized fishers and other sectors of the community. From the 16 original members, the Council’s
composition increased to 32 in 2001.
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LIPASECU CRM initiatives and outcomes
LIPASECU had seven programs that were implemented both at the municipal and council levels. Most
of the activities were focused on Institution Building and Gender Development. The other activities
were related to Resource Conservation and Rehabilitation, such as mangrove planting and reforestation,
establishment of marine sanctuaries, and coastal clean-up, which were done at the municipal level.
There were no activities for the Livelihood Enhancement Program. Noteworthy, however, were the
LIPASECU linkages with government agencies (6) and NGOs (15), which provided technical assistance
and sponsored many LIPASECU activities.
One of the major accomplishments of LIPASECU was the establishment of 17 marine protected areas
(MPAs) in various sites. The MPA in Malalison serves as a model in terms of processes in the setting
up of protected areas. These involved barangay consultations prior to the establishment and passing
of a resolution for approval by the municipal council. Unfortunately, for many of these sites, the resource
and ecological assessment was not conducted prior to the establishment (Table 2).
Table 27. Marine protected areas established in the LIPASECU area
Municipality/Barangay Sanctuary name Area (ha) Year established
Culasi
Malalison Guiob reef a 28 1995
Batonan Sur Batonan b 1 1996
Lipata Lipata reef b 5 1996
Naba Naba reef b 1 1999
Sebaste
  Poblacion Sebaste shoal 52c 1998
Abiera Abiera 2 1998
Pandan
Mag-aba  Mag-aba 2 1997
Patria  Patria 3 1997
Tingib  Tingib 1 1997
  Idiacacan  Idiacacan d 2 1998
Libertad
Taboc Sitio Balo 1 1999
Tinigbas Puntahan-Sambulit 1 1998
Barusbus Barusbusd 3 1999
San Roque Puntodd 2 1999
Pajo Puntod and Urid 3 1999
Union Cubay to Ocoy 3 1999
Pucio  Payapi site to Buruanga, 1 2000
Aklan boundary
Bulanao Puntod area 1 2001
Legend: a Assessed by SEAFDEC/AQD; b assessed by SEAFDEC/AQD in 1995 and by Hayuma in 2000c Originally declared for 395 ha,
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LIPASECU was able to formulate an Integrated Coastal Resource Management Plan covering the period
2002-2010. The CRM Plan identified strategies and programs of the Council for nine years. These include
maximizing the Council for the integrated resource management of Pandan Bay, intensifying a soft law
enforcement approach while continuing the hard law enforcement approach, expanding areas for
sustainable land use practices and environmentally friendly fishing and farming technology, among
others. Ironically, the alliance could not come up with a unified municipal ordinance. Pandan’s version
of municipal fishery ordinance differs from that of Sebaste and Culasi. Pandan is the only municipality
in the alliance with commercial fishing vessels (seven units), whose interests it has to consider. Small-
scale fishers own one of these units. Libertad did not have one at the time of the survey.
The LIPASECU Council favors the regulation of the use of compressor-aided fishing, but not Malalison
fishers and those in Sebaste, who believe that its use has an adverse effect on the fish catch of those
using less efficient gear. Their contention found support in the Memo Circular 2002-129, issued by the
former Secretary of the Department of Interior and Local Government, enjoining local governments
to enact ordinances banning the use of a compressor as a breathing apparatus in all fishing activities.
The most contentious issue facing the alliance, however, was the delineation of territorial waters in
Pandan Bay and the operation of commercial fishing vessels. Pandan opened 10.1 to 15 km of its
municipal waters to licensed commercial fishers for five years. This caused demoralization and
disenchantment among BFARMC members and fish wardens who are the front liners in law enforcement
and the establishment of MPAs.
Notwithstanding these issues, the Council members believe that LIPASECU as an organization is needed
for managing coastal resources, enforcing laws, consolidating efforts of LGUs, resolving conflicts, and
providing assistance for livelihoods and technical expertise, among others. About 79 per cent of them
perceived that LIPASECU meets the above needs of their municipality. Anecdotal reports also indicate
an increase in fish catch. Most Council members believe that LIPASECU will last long despite the ending
of support from ANIAD.
Discussion
Established prior to the enactment of the 1998 Fisheries Code, LIPASECU pioneered the pooling of
resources to manage fishery resources, thus, serving as a model for other LGUs in mitigating dwindling
resources and alleviating poverty in coastal communities. The Council provides a venue for airing
concerns and discussing conflicts affecting the four municipalities, particularly the opening of the
municipal waters to commercial fishers from 10.1 up to 15 km in Pandan Bay. It is able to mobilize
fishers and coastal communities to highlight issues in fisheries, enforce fishery laws, and generate
support for fish wardens. Because of the inability of the national government to enforce fishery laws,
the alliance pooled their resources to enforce them. LIPASECU organized a composite team within
each municipality with patrol boats equipped with radio telecommunication connected to the LIPASECU
headquarters, which reflects the Council’s serious intervention to protect the interest of small-scale
fishers. In addition, community participation to rehabilitate the resources was manifested in the
establishment of 17 MPAs, which serve as a rallying point for fisheries conservation and a concrete step
taken by the people to protect their coastal resources. Thus, LIPASECU has become an icon to symbolize
unity of purpose among LGUs, people’s organizations, NGOs, and small-scale fishers.
Similar to other organizations, LIPASECU is beset with problems, the major one being the funding
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of the four municipalities to sustain the operations of LIPASECU. While the Council has attracted funding
agencies, its activities are so confined to a donor’s agenda that it even took the Council five years to
formulate an Integrated Coastal Resource Management Plan. Furthermore, the over-emphasis on
building the capabilities of its leaders and ignoring the needs of BFARMCs, POs and fishers from whose
support lie its strength may weaken its operation. It had to launch a massive information and education
campaign in communities to gain trust, confidence and support for its activities. The role of the
Executive Director in ensuring continuity of the LIPASECU programs and projects is likewise crucial
considering that LGU officials sitting on the Council have a fixed term. Thus, the managerial capacity
of the Executive Director has to be strengthened, and rise beyond facilitating the activities of the
Council. Moreover, the role of NGOs as implementers as well as Council members places LIPASECU
in an awkward position to evaluate their performance. It also lacks the technical capability in bio-
resource rehabilitation and, therefore, cannot monitor and evaluate the effectiveness of MPAs. In
addition, it lacks an evaluation system to measure LIPASECU’s performance.
Lessons learned
The experience of LIPASECU draws attention to the difficulty of unifying rules on a large scale owing
to the different interests of members sitting on the Council. In Malalison, the fishers and village officials
resolved conflicts faster because of the small size of the area and the small number of fishers.
Nonetheless, gains are possible if problems are threshed out and the government and resource users
of contiguous municipalities share a commitment to sound resource management and the will to take
decisive actions. The pooling of scarce resources and involving the grassroots will come a long way
in ensuring sustained management and protection of coastal resources.
5.4.2 Evaluation of the integrated municipal council as an institution for co-management
in the coastal zone in Western Visayas, Philippines 7
In the Philippines, the coastal areas are facing many challenges, such as resource over-exploitation,
degradation of coastal habitat, user conflicts, and poverty of sustenance fishers. The Philippine
government has passed laws, such as the Local Government Code of 1991 and the Philippine Fisheries
Code of 1998, to address these challenges. The Local Government Code has devolved many functions
and responsibilities of the national government to local government units (LGUs) such as provinces
and municipalities. The Fisheries Code gave to the municipalities the jurisdiction of coastal or municipal
waters from the shoreline up to 15 kilometers. LGUs in the Philippines, especially the municipalities,
have to develop strategies and evolve institutions to better manage their municipal waters.
One institution that is evolving in Philippine coastal areas is the integrated municipal council (IMC),
which has been established by several municipalities to manage large bodies of water in which these
municipalities have jurisdiction. There is an advantage in having an IMC because several municipalities
can pool their meager funds to protect their fishery resources, and eliminate boundary disputes because
their municipal waters are combined together and treated as a single management unit.
There have been some success stories in the establishment of IMCs in the Philippines. One of these
is the Banate Bay IMC, which obtained a national award for local governance. On the other hand, there
have been cases in which an IMC was not successful in fulfilling its mandate. An example is the Batan
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Bay IMC, which despite obtaining foreign funding is still perceived to be unsuccessful in accomplishing
its objectives.
Banate Bay IMC
The Banate Bay IMC was initiated by Mayor Ramon Antiojo of the municipality of Anilao. His municipality,
similar to most coastal areas in the Philippines, is confronted with problems of over-exploitation of
fishery resources, destruction of coastal habitats, illegal fishing activities and poverty of sustenance
fishers. Mayor Antiojo’s awareness of the need for coastal resource management and the passage of
the Local Government Code, which provided additional powers and authority to the local government,
encouraged him to form an integrated municipal council with the nearby municipalities of Barotac
Nuevo and Banate.
The establishment of the Banate Bay Resource Management Council, Inc. (BBRMCI) started with a
series of consultations and dialogues started in November 1995, which culminated in the signing of a
memorandum of agreement in February 1996. The Banate Bay IMC may be considered a successful
institution and this has been validated when it won the national Pook Galing Award in 1998. This award,
a project of the national government and the private sector, is given to programs of LGUs for innovation
and excellence in local governance. Notable achievements of the IMC were increased awareness and
empowerment of the fishers of Banate Bay, improved enforcement of fishery laws, and provision of
alternative livelihoods.
The performance of Banate Bay IMC was evaluated, based on co-management criteria such as sustainability,
efficiency and equity, and fishers were interviewed using these indicators. With regard to the ten
sustainability indicators, the perceptions of participating and non-participating fishers were not
significantly different for eight indicators in the bay five years ago (Table 1). Significant differences,
however, were found in the perceptions related to the condition of the coral reefs and the economic
well-being of the fishers, where the non-participating fishers gave significantly higher scores. Both
groups believed that there was a significant decline in the fish stocks, sea grass, and in the economic
well-being of the fishers from the past five years compared with the present. These groups also think
that there was no significant change in the condition of the bay, mangroves, extent of fishing violations
of municipal and commercial fishers, but they also believed that there was a significant improvement
in their present knowledge of the bay’s resources and state of information exchange among fishers
in the bay.
For the efficiency indicators such as ease at which a collective decision is made, facility in resolving
fisheries conflicts, and ease in enforcing the fishery ordinance, the two groups showed different
perceptions. The participating fishers believed that there was significant improvement for these three
efficiency indicators at present with the Banate Bay IMC compared with five years ago when there was
no IMC. The non-participating fishers, however, said that there was no improvement for these indicators
even if there is an IMC in Banate Bay.
With regard to equity indicators, both groups stated that with the IMC, there is now limited access of
the fishers to the bay’s resources, which could be traced to the zoning plan effectively implemented
by the IMC. Both groups also agreed that there is now more active participation of the people in the
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that with the IMC, there is now fairness in the distribution of government resources compared with
the previous procedure where these resources were distributed by politicians. Moreover, they believe
that there is now significant participation of the people in their community affairs compared with five
years ago, which could be due to the fact that they were organized by the IMC. The non-participating
fishers, however, believed that there was no change in the manner of distribution of government
resources and people participation in the community affairs, even if the IMC was established. This
perception could be traced to their non-participation in the projects and activities of the IMC, which
made them feel that they could not avail themselves of the resources and benefits being provided by
the IMC.
These performance indicators showed that fishers perceive a significant decline in some of the biological
indicators and a few believe that there is no significant improvement even with the establishment of
the Banate Bay IMC. This suggests that the interventions made by the IMC had no effect on the fishers,
or these effects could not be felt during the five years after the establishment of the IMC. It was observed
that the non-participating fishers had a very negative attitude toward the Banate Bay IMC, probably
because it affected them adversely. The fishers from these non-participating barangays were mostly
the ones apprehended by law enforcement units of the Banate Bay IMC for violations of the bay’s
fishery ordinance. Moreover, the zoning plan for the bay is effectively implemented because both
groups of fishers say that they cannot easily fish in the bay now. There is also a positive outlook between
both groups of fishers that the condition of the bay, fish stocks, and their economic condition will
improve over the next 5-10 years and the presence of the IMC could be one of the contributory factors
for this optimistic outlook.Table 28. Perceptions of Banate Bay fishers on the conditions in the bay for two time periods:
five years ago when there was no IMC and at present with the IMC
Indicator Past condition Present
5 yrs ago,  condition Change through time,
without IMC with IMC past five years
Sustainabilty PF  NPF Prob. PF NPF Prob. PF NPF Prob.
State of Banate Bay 5.97 5.77 ns 4.90 4.73 Ns -1.07n -1.03ns ns
Status of fish stocks 6.53 7.07 ns 3.70 3.33 Ns -2.88** -3.73** ns
Condition of coral reefs 5.58 6.88 * 4.54 4.32 Ns -1.04ns -2.56** ns
Condition of mangroves 5.58 6.88 ns 4.90 4.83 ns -0.97ns -1.54ns ns
Condition of sea grass 6.92 6.32 ns 3.96 3.78 ns -2.96** -2.82** ns
Violations of 4.40 4.45 ns 5.27 5.47 ns +0.87ns +0.97ns ns
municipal fishers
Violations of 4.23 3.97 ns 5.23 5.37 ns +1.00ns +1.40ns ns
commercial fishers
Knowledge about 4.40 5.37 ns 7.73 7.77 ns +3.33** +2.40** ns
bay’s resources
Information exchange 4.33 5.00 ns 7.27 6.83 ns +2.93** +1.83* ns
by fishers
Economic well-being 5.33 6.93 ** 3.83 3.97 ns -1.50* -2.97** ns
of fishers
Efficiency
Collective 4.47 6.00 * 7.00 5.66 * +2.53** -0.34ns ns
decision-making
Conflict resolution 3.87 4.87 ns 6.47 5.73 ns +2.60** +0.87ns ns
Law enforcement 3.83 5.00 ns 7.00 5.50 * +3.17** +0.50ns *
Equity
Access to the 8.30 9.13 * 2.47 2.37 ns -5.83** -6.77ns ns
bay’s resources
Distribution of 2.62 2.86 ns 4.40 3.66 ns +1.90** +0.97ns ns
gov’t resources
Participation in 6.70 6.57 ns 8.30 7.33 ns +1.60** 0.77ns ns
community affairs
Participation in 4.53 5.17 ns 7.83 7.00 ns +3.30** 1.83** ns
bay management
N=60 with 30 participating fishers (PF) and 30 non-participating fishers (NPF). The scale used is from 1 to 10 with
1 representing a poor condition and 10 representing an excellent one. Probabilities are as follows: ns=not
significant, *=p<0.05, **=p<0.01.
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Batan Bay IMC
The Batan Bay IMC was part of a coastal resource management (CRM) project implemented by the
province of Aklan and the municipalities of Altavas, Batan and New Washington. The project was started
in January 1993 to address the issues of resource depletion and environmental degradation of Batan
Bay. Technical assistance was provided by the University of the Philippines in the Visayas (UPV) with
funding support from the Local Government Support Program of the Canadian International Development
Agency (LGSP-CIDA). The main objective of this two-year project was to develop the capability of local
government units to plan and implement an integrated and community-based coastal resource
management program for Banate Bay and vicinity. Funding support from LGSP-CIDA ended in April
1995 and the CRM project was able to accomplish the following: (1) increased awareness of the
stakeholders on the environmental issues affecting the bay; (2) conduct of consultation workshops and
basic trainings on planning, environment, gender and participatory development perspectives and
processes relevant to coastal resource management; (3) establishment of a zoning plan for the bay; (4)
promulgation of a common fishery ordinance for the whole bay that will be implemented by the three
municipalities; and (5) creation of an inter-municipal coastal resource management council or the Batan
Bay IMC.
The activities of the Batan Bay IMC were not sustained when funding support from LGSP-CIDA ended
in April 1995. To activate and strengthen the Batan Bay IMC, a second phase of the CRM project was
started in December 1997. A memorandum of agreement was signed in which LGSP-CIDA granted the
funds and UPV provided technical assistance to the three municipalities for the continuation of the
CRM project. A series of consultation meetings followed to review the progress of the project and to
formulate action plans for the bay. The zoning plan for Batan Bay was reviewed and the municipal
coastal resource management body was activated in each of the participating municipalities. A fish-
warden training course was conducted in August 1998 and the Batan Bay IMC structure was reviewed
in September 1998. However, funding support from LGSP-CIDA ended in October 1998. The second
phase of the CRM project focused mainly on capacity building and organizational work. The Batan Bay
IMC was not really able to take off because a new set of mayors took office after the local elections in
1998. They were not fully supportive. This lack of appreciation of the importance of the IMC on the
part of the new mayors, together with the termination of funding support from LGSP-CIDA, led to the
non-implementation of the plans and programs of the Batan IMC.
Factors affecting success of the IMC
Sustainability is a major challenge facing a bay-wide management council. The Banate Bay IMC has
survived even with changes in the political leadership of the LGUs and made notable achievements
even with the limited financial resources of the collaborating municipalities. The success of the Banate
Bay IMC could be attributed to factors such as active support of its mayors, the quality of leadership
in the council, and multi-sectoral partnerships made by the council.
In Banate Bay, the three mayors provided funds and full-time personnel to the IMC, and saw to it that
the plans were implemented in their municipalities. These mayors  did not interfere with the actions
of the IMC, especially in the apprehension of illegal fishers in the bay. The accomplishments of the
Banate Bay IMC can also be credited to its Executive Director and dedicated staff. At the start of its
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Director and her staff chose to stay despite these difficulties. When new mayors were elected and had
a lukewarm attitude to the IMC, the Executive Director conducted a series of dialogues and orientation
sessions with them until they fully appreciated the role of the IMC in the management of Banate Bay.
To augment its meager resources, the Banate Bay IMC collaborated with national government agencies,
non-governmental organizations, people’s organizations and the private sector in the conduct of its
activities. A memorandum of agreement was forged with agencies, such as the University of the
Philippines in the Visayas, Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Center, Iloilo State College of Fisheries,
Provincial Government of Iloilo and regional offices of the Department of Agriculture, Department of
Environment and Natural Resources, Technical Education and Skills Development Authority, Philippines
Coast Guard, and Philippines National Police. Technical and financial assistance were received through
these collaborative efforts, which contributed to the success of the projects undertaken by the Banate
Bay IMC.
In Batan Bay, the IMC did not prosper because of lack of support from the mayors. The newly elected
mayors did not appreciate the need for an IMC. Regular meetings were not held and contributions of
the participating municipalities to support the operations of the IMC were not provided. There was
no full-time Executive Director and staff that could advocate the continued existence of the IMC.
Therefore, when the newly elected mayors did not appreciate its existence, the Batan Bay IMC just
became inactive.
Challenges ahead for the IMC
The Banate Bay IMC has shown that an integrated municipal council can be a viable co-management
institution in the coastal area of the Philippines. It was able to implement a zoning plan for the bay,
effectively reduced illegal fishing activities, and provided livelihood opportunities for the fishers. The
IMC was able to make the fishers aware of the need for environmental protection and conservation
of fishery resources.
A major challenge in the survival of the IMC in the Philippines is the election of mayors every three
years. This regular political exercise can cause the demise of an IMC if the mayors do not appreciate
the need for it. The IMC should, therefore, evolve strategies to win the support of new mayors who
are not fully aware of its importance.
The Philippine government has decentralized responsibilities in the management of the coastal waters
to local government units. However, at the local level, governance is still highly centralized. This can
be seen in the operation of the IMC where its success is still very much dependent on personalities
like the mayor and the executive director. Thus, there is a need to make decentralization reach the
grassroots, that is, the fishers and the communities.
5.5 Participation in and attitudes about co-management
Participation in and positive attitudes towards co-management are crucial for its success. Three different
studies in Indonesia (Susilowati 2003), Bangladesh (Thompson, Sultana, Islam, Kadir, Hossain and
Kabir 1999), and Cambodia (Nao Thuok, Hap Navy, Bouy Roitana and Kaing Khim 2003) were undertaken
to better understand perceptions and attitudes towards co-management.140 FISHERIES AND COASTAL RESOURCES CO-MANAGEMENT IN ASIA: SELECTED RESULTS FROM A REGIONAL RESEARCH PROJECT
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5.5.1 Fishers’ participation in development activities in communities with different levels
of co-management processes: A case study in Demak and Pemalang, Central Java,
Indonesia 8
The importance of people participation in rural development programs has been emphasized for a few
decades. The term has diverse definitions and scope with different intensity among developing countries.
 Nevertheless, it is believed that through participation, development policies would better reflect the
practical realities of rural development. In addition, participation is seen as a means of promoting
democracy by enfranchising the poor people who are economically weak (Ingham 1993). Indonesia
is basically an archipelago and agricultural country. Nearly three-fourths of the people live in rural areas
and are involved in agriculture and fisheries. The majority who are involved in fisheries are indigent,
small-scale fishers. However, they need to be empowered through several development programs and
activities directed to improve their standard of living. Empowering is one way of helping poor people
to rise from a situation of powerlessness, poverty, and isolation.
Since Indonesia’s independence, a number of rural development programs have been launched. These
were aimed at helping poor people to raise their living conditions by empowering them through their
participation. The programs and activities varied among development sectors. Technical, investment,
and management assistance were provided to them by governmental and donor agencies. In the
fisheries sector, for example, one of the approaches used in a number of development activities was
through co-management processes in which local fishers and support agencies collaborated on
implementing development activities. By practicing this approach, it was intended that the development
programs and activities would be sustainable and provide continuous benefits to the fishers.
Methods
The main objective of the study was to determine the level of fishers’ participation in co-management
processes (CMPs) in Demak and Pemalang, Central Java, Indonesia. The specific objectives of the study
were: (a) to analyze fishers’ attitudes toward participation in development activities or program in the
study area; and (b) to provide policy recommendations for improving fishers’ participation.
Participation defies any single attempt at definition or interpretation. According to Oakley (1991),
community participation is an active process by which beneficiary or client groups influence the
direction and execution of a development project with a view to enhancing their well-being in terms
of income, personal growth, self-reliance or other values they cherish. With regard to development,
participation includes people’s involvement in decision-making processes, in implementing programs,
their sharing in the benefits of development programs, and their involvement in efforts to evaluate
such programs (Cohen and Uphoff 1980). According to Pretty (1995), a typology of participation consists
of manipulative participation, passive participation, participation by consultation, participation for
material incentives, functional participation, interactive participation, and self-mobilization.
The literature is stronger on quantitative indicators of participation than on qualitative indicators.
Oakley (1991) mentioned that indicators for the evaluation of a process of participation comprise of:
(1) beneficiaries’ role in the planning phase, (2) beneficiaries’ role in implementation phase, (3)
beneficiaries’ role in maintenance, and (4) project linkages to the beneficiaries. By employing the
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relates to several factors such as age, education, experience, income, number of family members, and
length of stay.
The research was conducted during March and April 2002 in fishing communities in the regencies of
Pemalang and Demak, Central Java, Indonesia, which are hypothesized to be different in the level of
co-management processes (CMP’s) (Susilowati 2003). This is subject to the external characteristics of
the people and availability of the local institutions or infrastructures. The two districts have different
fisheries profiles.
The operational variables of age, gender, level of education, number of family members, total income,
and fishers’ residence were employed to explain the fisher’s participation in the study area. In assessing
fishers’ participation, this study has utilized an approach based on the four types of participation
suggested by Cohen and Uphoff (1980) and indicators as postulated by Oakley (1991), Bahaman (1992)
and Waridin (1999) with necessary modifications. Participation in development includes people’s
involvement in program planning and decision-making, program implementation, sharing benefits,
and program evaluation. The Likert scale (1 to 5) was applied to measure the dimensions of fishers’
participation and attitudes. In addition, the categorical scale (1=low; 2=high) was used to discriminate
the factors influencing participation of fishers. The model of fishers’ participation behavior in the study
is formulated as follows:
PARTICIP = f (AGE, GENDER, EDUC, FAM, INC, DLOC)
where:
AGE – age of fisher (years)
GENDER – gender of fisher (1=male; 0=female)
EDUC – fisher’s education (years of schooling)
FAM – number of family members (persons)
INC – average monthly income (rupiah)
DLOC – residence of the respondent (1=Pemalang; 0=Demak)
Results
Tables 29 and 30 present a profile of the respondents. Participation intensity (low or high) of respondents
in Pemalang and Demak does not differ significantly although the two study areas were observed to
be different in level of co-management processes (CMPs) by Susilowati (2003)1/. However, the relationship
between gender and the level of participation is significant. Male fishers participate more than females
in development activities. Moreover, the participation intensity of fishers in their community is influenced
by the level of education. This implies that the more educated the respondent, the richer the experience
and the more progressive in his/her way of thinking.Table 29. Summary of characteristics of respondents
Description (N=108) Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Age of fishers 34.09 9.83 18 60
Gender of fishers n.a n.a. 0 1
Fishers’ education 1.29 0.68 0 4
Fishers’ experience 15.60 9.56 2 40
Number of family members 3.94 1.86 0 9
Total income (Rp. 000) 735.65 416.40 150 2100
Length of stay 28.87 13.95 1 60
Note: n.a. : not applicable
Table 30. Fishers’ education by gender.
Description Female Male Total
No formal education 0 3 3 (2.8%)
Elementary school 12 68 80 (74.1%)
Junior high school 2 16 18 (16.7%)
Senior high school 0 5 5 (4.6%)
Others 1 1 2 (1.9%)
Total 15 93 108 (100%)
(13.9%) (86.1%)
Pearson Chi Square= 3.670 Decision: There is no significant association.
Asymp. Sig. =0.453
In this study, participation of fishers in development activities is hypothesized to be determined by
age, gender, education level, number of family members, income and location (Cohen and Uphoff
1980; Oakley 1991, Bahaman 1992 and Waridin 1999 with necessary modifications). Two estimation
techniques were used to analyze the data: regression and discriminant analysis. The results from these
two techniques provide a similar conclusion, i.e. participation of fishers in development is guided
significantly by age and educational attainment. Results are shown in Table 31. Income and location
do not have significant impacts on the participation of respondents in the regression model.
Table 31. Summary of regression estimation
Variables Coefficient t-ratio Probability
Constant 10.427 8.173 0.000
AGE  0.135 4.603 0.000
GENDER -1.263 -1.900 0.060
EDUC 0.732 2.147 0.034
FAM -0.412 -2.688 0.08
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Variables Coefficient t-ratio Probability
INC 5.452E-08 0.120 0.905
DLOC -0.555 -1.215 0.227
R2 0.251
F-Ratio 5.639
(Prob. – Sig.) 0.000
DW 1.949 (dl=1.550; du=1.803); Decision: no autocorrelation
N 108
Dependent Variable: PARTICIPATION
Discriminant analysis performed showed that the independent variables of age, gender, education,
family members, income and residence of respondents were able to discriminate the level of participation
of fishers, as indicated in Table 32.
Table 32. Summary of discriminant analysis
PARTICIP= f AGE, GENDER, EDUC, FAM, INC, DLOC)









F – Approx. (prob-sig) 3.198 (Sig:0.000)




Low 29 28 57
High 11 40 51
%:
Low 50.9 49.1 100
High 21.6 78.4 100
Note : Tests null hypothesis of equal population covariance matrices.
Significant at alpha 2%. 63.9% of the original, grouped cases correctly classified.
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Conclusion
Participation of fishers in development activities and/or program in the study area with different co-
management processes (CMPs) was found not to be statistically significant. In contrast, age and education
factors were able to differentiate the fishers’ participation intensity in the study area of Pemalang and
Demak. By means of regression and discriminant analyses, it was found that age, gender, education,
and family members are the driving factors in determining the participation of fishers in development
activities in the study area. The findings of this study may be used for many purposes in enhancing
participation of fishers and determining the target for extension, training, and credit schemes.
5.5.2 An assessment of co-management arrangements developed by the Community
Fisheries Management Project in Bangladesh 9
The Community-based Fisheries Management (CBFM) Project in Bangladesh has worked in ten
rivers, three open floodplain wetlands (beels) and six morepermanently closed lakes (beels and baors).
The Department of Fisheries ensure access to the beels for fishers groups organized by five NGOs.
These fishers pay a government revenue for the fishing rights in the beels, and are represented on the
local management committees. These organized fishers have stocked closed beels. Representation of
different user-villages and stakeholders was an issue. Professional fishers, subsistence fishers, fish traders
and processors, investors in fish aggregating devices, floodplain farmers, and local government are all
stakeholders. They were represented in the committees or advised them in more open systems, which
have set aside sanctuaries and observed closed seasons when fish breed.
Strong competition for these resources, and the benefits (income and resource rent) that flow from
them, resulted in conflicts. The CBFM was expected to improve cooperation, but conflicts continued
in rivers because in 1995 the government ended leasing, thus allowing open access. Consequently,
fishers had no rights to resist encroachment by powerful people to make brush shelters. In the beels,
elections for leadership of management committees divided the fishers, but resulted in the benefits
of accountability and transparency. Higher fish catches were found in the open and closed beels where
the fishers and wider community complied with local rules limiting fishing seasons, areas, and types
of fishing. Because they hold property rights through payments of government revenue, fishers were
able to enforce rules and could call on government backing when needed. Successful management
of a floodplain beel with no formal fishing rights rested on involvement of local councils and a
homogenous subsistence fishing community.
To assess possible project impacts, baseline and impact surveys of the same samples of households
were undertaken. In each water body, separate random samples were taken of 60 fishing households
organized by the partner NGO and of 60 other households from the same villages that catch fish (mainly
for food). The surveys were designed to assess impacts in each water body and to distinguish between
households fishing for food and income. The non-NGO households form a "control" sample for
comparison with the direct participants of the NGO programs, but they too were expected to benefit
as they belong to the same communities and fish for subsistence. The CBFM was intended to recognize
the interests of all stakeholders in each fishery. The baseline survey was carried out in mid-late 1996.
In late 1997, a second round of surveys of the same households was undertaken along with baseline
surveys in four water bodies where BRAC had started activities. In late 1998, a third round of impact
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monitoring was undertaken covering the same households.
Conclusions: Lessons learnt and future plans
When asked what balance between fishers and the government is appropriate for co-management,
both NGO-organized fishers and others from the same villages favored a balance with a greater role
for fishers than the government, but still with substantial government involvement. The only exception
to this is in largely seasonal open beels, comprising private land where the communities feel government
involvement is not required. Also some non-participants who are excluded from closed beels thought
that management should be vested with the government, possibly in reaction to their loss of influence
and access.
Based on surveys of fishing households, both those organized by NGOs and others, and on the initial
experience of local management committees, some lessons can be drawn:
1. Establishing CBFM takes time where the fishers lack earlier fishery organizations or institutions.
Major benefits should not be expected within three years.
2. Community management has developed faster where there is a well-defined community and water
body and where there were few conflicts or factions within the community.
3. A clear intervention, which may be a visible conservation measure such as a sanctuary or an
improved-production technology, is a focus for fishers to work together in the expectation of
tangible benefits.
4. Progress was better where the partner organizations had local staff dedicated to the project and
with sufficient autonomy to develop local initiatives.
5. NGOs focused on poor people who fish for their livelihood. Compared with the government, the
NGOs have considerable advantages in working with fishers. But in open beels and rivers, an NGO
cannot expect its participants to have exclusive rights. They need to be flexible and willing to assist
communities to develop their own organizations and institutions for fishery management, and
recognize that the community includes stakeholders other than their group members; otherwise,
negotiation with those stakeholders is not possible.
6. NGO training and credit for participants to take up productive enterprises has helped, even if
incomes are not substantially higher. They give poor fishers an option to reduce their ties to
middlemen and moneylenders. They also help fishers to have extra sources of income. This has
encouraged some to comply with local fishing restrictions (seasonal bans or sanctuaries).
7.  Ad hoc government policies and lack of coordination, and a reluctance to support local communities
establishing rights over open water fisheries constitute serious limitations. Some parts of the
government machinery did not appear to recognize that the government had agreed to establish
genuine local co-management arrangements with fishing communities, for which the communities
needed support and rights.
8. The fishers often lack incentives for and past experience of working together. Some form of revenue
payment is needed for a specific spatially-defined fishery if property rights are to exist in fisheries
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experience strongly indicates that community management is unlikely to take off unless communities
have rights over defined fisheries. Arrangements developed by the CBFM Project in closed and
open beels appear generally successful. However, changes are needed in the rivers. Common
property rights and CBFM could be enabled in rivers while maintaining the policy of minimizing
taxes on fishers in rivers.
Already, a number of projects in Bangladesh are adopting a community-based approach, and the CBFM
Project is one reason for this trend. However, "community-based management" should not be seen
as a panacea. Approaches adopted so far have not worked in all locations. Also, it is all too easy to
involve NGOs on a short-term basis to help fishing communities, without making a commitment to
devolve fishing rights and responsibilities to local communities. The evidence is sufficient to warrant
expanded piloting of different institutional arrangements for fisher-led management and co-management.
The government should enable these arrangements on a flexible, but clear basis. Assessment of the
results will then be used to advocate appropriate policy changes and strategies for fisheries in general.
5.5.3 Community participation and attitudes towards co-management in Cambodia: A
case study in Stung Hao and Prey Nup Districts of Sihanoukville. 10
The coastal area of Cambodia is being increasingly managed under a co-management system as the
government has reformed the fisheries policy in the country. Since 2000, there have been several
coastal fishing communities organizations established that give rights to local users to participate in
resource management. There is a need to study the effects of communitiy participation and attitudes
towards co-management in the coastal area of Cambodia. The objective of this study was to evaluate
the views of the local stakeholders towards co-management. The study was undertaken in three areas
using three types of fisheries management in the coastal zone near Sihanoukville. The first type of
fisheries management is co-management or fisheries community with a support project, namely the
Ream Fishing Community. The second type is co-management without a support project, namely Prey
Nup 1 Community Fisheries. It was organized with the help of the provincial fisheries staff. Both of
these cases are located in Prey Nup district. The third type is in the area of Stung Hao district where
there is no co-management or community fisheries established yet.
The data collected for this study was based on a field survey that was carried out in the three study
areas by using a standardized questionnaire for 150 households. A focus group discussion was also
undertaken in order to obtain general information from the stakeholders.
Results
Marine fisheries are important to the livelihood of coastal people in Cambodia. The past management
systems of fisheries focused on commercial fishing and favored this type of fishing in coastal areas,
resulting in negative impacts on fisheries-dependent households. These impacts include:
• Strict control over poaching and movement of local fishers who live in and around coastal
fishing grounds
• High fees to the government causing indebtedness
• Illegal fishing and over-fishing in the coastal areas
• Tension and conflicts between small-scale and small commercial fishers
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• No right or power given to the local people to take care of the natural resources
The policy reform of fisheries, which was brought about by Prime Minister Hun Sen in 2000 to give
rights to the local people to manage their natural resources, was advocated by local fishers, representatives
of the Community Fisheries Development Office of the Department of Fisheries, Provincial Fisheries
Offices, local authorities, and the police/military. The dissemination of information about the reform
was done by the Sihanoukville fisheries office for the coastal areas. The reform focused on the fishing
community organizations, protection of fisheries resources by encouraging small-scale fishing rather
than commercial fishing, protection of mangrove forests, and stopping illegal fishing. However, the
dissemination process was short and targeted mainlyfishers.
The fisheries reform is not so well accepted by coastal people as freshwater people. During the
interviews, community members had no idea about fisheries co-management or fisheries reform. The
Ream fishing community cannot undertake fisheries co-management without support from external
donors, especially the costs of control and protection from illegal fishing. The Prey Nup 1 fishing
community organized by the Sihanoukville fisheries office has no funds to support similar activities.
In Stung Hao, most respondents want their fisheries to be operated as a small-scale group, which is
endorsed by representatives of the Provincial fisheries office and the Department of Fisheries. They
feel that the community fisheries cannot operate currently without external support.
The results of the study show that there are many constraints facing community fisheries in Cambodia.
These constraints include political, economic, socio-cultural, technical and institutional aspects. Each
aspect is linked with another. The most important and immediate need is a political will to decentralize
power and rights to lower administrators and local fishers to take responsibilities and participate in
the process of fisheries resource management through the process of co-management.
The analysis indicates that fishing communities are willing to participate in co-management, but the
local people are weak in terms of available resources, such as human capacity and financial resources;
and capabilities including technical knowledge, skills and organizational and management skills.
Moreover, the community fisheries are under threat from the slow process of adopting the sub-decree
on community fisheries, opportunistic fishers’ contempt on co-management, poor education of fishers,
and others. On the other hand, fishing communities are willing to learn and implement co-management.
Some government staff have advocated the reform and see co-management as an alternative to bring
about a sustainable livelihood for local populations and sustainable resource management.
Concepts of co-management are very new to the local people. Co-management in these areas has just
started. Currently, local fishers, local authorities and the police/military do not understand the process
of co-management. There are many barriers to establish and implement co-management in the coastal
areas without support.
Recommendations
In order to regulate the sustainable use of the natural resources, to protect the coastal habitats, to
decentralize the fisheries reform, and to pilot ideas for livelihoods, the activities should include:
• Training in the co-management concept to the local people, provincial fisheries staff, local
authority and institutions concerned.148
• Providing fund and technology to organize and develop fishing community and extend
public awareness to all natural resources users along the coast.
• Limiting the overuse of natural resources by promoting supplemental incomes such as
improving aquaculture.
• Conducting catch monitoring programs on marine production (for Sung Hao district), and
a catch and mangrove monitoring program (for Prey Nup district).
1/ Several criteria were imposed, among others are: participation intensity shared by the stakeholders, outcomes achieved in the
community from the programs launched by the government or NGO/ universities or other agencies in the two sites; degree in attention
given by the community for having cooperation and collaboration with other people or organization; management strategy performed
by the community, such as in solving conflicts, formulating a plan, etc.; numbers of informal and formal organizations exist at the two
sites.
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